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ABSTRACT 
 
 
BACKGROUND: Over 30% of the %ULWLVK $UP\¶V ,QIDQWU\ Recruits who 
underwent training between 1999 and 2003 failed to complete their training. 
Previous studies have focused predominantly on identifying the cumulative 
reasons for failure.  There is a dearth of research investigating the effect of 
failure on the individual recruit and what influences their ability to pass 
training.   
AIM: The overall aims of this study were: to achieve an understanding of the 
role that antecedent personal, social and demographic factors play in a British 
$UP\UHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\WRFRPSOHWHEDVLFWUDLQLQJWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
identifying predictive factors that would identify infantry recruits who were at 
risk of being unable to cope with the transition to life in the British Army; and to 
explore the reasons given by those recruits who failed to complete basic 
training to develop a more comprehensive understanding of why recruits fail.  
METHODS: All new army recruits joining the first and second battalion 
between September 2002 and March 2003 were invited to take part in the 
study. A biographical questionnaire based on a modified version of the US 
$UP\¶V15 item biographical questionnaire form was self-completed prior to 
infantry training by all those agreeing to take part in the study. Study 
participants were monitored weekly throughout their training and the training 
outcome (pass/fail) was recorded. The data was randomly split into a 
development dataset (two thirds) and a test dataset (one third). Independent 
variables were grouped into five categories (Demographic & Physical 
Measurement, Education, Outdoor Education, Non-Physical Activity and 
Conduct and Behaviour) and tested univariably and multivariably to examine 
their association with training outcome in the development dataset using 
3 
logistic regression. The multivariable model was then used to construct a 
score and its sensitivity and specificity was tested using the test dataset. 
All those within the study who failed to complete Infantry recruit training were 
invited to take part in a qualitative semi-structured exit interview. These 
interviews were analysed using framework analysis methodology. Findings 
from both the quantitative and qualitative analysis were integrated to 
determine whether prediction of failure was practicable and to develop an 
increased understanding of the impact that antecedent factors and training 
experiences contributed to training failure.  
 RESULTS: Of the study cohort of 999 recruits 36.2% (n=362) failed.  Within 
the failure group 74.4% (n=269) gave reasons to suggest that this was 
attributable to difficulties in adapting to life in the British Army Infantry.  Factors 
associated with higher odds of failure were: absence of female siblings 
(p=0.005), aggressive coping strategies (p=0.013), use of ecstasy (p=0.02), 
evenings per week spent at the family home (p=0.032), truancy (p=0.039), an 
increased number of schools attended (p=0.046) and classroom behaviour 
(p=0.052).  The area under the curve on the test dataset was 0.58 (0.501-0.65 
95% CI).  
Analysis of the qualitative data suggested that there was a marked difference 
between the socio-personal identity of recruits who failed training and the 
organisational identity of the British Army Infantry.  Cognitive dissonance and 
varying extremes of stress were reported by those recruits that failed during 
the transition to military life.  
CONCLUSION: A screening tool constructed from items of the biographical 
questionnaire was unable to predict failure in training with sufficient accuracy 
to recommend its routine use for new recruits to British Army Infantry training. 
This study has identified that there is a lack of fit between military identity and 
the socio-personal identity of the infantry recruit which results in dissonance 
4 
and stress during the transition into the military.  It is recommended that future 
studies should focus on how to reduce the psychological impact of the 
transition into infantry training. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This study developed from ideas generated when I was working at the 
Defence Psychiatric Services Military Training and Rehabilitation Unit  (Neal et 
al., 2003).  A new project was instigated to develop an alternative method of 
care delivery to meet the specific requirements of service personnel with 
mental health problems.  Its primary aim was to promote full recovery and 
reduce the number of personnel being returned to their units with occupational 
restrictions1 following admission to the Defence Services Psychiatric Facility.  
 
This Military Training and Rehabilitation Unit project began in January of 2001 
and received patients for rehabilitation from the defence psychiatric services 
inpatient unit.  A database was kept on all service personnel who passed 
through the unit; this was primarily to assess the extent to which the unit was 
meeting its aim.  Through retrospective analysis of the data collected it 
emerged that although the unit took referrals from all three services (Royal 
Navy, Army and the Royal Air Force), 34% of all those admitted were army 
infantry soldiers.  A further investigation into all admissions into the Defence 
Services Psychiatric facility showed that 26% from all three services were 
infantry soldiers. The Armed Forces current strength is approximately 210,000 
with the infantry career employment group being approximately 28,600. 
Infantry personnel contribute to 14% of the UK armed forces population but 
accounted for over a quarter of all referrals from the total population to 
inpatient psychiatric care.  This relatively high proportion of mental health 
                                            
1
 All military personnel have a medical grading that determines their combat 
occupational status i.e. a soldier who is deemed fully fit can be sent to any combat 
zone in the world, a soldier who is not fully fit but still able to do some of their core 
duties might be sent to a combat zone but would have to remain in the main base.  
The occupational restrictions are a way for the Army to protect a soldier who might not 
be fully fit due to physical or psychological reasons. 
15 
referrals in one employment group of the armed forces raises questions as to 
why this single group is over represented.   
 
Psychiatric pathology within the armed forces is very different to that seen in 
the NHS.  Referrals comprise few,  LIDQ\LQFLGHQWVRIµVHULRXV¶PHQWDOLOOQHVV
(i.e. diagnoses of psychotic illness). Individuals are typically referred with 
relatively mild mental health problems related to social issues.  It is the low 
tolerance by military commanders of behaviour related to mental health 
problems in a safety critical environment which leads to referral to mental 
health services.   It is difficult to account for higher referral rates from the 
infantry but this has been linked to it having one of the lowest educational 
entry requirements in the UK Armed Forces. The British Army has over 100 
trades to which recruits may apply.  To assist educational streaming for fitness 
to undergo training, recruits sit a test called the British Army Recruit Battery 
(BARB) and are issued with a score called a General Trainability Index (GTI) 
(Hampson, 1997).  This score determines what job a recruit can do within the 
Army.  The lowest GTI score is 26 and this is for infantry soldiers2. It is very 
common in my day to day work as a military mental health practitioner to have 
recruits and trained soldiers UHIHUUHG WRPHDV µXQKDSS\VROGLHUV¶ 7KHPRVW
common reason for their unhappiness is finding themselves in a different trade 
to that which they applied for at the recruiting office.  This is usually the case 
with unhappy infantrymen who tend to report that they went to the Army 
                                            
2
  Infantrymen are soldiers who are specifically trained for the role of fighting on foot to engage 
the enemy face to face and have historically borne the brunt of the casualties of combat in wars. 
As the oldest branch of the Combat Arms they are the backbone of armies. Infantry units have 
more physically demanding training than other branches of armies, and place a greater 
emphasis on discipline, fitness, physical strength and aggression.  Wikipedia 2009. Infantry. In: 
Wikipedia (ed.). 
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careers office to join a certain trade within the Army, but ended up in the 
infantry with promises that they could transfer to another trade later in their 
career.  It is possible that at the time of recruitment they did not have the 
educational requirements or achieve a high enough GTI score to undergo the 
training of their choice.  In addition to this, the infantry constantly struggles to 
meet recruitment targets, and recruits are potentially being directed to the 
infantry whatever their preferences to ensure front line units are kept 
operational.  The impact of this at an individual level is that many who did not 
set out to be an infantryman find themselves undergoing some of the most 
arduous training in the world3.   
 
In addition to this it is also important to reflect on the nature of the 
LQIDQWU\PDQ¶s role.  A seminal publication used by the Joint Services Defence 
6WDII &ROOHJH WR VWXG\ ZDU LV µ2Q:DU¶ E\ &DUO 9RQ &ODXVHZLW] (Clausewitz, 
1832).  Although an historical document it is still deemed relevant today in 
defining the act of war (Herberg-Rothe, 2009, Jackman, 2008, Villacres and 
Bassford, 1995).  The definition of war itself can be simply viewed as an act of 
violence intended to compel an adversary to fulfil the will of of a nation state 
(Clausewitz, 1832) .  The instrument that delivers violence at the personal 
level is the infantryman.  ,W LVDUJXHGWKDWWKH µQDWXUHRIZDU¶ LVHQGXULQJDQG
never changes and will always consist of violence and death (Herberg-Rothe, 
2009, Jackman, 2008, Villacres and Bassford, 1995, Clausewitz, 1832).  The 
nature of war is in no way changed or modified with the progress of civilisation 
LW LV WKH µFKDUDFWHU RI ZDU¶ (Clausewitz, 1832) that changes and modernises 
with time. The progression from the long bow to the musket can be used as an 
                                            
3
 &RPEDW,QIDQWU\PDQ¶V&RXUVHInfantrymen complete a 26-week course designed to teach all 
the skills required to operate as an infanteer on operations anywhere in the world Mod 2009. 
Infantry Soldier. In: Mod (ed.) 
http://www.armyjobs.mod.uk/Jobs/Pages/JobDetail.aspx?armyjobid=INF101%2F501%2F601&c
ategory=. Ministry of Defence. 
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example; while they were both designed to kill (nature of war) the musket was 
more effective (character of war) and modernised the warfare of its day.  
However, even with the modernisation of the character of war the role of the 
modern infantryman can differ little from that of his medieval counterpart.  As 
recently as the  Iraq conflict the British Infantryman has had to result to using 
the bayonet to deliver death to his enemy with the individual infantryman 
experiencing the overwhelming assault on his senses that this inevitably 
brings (Holmes, 2007).  To be able to achieve this and control fear there has 
to be strong FRKHVLRQZLWKLQWKHJURXSDVLWFDQQRWDIIRUGWRKDYHµGLVVHQWHUV¶
µZHDN-OLQNV¶RUµQRQ-FRSHUV¶DWVXFh a time.  Within the military the importance 
of the group rather than the individual is paramount and this leaves little place 
for individualism. This makes it very complex for the military to meet the 
individualistic expectations of modern recruits.  
 
In order to better understand the psychological stress and strain that the 
infantryman is placed under, the Infantry Training Centre at Catterick Garrison 
was visited as it is the entry point for all infantrymen joining the British Army.  
This visit revealed that of the total infantry recruits (n=3700) for the training 
year 1999-2000, there was an attrition rate of 16% during the first 12 weeks of 
basic training alone, rising to over 30% by the end of the 26 week course 
(I.T.C, 2001). In effect, 593 recruits did not complete the first 12 weeks of 
training for the following reasons (routinely recorded in military records):   
175 (5%) Discharged as of right, that is they took their own discharge. 
257 (7%) Services no longer required, (equal to dismissal). 
68 (2%) Other & Absent without leave. 
93 (2%) were 'back squaded', i.e. made to repeat the initial training due to 
physical injury or failing to achieve the standard required.  This visit and the 
subsequent meetings with the Commanding Officer of the Infantry Training 
18 
Centre revealed that there was a significant problem with recruit wastage and 
failure in basic infantry training. 
 
Recruit selection to military service will never be an exact science, and 
inevitably there will always be those individuals that will have been incorrectly 
selected for service.  However, poor selection methods that lead to the 
enlistment of unsuitable recruits has both a financial impact and a human toll 
(Borman et al., 2004b). Within key British Army career employment groups 
such as the Infantry, Royal Artillery, Royal Armoured Corps and the Royal 
Engineers, attrition within the first 12 weeks of training remains consistently 
above 30% a year (A.R.T.D., 2010).  Within that percentage of failure nearly 
three quarters is attributed to psychological, personnel and disciplinary 
reasons rather than  physical factors. Army Recruitment and Training Division 
(2010) financial assumptions calculate that individual uniform issue at the 
beginning of training costs £1299 and each recruit incurs a costs of 
approximately £64.74 per day (this includes pay, field rations, cost of 
ammunition and travel expenses, but does not include food and 
accommodation).  To calculate an approximate cost of wastage the following 
formula was used: cost of wastage = number of failed recruits x 1299 (uniform 
issue) + ((64.74 x number of days completed) x number of recruits. If applied 
to the current figures for wastage within the county regiments of the infantry 
career employment group (n=936), a conservative cost of wastage (this 
assumes all left at 28 days4 (cost of wastage = 1299 x 936 + ((64.74 x 28) x 
936)) would be £2,912569 (A.R.T.D., 2010). Such a consistent level of recruit 
wastage indicates that recruit selection criteria should be examined with a 
view to exploring alternative methods of ascertaining recruit suitability.   
                                            
4
 Once recruits have enlisted they have to complete a minimum of 28 days before they 
are allowed to self discharge. The majority of self discharge will occur in this period, 
however others may leave later in training 
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These figures identify three significant problems with the current selection 
methods used by the British Army: 1. The financial cost of wastage is 
indefensible in the current financial climate where all public departments 
including the Ministry of Defence having to make significant cuts to their 
annual budgets.  2. The British Army is currently engaged in a sustained 
conflict in Afghanistan and is reliant on manpower replenishment in its infantry 
units.  This significant wastage during recruit training has the potential to leave 
frontline units undermanned. 3. There is no clear understanding of the impact 
or human toll that this amount of wastage is having on the individual recruit 
that fails.  Army Recruitment and Training Division figures show that average 
training wastage across the British Army (excluding infantry formations) Is 
14.2% (A.R.T.D., 2010) indicating that the Infantry is experiencing a 
disproportionate amount of training wastage, of which nearly three quarters is 
attributed to psychological, personnel and disciplinary reasons.   
 
A key aspect of the military mental health nurses role is to identify social 
situations within the military environment that cause disproportionate amounts 
of manpower loss to the Army due to psychological difficulties.  Due to 
discharge methods and the trainees status as recruits, this excessive loss of 
manpower had not been identified as a significant occupational mental health 
problem.   What was of most interest initially was just how little was known 
about the reasons for the methods RIGLVFKDUJHVXFKDVµGLVFKDUJHDVRIULJKW¶
µVHUYLFHQRORQJHUUHTXLUHG¶DQGWKRVHWKDWJRDEVHQWZLWKRXW leave. The three 
reasons for discharge each raise particular points of interest. 
 
Firstly, individuals who choose to leave employment in the army, which 
requires an enormous amount of commitment and effort to join are arguably  
experiencing significant discomfort in their new role.  It is of interest to explore 
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what is causing their difficulties, how the role differs from expectations, and 
what psychological and social factors are associated with the group of recruits 
who take their own discharge. 
 
 Secondly, for those recruits lost through Service No Longer Required (SNLR), 
Absent Without Leave and others, it is an understanding of why the recruit 
fails to adapt to the army's expectations that is of interest. SNLR was the 
highest cause of infantry recruit attrition at the Infantry Training Centre during 
the 12 week period examined and presently there is very little information 
available to explain what it was that was causing the recruits to be dismissed.  
 
Thirdly, if  the precise nature of difficulties can be identified then it is possible 
WKDW LQWHUYHQWLRQV WR HQKDQFH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRSLQJ VWUDWHJLHV PD\ HQDEOH
more recruits to succeed in basic training. If prediction of this vulnerable group 
of recruits were possible then strategies, including mental health interventions, 
could be targeted to attempt to reduce the attrition.  
 
It is clear from both the Infantry Training Centre data as well as more recent 
data from the Army Recruitment and Training Division that wastage within the 
Infantry Training Centre remains unacceptably high and worryingly consistent 
year on year.  As this thesis will show, recent studies have focused on the 
recruit as the protagonist in failure and that there has been very little reflection 
on the organisation¶s role in the recruit failure process.  In contrast, this study 
assumes that infantry recruit failure is potentially more complex than individual 
inadequacy and approaches the problem from a holistic perspective, 
examining the role that both the recruit and the organisation play in the failure 
pathway.   
21 
The study aims to identify and explore the factors associated with recruit 
failure in the infantry in order to consider ways in which the consistently high, 
and extremely costly levels of failure might be redressed.   It begins by 
identifying biographical factors associated with failure and then through the 
use of semi-structured interviews and OHDYHU¶V reports develops a greater 
understanding of the process of failure from both the recruits and the training 
VWDII¶V perspective.  To achieve this a mixed method approach is adopted 
using a biographical questionnaire (with a cohort of 1000 consecutive recruits) 
followed by semi-structured interviews with those who failed in infantry training 
and analysis of Commanding Officer¶s discharge reports.  
 
Organisational identity theory will be used as a theoretical framework to 
examine the current difficulties that the Army is experiencing with infantry 
recruit attrition. Initially this thesis will examine Organisational Identity Theory 
and its origins in Social Identity Theory and then critically examine its 
relevance as a framework for understanding organisational difficulties within a 
military population The literature review concludes with a critique of recent 
studies undertaken to predict and understand recruit attrition in a military 
population. 
 
The methodology is split into four sections; initially it will outline the study 
design, including methodological considerations and then describes the study 
setting in detail.  The study is split into three phase, each of which will be 
described in turn.  Finally it will discuss the ethical issues faced whilst 
conducting research on a military population. 
The result section is split into two chapters, initially the findings of the 
biographical questionnaire are reported and secondly the findings of the exit 
interviews and training reports.  Finally these results are synthesised in the 
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discussion chapter which looks at the gap between societal identity and 
military organisational identity and the effect of the training institution on the 
infantry recruit.  In summary the thesis will discuss what future research 
should be undertaken and what changes could be made to reduce recruit 
attrition.     
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CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL, ORGANISATIONAL AND MILITARY IDENTITY  
 
1.1: Social identity 
1.1.1: Categorisation 
 
Rosch (1978) argues that people categorise themselves at a number of 
different levels of abstraction and Hogg and McGarty (1990) identify the three 
most important levels as: The superordinate level of humanity (defining ones 
human identity), the intermediate level of in-group-out-group, (defining ones 
social identity) and the subordinate level of self (defining ones personal 
identity). This study focused on the relationship between the military 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDQGWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSUHYLRXVFLYLOLDQLGHQWLW\DQGWKHLPSDFWLt had 
on training success. Therefore this thesis is primarily concerned with the 
intermediate level, social identity, and the factors which influence a specific 
component of it, military organisational identity. 
 
Turner (1984) argues that social Identity arises out of a process of 
categorisation which cognitively segments the social environment so that the 
individual can define himself and others, and understand the relationship 
between the two. Social identity is therefore relational and comparative in the 
sense that the individual defines themselves in relation to individuals in other 
categories or groups (Tajfel and Turner (1985).   
 
Abrams and Hogg (1990) and Jenkins (1996) argue that this process of 
categorisation involves reference to being a member of, or belonging to 
certain social groups. The groups range from broad entities (nationality) 
WKURXJKRUJDQLVDWLRQV WKHPLOLWDU\ WRPRUHH[FOXVLYHJURXSV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
family). Further categorisation in terms of idiosyncratic or personal attributes 
such as bodily attributes, abilities, psychological traits and interests, then 
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yields a personal identity (Bong and Clark, 1999).  Figure 1 summarises some 
of the key categories that could FRQWULEXWHWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VLGHQWLW\ZKLOVWDOVR
bringing out the relationship between personal and social identity. 
 
 
Figure 1: Influences on individual social identity 
 
 
1.1.2: Partial identification and temporal variation 
 
Some authors have argued (Adler and Adler, 1987, Schneider et al., 1971) 
that the extent to which a given individual is a member of a group, or identifies 
with a group, is a matter of degree (Adler and Adler, 1987). An example of this 
is given by Ashforth and Mael (1989) who refer to a study undertaken by 
Jackall (1978) on bank workers.  Jackall (1978) observed that bank workers in 
menial jobs often distanced themselves from the bank-organisational 
component of their social identity in that although they were clearly members 
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they saved money to start their own business. This finding indicates that 
individuals who are unhappy with their imposed identity (bank worker) will 
psychologically distance themselves from it and reject it as a category within 
their social identity. 
 
Furthermore, not only is membership of a category at any given point in time 
influenced by a range of factors, but Jenkins (1996) has pointed out that social 
categorisation, and therefore social identity formation, is constantly evolving 
through time. Individuals can join or leave individual groups and sub-
categories within a group of which they consistently remain a member.  
Membership can change depending, for example, on economic or personal 
circumstances, for example social mobility from working class to middle class 
through education and good employment (Jenkins, 1996).  
 
The findings that social identity is the result of (1) the application of multiple 
categories, (2) influenced by multiple factors and, (3) subject to change over 
time (e.g. when an individual joins a new organisation), raises the possibility of 
conflict and inconsistency within the individual. This can be understood as a 
FRQIOLFWEHWZHHQWKHFRPSRQHQWVRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOLGHQWLW\EXWAshforth 
and Mael (1989) prefer the view that an individual can have several 
simultaneous identities and that the identities themselves can conflict. 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) go on to suggest that the resolution of these 
conflicts and inconsistencies (as might arise when an individual joins a new 
organisation such as the military) is achieved by individuals structuring their 
identities hierarchically in terms of importance. 
 
  
26 
1.2: Organisational identity  
1.2.1: The nature of organisations 
 
Organisations are social entities with distinctive and enduring characteristics 
(Albert et al. (1985). Membership of particular organisations, modulated by the 
H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V µFRJQLWLYH VWUXFWXUHV¶ (Mael and Ashforth, 
1995) are embraceGFRQVWLWXWHVDVSHFLILFSDUWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOLGHQWLW\
known as their organisational identity.  
 
In order to understand the development and maintenance of social identity 
0DHO DQG 7HWULFN¶V (1992) theoretical paper identifies that organisational 
identity theory has elements of its theoretical fouQGDWLRQVLQ³LGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK
D SV\FKRORJLFDO JURXS WKHRU\´  )RRWH (1951) states that psychological 
identification is the individuals¶ perception of their cognitive oneness with the 
group, not their behaviour as a result of those cognitions.  Whereas 
organisational identification is the process by which the goals of the 
organisation and those of the individual become increasingly integrated (Hall 
et al., 1970), psychological identification is the emotional attachment with the 
organisation (the emotion the individual experiences as part of belonging to 
the organisation). 
 
1.2.2: Organisational attractiveness 
 
For organisations to survive they must attract new members and therefore it is 
important to understand what makes organisational membership attractive and 
what binds the individual psychologically to it. Oakes and Turner (1986) 
suggest that distinctiveness and prestige are two factors which increase the 
likelihood of an individual to identify with an organisation.  Distinctiveness of 
DQRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VYDOXHVDQGSUDFWLFHVLQUHODWLRQWRFRPSDUDEOHRUJDQLVDWLRQV
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differentiates the organisation from others and provides a unique identity.  The 
distinctiveness however does not have to be a positive one to forge a strong 
identity. Ashforth and Mael (1989) use racism as an example. By giving the 
persecuted group the psychological ability not to bend to others beliefs that 
being black is negative, but rather that being black sets them aside from the 
rest, it is possible through that distinctiveness to develop a positive identity of 
themselves and the group.  It is about WKHJURXS¶s ability to be at ease and feel 
good about their identity in the face of those who view their group as negative.  
Ashforth and Mael (1989) believe that the stronger the threat or persecution of 
the group, the greater the defensiveness becomes.  They believe that such 
PDFKLQDWLRQV SDUWO\ H[SODLQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V ILHUFH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK
countercultures or disaffected groups. 
 
6HFRQGO\ WKH µSUHVWLJH RI WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶ LV DOVR D IDFWRU LQ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ
(Chatman et al., 1986, March and Simon, 1958).  Ashforth and Mael (1989) 
argue that perceived organisational prestige is related to organisational 
identification and Mael and Tetrick (1992) suggest that individuals often 
cognitively identify themselves with a winner or successful person which in 
turn RIWHQ DFFRXQWV IRU WKH µEDQG ZDJRQ HIIHFW¶ RIWHQ ZLWQHVVHG LQ
organisations.  This is where popular support for an individual or idea 
suddenly gains momentum and escalates, thus creating distinctiveness in line 
with prestige within the group.  Schelling (1957) observed that the desire for 
positive identification effectively creates champions within an organisation.  
Therefore successful individuals within an organisation benefit the whole 
organisation by making the identity of the group more attractive due to 
prestige, a phenomenon often seen with successful sports teams.   
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Distinctiveness and prestige is not just restricted to the organisational level. 
Within an organisation there will also be sub-groups with their own perceived 
distinctive and prestigious identities.  Using football as an example, a 
IRRWEDOOHU RQ EHLQJ DVNHG ZKDW KH GLG IRU D OLYLQJ ZRXOG UHSO\ µIRRWEDOOHU¶
assuming the collective identity of the profession and the prestige which that 
holds.  However, every footballer belongs to a team (sub-group) that sits 
within the global identity of professional football, and each team will have its 
own organisational identity that sets it apart from other teams within 
professional football.  Ashforth and Mael (1989) suggest that inter-group 
conflict between these sub-groups occur due to the fact that groups exist 
within an organisation.  This inter-group conflict can be extremely important 
when the organisation wants to influence performance and the internalisation 
of goals, values and commitment.  
 
1.2.3: Identification and internalisation 
 
Individuals who are attracted to an organisation will seek to learn more about 
its goals and values; organisational attractiveness is the initial process in an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V identification with an organisation. Dutton et al (1994) developed 
an untested model to attempt to explain how prestige,  distinctiveness and 
imagery can affect an individual¶s strength of identification with an organisation 
and the internalisation of its beliefs and values. The model led to thirteen 
propositions of the way in which organisational identification affected its 
PHPEHU¶V patterns of social interaction. The authors focused on two 
organisational images, one based on what a member of the organisation 
believes is distinctive, central and enduring about their organisation and the 
PHPEHU¶V EHOLHIV DERXW ZKDW RXWVLGHUV WKLQN DERXW WKHLU RUJDQLVDWLRQ  7KH\
conclude that when an individual identifies strongly with an organisation, the 
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attributes that they use to define the organisation are also used to define 
themselves. 
  
Dutton et al (1994) developed these conclusions from a series of interviews 
with New York Port Authority Employees and 3M sales personnel.  3M 
personnel described how they felt proud to belong to an organisation that is 
seen by outsiders as having socially valued characteristics.  In contrast 
employees from the New York Port Authority described the opposite feelings 
and emotions.  The New York Port Authority, in response to homeless people 
congregating and sleeping on New York Port Authority property, instigated a 
µFOHDQ XS¶ program designed to remove all homeless people from the New 
York Port Authority area.  The organisation came under media criticism for this 
and was depicted as ineffective and inhumane.  This unfavourable image 
affected employees, leaving them feeling demeaned and hurt by the criticism.  
As a result of the unfavourable press there was an increase in staff absence 
due to strain and stress.  Dutton et al (1994) concluded that those New York 
Port Authority personnel that had identified with the organisation and 
internalised the organisation¶s values and beliefs were affected emotionally by 
the negative press as they believed it to be a criticism of themselves. This 
personalisation of the organisational image was also identified by Porter et al 
(1974) and Mowday et al (1982) in similar studies. Tajfel and Turner (1985) 
and Ashforth and Mael (1989) propose that identification with the organisation 
is at its strongest when these psychological attachments are formed and the 
members categorise themselves into a social group that is the organisation.  
 
The amount that the individual internalises the organisation¶s identity remains 
RSHQ WR GHEDWH 'XWWRQ HW DO¶V (1994) model assumed that the greater the 
attractiveness of the organisation¶s identity the stronger the individual would 
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identify with it and internalise its goals and values. However, this assumption 
is not fully supported by 7]QDQG&D÷ODU¶V (2009) study of 545 public and 
private bank workers in Turkey.  They used three scales in their methodology, 
a six item organisational identification scale (Mael and Ashforth, 1992), an 
adapted 23 item attractiveness of perceived organisational identity 
questionnaire (Dukerich et al., 2002) and an 12 item organisational trust scale 
(Cummings and Bromiley, 1996).  Their results showed that attractiveness of 
perceived organisational identity had no influence on organisational 
identification; however attractiveness of organisational identification was 
positively influenced by the level of trust that the individual had with the 
organisation and organisational trust clearly acted as a mediator between 
attractiveness of organisational identification and organisation identification.  
This would suggest that Dutton HW DO¶V (1994) model requires adaptation, as 
being attracted to an organisation does not necessarily mean that the 
individual will embrace the organisational identity, there must be an element of 
trust before organisational identification occurs.  This supports Puusa and 
7ROYDQHQ¶V (2006) theoretical paper which suggests that trust is the link 
between member identification and strong organisational identity and that the 
key to greater organisational commitment is trust.  Therefore, it can be 
assumed that before psychological attachments can be formed with an 
organisation the individual must find the organisation¶s identity attractive and 
trust the organisation. 
 
1.2.4: Belonging and commitment 
 
It has been suggested joining a new organisation involves a series of 
conscious and unconscious decision making. To add categories to an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOLGHQWLW\DQLQGLYLGXDOLQLWLDOO\VHHNVDQRUJDQLVDWLRQWKDWWKH\
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find attractive. Once settled on an organisation they begin to explore its goals 
and values which is the initial process of identification. The organisational 
identity begins to be incorporated into the individual¶s social identity, where the 
individual will categorise the importance of the organisation within their own 
social identity hierarchy. The level of commitment to the new organisational 
identity is determined by the level of internalisation of the organisation¶s goals 
and values, as this ultimately determines the position of the organisation within 
the individual¶s social identity hierarchy. What is not clear is what initially 
drives the individual to seek membership of new organisations in the first 
instance. 
 
Social identity theory is based on the concept of in-group behaviour (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979) and the processes that an individual uses to categorise 
themselves and others within society.  The fact that individuals do categorise 
themselves suggests that humans have a desire to belong to social groups 
and that social inclusion is paramount within society.  Social inclusion is 
associated with employment, prosperity and status and the consequences of 
social exclusion are enormous (Repper and Perkins, 2003). Reberio and Allen 
(1998) examine the use of voluntarism as a therapeutic intervention for 
sufferers of Schizophrenia to enable them to reintegrate into society.  They 
conducted a single case design study to explore and describe the personal 
experiences of an individual with schizophrenia who resides in the community;  
it looked at how the individual used voluntarism to construct an acceptable 
social identity so that he would be accepted within society.  This study 
identified the need of an individual to belong to a social group and to fit into 
society.   
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To achieve social acceptance and belonging an individual has to conform to 
the expectations of the society or organisation and abide by their norms5 and 
values6.  Hart's (1961) concept of law argues the importance of norms and 
values within society.  He views the behaviours or etiquette associated with 
functioning in a society or culture as the primary rules of obligation.  These are 
modes of behaviour that are controlled by the society through social pressure.  
A society without law would evolve its primary rules of obligation and look to 
induce conformity through the use of social pressure.  Within a society that 
lives by its primary rules of obligation there is no written law and, as with 
etiquette, there is no procedure for settling doubt and there is no control on the 
free use of violence, theft and deception.  Therefore Hart (1961) identifies that 
the primary rules of obligation need supplementing with secondary rules, 
which are permanent law.   
 
To belong within society and fit in the individual must abide by permanent law 
and respect the primary rules of obligation.  If they do not they will no longer 
belong in society, e.g. those that break the law are removed from society and 
held in a prison.  Therefore it must be a pre-requisite that to belong in society 
you must believe to some extent in the goodness of the norms and values of 
that society, and internalise part or all of them as your own.  Social and 
organisational identity theory would dictate that the more an individual 
identifies with norms and values, the greater the internalisation of those 
societies¶ or organisations¶ beliefs into their own.  This internalisation will lead 
to a greater sense of belonging and commitment to the society, demonstrated 
                                            
5
 &XOWXUHFRQWDLQVDQXPEHURIUXOHVWKHVHDUHWKHµQRUPV¶WKDWXQGHUSLQFXOWXUH
Haralambos anG+ROERUQRXWOLQHWKHVHµQRUPV¶DVDJXLGHWRDFWLRQVZKLFKGHILQH
acceptable and appropriate behaviour in particular situations  
6
 9DOXHVDUHWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIVRIZKDWLVLPSRUWDQWRUZRUWKZKLOHDQGZKDWLV
good and desirable. Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. 1991. Sociology Themes and 
Perspectives, London, Collins Educational. 
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by acceptable inclusive behaviour and abiding by the norms and values of that 
society. 
 
Internalisation of goals and values may generate a stronger committed bond 
between an organisation and an individual; however there are strong 
arguments to suggest that commitment and identification are mutually 
exclusive. Early  work on oUJDQLVDWLRQDOFRPPLWPHQWVXFKDV0RZGD\HWDO¶V
(1979) Organisational Commitment Questionnaire found that identification and 
commitment were one and the same thing, while Wiener (1982) and Riechers 
(1985) characterise commitment as a belief in, and acceptance of the 
organisations goals and values, which again asserts that commitment is 
synonymous with identification.   
 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) identify that Riechers¶ (1985) theory of 
organisational commitment includes internalisation, behavioural intention and 
affect but not identification.  Ashforth and Mael (1989) argue that although 
identification is organisation specific, internalisation and commitment are not.  
They believe that commitment questionnaires such as the Occupational 
Commitment Questionnaire generalise goals and values rather than specify 
which values are specific to the organisation.  Therefore an individual would 
score a high commitment score if membership of that organisation suited their 
own career goals.  Wiener (1982) further supports this theory by defining 
FRPPLWPHQWDVµWKHWRWDOLW\RILQWHUQDOLVHGQRUPDWLYHSUHVVXUHVWRDFWLQDZD\
ZKLFKPHHWVRUJDQLVDWLRQDOJRDOVDQGLQWHUHVWV¶+HVXJJHVWVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOV
exhibit behaviours solely because they believe that it is the right and moral 
thing to do. If an individual truly identified with an organisation, they would 
experience some level of emotional loss on leaving (Levinson, 1970).   
Ashforth and Mael (1989) therefore argue that to understand the true impact 
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that organisational identity has on organisational commitment, the confusion 
between identification with the organisation and commitment to it must be 
resolved.  Organisational commitment can only be achieved when the 
individual begins to internalise the values and beliefs of the organisation into 
their own.  This argument is not dissimilar to the theoretical debate between 
identification and internalisation. In relation to organisational commitment, 
internalisation can be viewed as the bridge that the individual uses to move 
from identification with the organisation to greater commitment to the 
organisation, the key being the formation of a psychological attachment.  If 
they left the organisation the individual would experience an emotional loss. 
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1.3: Military identity 
1.3.1: The military organisation 
 
Although the military organisation has distinct characteristics it is not dissimilar 
IURPDQ\RWKHURUJDQLVDWLRQZLWKLQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOLGHQWLW\,WFRQVLVWVRI
a cognitive structure (Mael and Ashforth, 1995) which the individual negotiates 
to form constituent parts of their social identity.  However, the unique 
characteristics found in the military organisation can make membership 
increasingly difficult.  Goffman (1961), in his essays on asylums, identifies the 
military as a total institution within his list of five groupings of total institutions 
in society.  He explains the pre-requisites of defining a total institution by 
focusing on key aspects of daily living.  Individuals within society will usually 
sleep, play and work in different places, with different co-participants, under 
different authorities and without an overall rational plan (Goffman, 1961).  He 
describes the central feature of the total institution lying in  the breakdown of 
the barriers that separate these three spheres of life.  This is demonstrated in 
Figure 2 which examines each aspect of a military recruit¶s basic training 
experience LQ UHODWLRQ WR *RIIPDQ¶V PRGHO RI WKH WRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQ (Goffman, 
1961).  It can be seen that the model of the total institution offers a fitting 
framework for examining the military organisation, especially the recruit 
experience.  However, the theory is not without its critics and the use of the 
total institution model as a theoretical framework is applied with caution.   
  
Key FULWLFLVPV RI *RIIPDQ¶V HVVD\ RQ WRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQV refer to his 
methodology:  Goffman studied one psychiatric hospital in depth and then 
generalised from this single (and quite specific) case study to various non-
psychiatric institutions.  Various commentators question the validity of claims 
that similar processes necessarily occur in other psychiatric institutions, so the 
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parallels drawn with non-psychiatric institutions are even more nebulous.  
(Scott, 2010, Perry, 1974, Weinstein, 1994, Levinson and Gallagher, 1964).   
 
More specifically, Perry (1974) argues that  *RIIPDQ¶V GHVLJQDWLRQ RI
particular organisations as total is to absolute and does not reflect the varying 
degrees of totality within an institutions. 
Figure 2: Comparison of Goffmans five principles of a total institution 
and military basic training 
 
Other authors join Perry (1974) in asserting that the extent to which an 
institution is µtotal¶ is a matter of degree and what Goffman portrays is the 
extreme of the total institution (Scott, 2010, Perry, 1974, Weinstein, 1994).  Of 
key interest to this study is the effect that the degree to which an institution 
PLJKWEHYLHZHGDV µWRWDO¶has on the individual.  Weinstein (1994) examines 
*RIIPDQ¶V WKHRU\ RI DV\OXPV IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH VRFLDO VLWXDWLRQ RI
PHQWDOSDWLHQWVDQGFRQFOXGHVWKDW*RIIPDQ¶VSRUWUD\DORI WKHWRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQ
and the extent of self-mortification7 that it has on the inpatient are exaggerated 
and overdrawn.  Similarly, Scott (2010) argues that this pessimistic view of the 
                                            
7
 Self-mortification is defined as a loss of self concept and self esteem when an 
individual is admitted to a total institution Homer, J. 1981. Total Institutions and the 
Self-Mortifying Process. Canadian Journal of Criminology, 23, 331-342. 
ARMY INFANTRY 
TRAINING
Life is conducted in 
the same place under 
one single authority
Duration of training is 
conducted at ITC 
under the command 
of one individual
Each phase of that 
daily life is carried out 
in the immediate 
company of large 
batches of other 
individuals
Throughout training 
individuals will will 
live, eat sleep and 
train with the same 
group of individuals
All phases of daily 
activities are tightly 
scheduled, with one 
leading into another 
at pre-arranged times
Daily timings are 
rigidly controlled with 
harsh punishments for 
lateness and 
absenteeism
This is all imposed by 
a system of explicit 
formal rulings and a 
body of officials.
On enlistment all 
recruits come under 
military law with its 
own judical system 
and punishments for 
any infringement
All activities are 
designed to fulfil the 
official aims of the 
institution
ITC has one aim and 
that is to produce 
infantry soldiers
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totality of the psychiatric institution is a result of Goffmans flawed 
methodology, that is he only viewed the institution from the inmates 
perspective and did not reflect on the necessity for them to be there or the 
perspective of the staff who have to maintain order within a challenging 
FRPPXQLW\ :KDW LVPRVWSURPLQHQWDERXW*RIIPDQ¶VFUitics is that much of 
the criticism is based on his total institution models poor fit to the psychiatric 
hospital setting. What is generally accepted is that the characteristics of his 
total institution would undoubtedly have an undesirable effect on those in the 
µinmate¶ role.  Therefore if Goffman¶s model of the total institution is viewed as 
a theoretical framework it is useful in assessing the extent to which an 
institution is total and can be used by organisations such as the military to 
reflect on the impact that their organisation might be having on its personnel.   
 
Implicit in much of the literature on total institutions has been the belief that 
µinmates¶8 improve as a result of being in the particular institution, with 
improvement being measured in terms of the extent to which they  conform to 
certain standards of behaviour defined by the institution (Karmel, 1969). 
Goffman (1961) describes the impact of total institutions have on individuals 
as a  process of mortification and Karmel (1969) DUJXHVWKDW*RIIPDQ¶VZRUN
implies that self-mortification occurs regardless of how therapeutic or non-
therapeutic the organisation is.  Scott (2010) FKDOOHQJHV*RIIPDQ¶VDUJXPHQW
that the µinmate¶ is a passive observer with no autonomy to determine their 
own fate, and Homer (1981) argues that Goffman¶s assertion that the 
induction processes are a conscious act to debase, depredate and humiliate 
the µinmate¶ are again pessimistic, condemnatory and one sided.   
 
                                            
8
 7KHWHUPLQPDWHLVXVHGFROOHFWLYHO\E\PDQ\DXWKRUVUHIHUULQJWR*RIIPDQ¶VZRUN
and the term defines those individuals that reside within an institution.  
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There is a consensus of agreement amongst most authors that new µinmateV¶ 
experience what Goffman describes as a µVKRFNSHULRG¶(Scott, 2010, Homer, 
1981, Karmel, 1969) as they adapt to an institutional life.  Although Homer 
DUJXHVWKDW*RIIPDQ¶Vportrayal  of this shock period and self-mortification is 
oversimplified and one dimensional and Jenkins (2008) claims that the total 
institution is a dynamic entity and the newcomer undergoes a complex 
process of reshaping and redefining of their individual identity 
 
This study argues that *RIIPDQ¶V PRGHO RI D WRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQ LV still relevant 
today if used by organisations as a reflective tool to examine the extent of 
totality within their organisations.  This is of particular interest to military 
organisations as the nature of an organisation can adversely affect its 
organisational attractiveness and seriously affect its ability to attract and retain 
new recruits (Dutton et al., 1994).  
 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) identify from  Fisher¶s (1986) DQG*RIIPDQ¶V(1961) 
work on total and quasi-total institutions, the potential difficulties and 
psychological conflict organisational newcomers might experience when 
adapting to a new organisation such as the military.  Unlike a job in civilian 
society (such as a supermarket) the military adopt induction behaviours to 
encourage the newcomer to feel as if they belong and separate them from 
their previous life. On arrival at basic training in the military symbols of the 
recruits previous identity are removed, their hair is cut, their clothes removed 
and codes of dress and behaviour are imposed.  These are all methods of 
encouraging the individual to adapt to their new environment and encourage 
the internalisation of the organisation¶s goals and values. The process 
SURYLGHV WKH LQGLYLGXDO ZLWK DQ LGHQWLW\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V
H[SHFWDWLRQV  +RZHYHUGXULQJWKLV WUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRG WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIV
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and attitudes are challenged which causes a varying degree of cognitive 
discomfort as the individual prioritises the military identity within the hierarchy 
of their social identity.   
 
1.3.2: Impact of Military Identity 
 
Society influences an individual¶s social identity through both subtle and overt 
PHDQV .H\ PLOHVWRQHV LQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V development will impact on their 
social identity; for example starting school, changing to senior school or 
OHDYLQJ KRPH 7KH LPSDFW RQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VRFLDO LGHQWLW\ FDQ EH ERWK
positive and negative, but overall the societal influence aims to help the 
individual to function within their chosen society. Studies undertaken in Israel 
identify the impact that compulsory military service can have on the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDODQGLQGLYLGXDOLGHQWLW\%OHLFKDQG/HY\
HW DO¶V (1986) theoretical paper argues that a crisis in identity occurs when 
young Israelis are conscripted into the army.  Israeli conscripts are generally 
ODWHDGROHVFHQWVZKRDUHDW WKHKHLJKWRI µH[SORUDWLRQ¶DQG µFU\VWDOOLVDWLRQ¶RI
their identities in all its bio-psychosocial aspects.  During this period the 
individual is making sense of the socialisation they have undergone as a child, 
DQGFRPLQJWRWHUPVZLWKWKHLUµVWDWXVDQGUROH¶DVZHOODVPDNLQJVHQVHRIWKH
cultural norms and values that shape their world.  Levy et al (1987) expand on 
%OHLFK DQG /HY\¶V (1986) theory and describe this process as the natural 
IRUPDWLRQRIµ\RXWKLGHQWLW\¶ZLWKLWVRZQLQWHUHVWVFXOtural norms, values, and 
KRZWKLVFRQWUDVWVZLWKµPLOLWDU\LGHQWLW\¶ZKLFKLVDµUDWLRQDOIRUPDOJURZQ-up 
ideology. 
   
Military identity within Israeli society however is an imposed social identity as 
the conscript has no choice but to serve in the military.  Bleich and Levy 
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(1986) describes how Israeli society views national service as an expected 
moral undertaking, which is the sacrifice of personal freedom to serve the 
country.  The adolescent Israeli does not choose the category for their social 
identity as it is forced upon them through social pressure and expectation.  
What Bleich and Levy (1986) identify in the recruits that they studied was a 
degree of cognitive conflict between identities as the conscripts struggled to 
incorporate the military identity into their social identity. 
 
1.3.3: Cognitive dissonance, military service and identity conflict 
 
The cognitive conflict identified by Bleich and Levy et al (1986) in Israeli 
conscripts is recognised in FestiQJHU¶V (1962) cognitive dissonance theory.  
Festinger (1962) proposed that an individual prefers and seeks consistency, 
and will change attitudes and behaviours to reach a consistent state.  
Dissonance refers to the personal tension or stress experienced when an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V DFWLRQV FRQWUDGLFW RU DUH LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK KLV RU KHU YDOXHV RU
EHOLHIV *UXEHU   )HVWLQJHU¶V (1962) dissonance theory assumes four 
concepts: People like to be consistent in their thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, 
values and actions; dissonance is the result of psychological inconsistency not 
logical inconsistency, and therefore makes the discomfort more significant as 
the individual acknowledges that the life change that they have made is 
logically correct, but is causing them psychological discomfort.  Dissonance 
drives people to action with the expectation of obvious change and 
dissonance stimulates people to attain consistency and reduce inconsistency.   
 
More recent studies by Hampson (1997) and Hale (2008) have observed 
EHKDYLRXU FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK )HVWLQJHU¶V (1962) theory in recruits joining the 
British military, which supports %OHLFKDQG/HY\HWDO¶V(1986) earlier findings.  
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Hampson (1997) conducted a study that explored the possibilities of predicting 
the voluntary withdrawal from training of British Army recruits.  He used a 
focus group approach to collect data on why recruits withdrew from training 
and interviewed both recruits and training staff.  Training staff identified what 
WKH\UHIHUUHGWRDVµFXOWXUH-VKRFN¶LQUHFUXLWV5HFUXLWVZHUHXQDEOHWRPDQDJH
WKHH[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHLUQHZVXUURXQGLQJVDQGZLWKGUHZIURPWUDLQLQJ+DOH¶V
(2008) qualitative study consisted of 29 semi-structured interviews with 
recruits from the Royal Marines, Army and the Royal Air Force and focused on 
the role that masculinity and symbolic resource theory had in relation to the 
transition to military life.  Hale (2008) identified that recruits make a transition 
from belonging only to a civilian culture to also being a member of a military 
RQH  6KH LGHQWLILHG WKDW ZKHQ UHFUXLWV HQOLVW WKH\ H[SHULHQFH D µUXSWXUH¶ DV
everything that was certain and familiar for the individual became uncertain 
and unfamiliar and the rupture (the name given to the period of transition to 
military life) played a pivotal role in how the individual constructed their military 
identity.   
 
7KHVHVWXGLHVVXSSRUW)HVWLQJHU¶V(1962) theory as periods of dissonance are 
being observed in military recruits on enlistment.  Recruits taken out of their 
known social identity (physical surroundings, support networks, interests, 
groups and friends) will experience a varying degree of psychological 
discomfort.  They will seek consistency in their thoughts as they struggle to 
resolve conflict between identities.  This conflict will result in a specific 
behavioural outcome; the recruit will adapt to their new surroundings or will 
leave and return to the social identity that they were comfortable with.  With 
army recruits that action can be either positive or negative.  The individual that 
adapts to the new surroundings, norms and values of the Army will achieve an 
outcome that is positive for all involved. However, the individual who has 
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difficulty adapting will experience discomfort and distress and will take action 
to restore psychological consistency in their life.  If they are unable to adapt to 
the imposed values and norms and their new surroundings, they will seek to 
reduce their cognitive dissonance by leaving the Army. This is a positive 
outcome for the individual as consistency is restored but a negative outcome 
for the Army which loses a recruit.  
  
1.3.4: Military newcomers 
 
It has been argued that to achieve organisational commitment the organisation 
must be viewed by the individual as attractive and trustworthy before 
identification and internalisation can take place. It has also been argued that a 
GHJUHH RI FRQIOLFW RFFXUV EHWZHHQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V HVWDEOLVKHG VRFLDO LGHQWity 
and the new organisational identity. Ashforth and Mael (1989) argue that 
organisational newcomers are particularly vulnerable as they are unsure of 
their role and status within the new organisation and will build a self definition 
of the organisation based on their initial experience.  If a newcomer is left in 
doubt as to what the role expectations and behavioural norms of the 
organisation are there is the potential for the individual to begin to change their 
perception of the organisation and no longer find membership attractive.  The 
organisation must have an induction process that reinforces the goals and 
values that sit at the heart of their organisational identity and be able engage 
the newcomer in the process of internalising that identity. 
 
The military use inter-group rivalry in basic training to reinforce core military 
values and standards in recruits.  With the British military there is no ambiguity 
as to what those values and standards are as they are published in a booklet 
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given to recruits9.  The military use sub-group distinctiveness to promote sub-
unit pride, cohesion and identity. All soldiers belong to the collective identity 
that is the Army, but within the organisational identity of the Army are 
individual regiments or sub-groups.  Inter-regiment rivalry promotes the 
development of sub-group identity which in turn provides leaders with a tool 
for motivation and greater performance.  Organisational and sub-group identity 
can be influenced by leadership as good leadership can influence a mHPEHU¶V
acceptance and reinforcement of the organisational identity.  
 
Leaders within the British Army will actively promote the view amongst 
soldiers that they are the most highly trained and professional Army in the 
world.  They support this claim with references to units such as the Parachute 
Regiment and the Special Air Service (SAS), collectively referred to as an elite 
unit and a special force respectively.  At regimental level commanding officers 
will assure their soldiers that within the best army in the world they are the 
best regiment.  They will reinforce this identity within the members with the 
XVHRIWKHUHJLPHQWDOFRORXUVWKHUHJLPHQW¶VIODJV, on which are the dates of 
the regiment¶s victories in battle. In addition to this their uniforms will have 
items or badges that remind the individual of victories in battle.  For instance, 
the fusiliers hackle (plume attached to the head-dress) is a battle trophy won 
by the Northumberland Fusiliers at the battle of St Lucia in 1778.  Regiments 
use these insignia along with distinctive head dress and other parts of the 
uniform to promote a clear, prestigious and distinctive identity.  Ashforth and 
Mael (1996) identify that organisations that lack a strong organisational 
identity at senior management level are essentially rudderless, and have a 
                                            
9
 Values and Standards of the British Army: Dannatt, R. 2008. Values and Standards 
of the British Army [Online]. London: 
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/v_s_of_the_british_army.pdf.  
[Accessed]. 
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tendency to drift without a sense of direction or mission.  This directly impacts 
on the performance and behaviour of the sub-groups within that organisation 
and affects the extent to which the individual internalises the organisation¶s 
values and goals.   
 
However, Ashforth and Mael (1996) suggest that there is a balance to be 
struck in relation to how an organisation manages its identity. Organisational 
identities are always under pressure to evolve with time and society. Asforth 
and Mael (1996) argue that this pressure to constantly evolve can cause 
internal conflict within an organisation. Organisations are built on values and 
goals that form their identity, and to change those values and goals would be 
the potential cause of conflict.  However, they also argue that if an 
organisation fails to evolve with time it runs the risk of becoming out of touch 
with society, the identity of its current members remains strong but the 
organisation becomes unattractive to potential recruits.  As an organisation 
becomes more isolated from society its leaders come under increasing 
pressure to make the system work, usually resulting in rigidity of thinking and 
reliance on past practices to solve the problem; the greater the threat to the 
identity the more rigid it becomes in an attempt to defend itself.  Organisations 
are dependent upon newcomers for their survival and therefore must 
constantly be insightful as to the attractiveness of the image that they project, 
with special reference to whether it is attractive to those individuals it wishes to 
recruit. 
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1.3.5: Acceptance in the military organisation 
 
In this chapter I have argued that acceptance and belonging within society is 
an achieved status, so it equates that acceptance within an organisation is no 
different and also has to be achieved. Ashforth and Mael (1989) describe the 
process a newcomer goes through and as discussed earlier in this chapter 
5HEHLULRDQG$OOHQ¶V(1998) study shows how an individual with mental illness 
can use voluntarism as a method to achieve societal acceptance.  Rebeirio 
DQG$OOHQ¶V(1998) study participant focuses on the importance of being seen 
WRµILWLQWRVRFLHW\¶DQGDFKLHYLQJVRFLDODFFHSWDQFH6KDEWD\¶V(1995a) work 
on the experiences of Ethiopian Jewish soldiers in the Israeli army also 
discussed the notion that identity is achieved through acceptance by society.  
Shabtay (1995a) examines the experiences and expectations of Ethiopian 
immigrants who enlisted into the Israeli defence forces.  He suggests that 
,VUDHOL LGHQWLW\ LV DQ DFKLHYHG VWDWXV ³RQH WKDW LV DFTXLUHG WKURXJK DFWLYH
struggle to establish positive self esteem and acceptance within society and 
PRWLYDWHG E\ D VWURQJ GHVLUH WR EHORQJ´  6KDEWD\ (1995a) goes on to 
introduce Israeli government policy on the use of military service to create 
social mobility and the absorption of immigrant communities into Israeli 
society.  Israel holds all service in the defence forces in high esteem, and for 
an immigrant to enlist on entering the country is seen as a positive step 
towards social inclusion and social acceptance.   Within a unique society such 
as the military it can be argued that not only is it important for an individual to 
feel that he belongs, it is imperative that the individual is seen to belong and 
be accepted or else they would find themselves socially excluded from military 
society, suffering the consequences and stigma which that entails. 
 
Jenkins (1996) examines the part stigma plays in social and individual identity 
ZLWK SDUWLFXODU DWWHQWLRQ WR *RIIPDQ¶V  SHUVSHFWLYH (1961).  Goffman (1961) 
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suggested that identity can be spoiled or stigmatised due to a range of social 
or physical situations.  Jenkins (1996) within the context of social identity 
describes stigma as an emphasis of the demands that others make on us, 
which he believes LV RQ WKH EDVLV RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SXEOLF LPDJH  -HQNLQV
(1996) suggests that individuals can in essence live a life as a consequence of 
VRFLDO SUHVVXUH UDWKHU WKDQ D OLIH WKH\ ZRXOG FKRRVH  7KLV LPSRVHG µVRFLDO
FDUHHU¶(Jenkins, 1996) is not just a result of naming or categorising but also a 
consequence of how society responds to us and treats us.  This is very much 
a one dimensional perspective of social stigmatisation and focuses only on the 
negative aspects of stigma.  Jenkins (1996) expands this theory by suggesting 
that the process of labelling and social pressure that is applied by society can 
have positive as well as negative consequences, as an individual can 
internalise valued identities, with stigma and social pressure being used to 
shape valued (considerate and law abiding) members of society (the primary 
and secondary rules of obligation that form and dictate a societies cultural 
norms and values (Hart, 1961) .  The process of stigmatisation functions within 
military society to promote conformity, group cohesion and battle 
effectiveness.  There is a strong organisational identity that forms clear in-
groups and potentially out-groups, the emphasis being placed on the 
individual being part of the in-group.  Membership of that in-group will be a 
direct result of the individual accepting the consequences of the social 
pressure applied to conform to military life. TKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFFHSWDQFHRIWKLV
µVRFLDOFDUHHU¶ZLOOKDYHDGLUHFWLQIOXHQFHRQKRZWKHVRFLHW\ZLWKLQZKLFKWKH\
live will respond to them and treat them.  As a Military Mental Health Nurse 
working within conflict areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo Iraq and Afghanistan, I 
have regularly discussed with infantry soldiers what it was that maintained 
their resolve to fight in a situation that on many occasions only offered injury or 
death.  Their responses reflected emotions and beliefs based around honour, 
47 
integrity and the seeking of their FROOHDJXHV¶ approval.  They wanted to be 
perceived as one of the group and for their peers to recognise that when the 
time came they were able to stand and fight alongside their fellow soldiers.  
The individual that runs or refuses to fight would be stigmatised by being 
branded weak or cowardly.  The social stigma applied to running from a fight 
would be so socially crippling within the close confines of military society that 
the stigma has the effect of providing an incentive for men to remain together 
and fight.   
 
However, Jenkins (1996) argues that just because a society applies a label it 
does not necessarily mean that the individual takes on that label as an 
identity. The military has to be mindful that if the stigma of failure to meet 
expectation is not successful in producing a positive outcome for the 
individual, then the negative outcome for that individual would be catastrophic 
as it would probably lead to social exclusion within the military society.  
Repper and Perkins (1998) focus on the impact that mental health problems 
KDYH RQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V DELOLW\ WR IXQFWLRQ DQG EH SDUW RI FRPPXQLWLHV DQG
society in general.  In the cases that they study they focus on the social 
exclusion that individuals suffer as a consequence of their mental health 
problems.  But the consequences perceived are not dissimilar to those that an 
individual within military society would experience should they be excluded 
from military society.  The difference being that the consequence for the 
military individuals could be mental health problems as a result of social 
exclusion. Much of the literature regarding social exclusion focuses on social 
exclusion being a symptom of mental health problems; within the military 
environment failure to identify oneself with the organisation and be part of the 
in-group can lead to social exclusion and mental health problems then 
become a symptom of that. 
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1.3.6: Newcomer vulnerability in military service 
 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) identify that organisational newcomers have a 
period of adjustment that makes them vulnerable to rejecting the organisation. 
They believe that this is most prominent in professions such as the military or 
the fire service, where individuals have romanticised views of the profession 
which they have established from written fiction and televised drama.  Training 
GDWD IURP WKH %ULWLVK $UP\¶V ,QIDQWU\ WUDLQLQJ &HQWUH KDV VKRZQ WKDW WKH
highest rate of attrition occurs in the first 12 weeks of training (I.T.C, 2001) and 
the literature has identified that recruits pass through a period where they 
have to adjust to the physical reality of military life (Mael and Ashforth, 1995, 
Hale, 2008), adapting their social identity to achieve acceptance and 
belonging. There have been a limited amount of studies that look at recruit 
failure, and the majority of those have focused on predicting recruit attrition 
prior to enlistment (Long, 1990, Mael and Ashforth, 1995, Hampson, 1997, 
Larson et al., 2002, Niebuhr et al., 2008).  
 
/RQJ¶V (1990) research examined the predictive validity of the Royal Navy 
officers selection process.  A retrospective study was undertaken to examine 
the DFFXUDF\RI+ROODQG¶V9RFDWLRQDl Preference Inventory (Holland, 1985) at 
predicting voluntary withdrawal from training. Prior to the study the inventory 
was being used as part of a selection interview, with the Vocational 
Preference Inventory score being used to determine organisational fit.  The 
study did not examine the sensitivity or specificity of the findings or provide 
positive and negative predictive values. The results were reported as µhit¶ and 
µmiss¶ criterion with regards successful predicition of voluntary withdrawl.  
Longs (1990) results showed that in 25% of recruits the Vocational Preference 
Inventory incorrectly identified recruits that subsequently passed training. As 
the inventory at the time of the study was being used to select recruits out of 
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training, Long concluded that it was not an accurate enough predictor to 
exclude potential recruits.  
 
0DHODQG$VKIRUWK¶V (1995) study was predominately a factor analysis study 
(n=1082) to identify the dimensions of organisational identity within the US 
military.  It is the only one of the five prediction papers that focuses on 
identification with the military and the the conflict between social identity and 
military organisational identity. The focus of the study was on the relationship 
between a recruits antecedant biographical factors and identification with the 
US Army. The impact of organisational identification in relation to recruit 
attrition was measured as a practical concern.  Their results identified four 
biographical factors which were associated with increased organisational 
identification: pre-enlistment participation in rugged outdoor activity, solid 
citizen (evidence of good and dependable school and employment behaviour 
prior to enlistment), participation in group orientated team sports and 
intellectual and achievement orientated pursuits (non-physical extracarricular 
intellectual pastimes).  The authors acknowlege that the relationship between 
organisational identification and attrition was not the focus of the study; 
however they examined the utility of measuring poor identification with 
attrition. They split the sample and computed cross-validation co-efficients for 
the attrition at 10 and 21 months. The association between poor identification 
and attrition was significant; however the attrition sample suffered extensive 
shrinkage (10 months n=98 and 21 months n=176). The authors acknowlege 
the poor power of these findings as they were based on only 50% of the 
attrition sample (10 months n=49 and 21 months n=88).  The study identified a 
positive relationship between good organisational identification and reduced 
attrition, however it did not establish the effectiveness of biographical data 
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alone in predicting attrition. However, the potential role of biographical data for 
development of recruit selection methods has been highlighted. 
 
Hampson (1997), who cites previous evaluations of British Army recruit 
selection tools by Jacobs (1997a) Jacobs (1997b) and Holroyd et al (1995), 
focuses more on exploring possible methods of better prediction of voluntary 
withrawal amongst Army recruits.  He used a combination of interviews with 
training staff, group discussions with recruits, and analysis of selection and 
training data (n=5000) to evaluate the effectiveness of current methods of 
selection and identify potentially more effective methods of training outcome 
prediction.  The study identifies three main reasons for attrition: external 
reasons (family), unmet expectations of Army life, and the dislike of various 
aspects of training.  Recruits were more inclined to cite multiple reasons for 
leaving rather than a single one which suggested that failure was due to 
several influencing factors.  Hampson (1997) concluded that as the nature of 
voluntary withdrawal is multi-faceated the likelhood of a single predictor of 
withdrawal is remote.  However, he does acknowlege that the improved use of 
biographical data in a weighted biodata proforma could add to the prediction of 
training risk.   
 
Larson et al (2002) used a medical and psychosocial history questionnaire to 
measure prediciton of attrition in United States Navy recruits.  They concluded 
that this approach was considerably more powerful than educational 
credentials or mental ability score; however this approach still produced a high 
number of false positives at the cut points identified.  At the initial cut point 
26% would have been incorrectly referred for remedial training and at the 
second cut point that increased to 34%.  In the British Army, where resources 
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are becoming increasingly reduced, this level of false positives would have 
resulted in considerable extra costs in unnecessary extra training.   
 
Niebuhr et al (2008) used a fitness performance test (The Assessment of 
Recruit Motivation and Strength) to identify individual US recruits fitness and 
motivation to complete basic combat training.  Their findings indicate that low 
fitness and motivation scores were associated with training failure; however 
the predictive tools ability to measure the likelihood of attrition diminished over 
longer periods (>180 days).  They argue that the relevance of the performance 
test diminishes because poor physical fitness and motivation would manifiest 
in the first nine weeks of basic training.  However, the study does have some 
difficulty in differentiating between those training discharges due to army 
physical fitness test failure and those failures related to conduct.  More 
interestingly, the largest cause of discharge was failure to meet medical 
standards, most commonly asthma, personality disorder and mood disorders 
while passing or failing the fitness performance test was not associated with 
discharge for these reasons.  The authors acknowledge the limitations of the 
study as regards the lack of specificity in Army discharge codes, and without 
any measurement of the tests predictive ability it is difficult to assess its value 
as a tool to predict recruit attrition. 
 
6LUHWW¶V (1999) study focused on the reason for British Army recruits 
discharging and found that over 50% of all discharges could be attributed to 
the recruit having some level of psychological difficulty in adapting to Army life.  
Loss of freedom, homesickness and the demands of training were cited as the 
most common reason for voluntary withdrawal from training. These findings 
are similar to those of Hampson (1997) who also identified multiple cumulative 
factors associated with training failure in Britsh Army recruits.  Hampson and 
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6LUUHW¶VVWXGLHVERWK IRFXVRQ WKHcumulative factors associated with training 
failure but not the impact which those factors have on the individual.   
 
1.4: Summary 
This thesis seeks to understand why such a significant number of British Army 
infantry recruits are fail to complete recruit training and choose to leave.  It is 
acknowledged that the literature surrounding organisational identity is theory 
laden with more theoretical debate than empirical testing (Rock and Pratt, 
2002).  However, its importance should not be dismissed because of a lack of 
empirical evidence.  The debate surrounding organisational identification and 
commitment is an important one as it strives to make sense of the relationship 
between the individual and the organisation.  The debate has not been used to 
prove or dismiss a theoretical assumption but more to stimulate thinking and 
create a framework to examine organisational and individual behaviour and 
attempt to understand and observe the relationship between them. 
 
Existing literature suggests that individuals have a desire to belong to a group 
DQGWKLVGHVLUHIRUJURXSPHPEHUVKLSVLWVDW WKHKHDUWRI7DMIHODQG7XUQHU¶V
(1979) social identity theory which in turn provides the foundation for 
organisational identity theory (Mael and Ashforth, 1995).  Social identity 
theory, and by default organisational identity theory, focuses on in-group 
membership and contributes to our understanding of how an individual defines 
themselves and behaves as a result of that group or organisational 
membership.  Individuals seek to belong to an organisational structure, be it 
society or an interest group, and they adapt their own values and beliefs to 
enable them to belong and be accepted by the organisation or group that they 
desire membership of (Shabtay, 1995a, Rebeiro and Allen, 1998, Shabtay, 
1995b). 
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Organisational identification is intrinsically linked to organisational 
commitment; however they are independent, and an individual can identify 
with an organisation without committing themselves to it.  Organisations can 
not assume that an individual is committing and internalising their values and 
beliefs just because they identify with it.  The individual could as easily be 
using the organisation to achieve their own values and goals without 
committing.  The British Army can not assume commitment because the 
individual joins. The Army must earn the recruits commitment through the 
projection of an attractive, achievable organisational identity and developing 
trust between it and the individual.  By promoting an attractive organisational 
identity and developing trust the individual will potentially be more inclined to 
alter the way that they think about the organisation and internalise aspects of 
its goals and values. This in turn has the potential benefit of the individual 
changing their behaviour toward the organisation and becoming more 
committed. 
 
Considering the potential benefits of understanding organisational identity is 
important because organisational identity holds the key to developing a mental 
bridge (Puusa and Tolvanen, 2006) between the individual and the 
organisation.  Not only must organisations be clear as to what is the essence 
of their organisational identity, they must also have the ability to acknowledge 
when there is a potential problem with it.  This study is concerned with the 
question of why so many British Army infantry recruits fail in basic training; this 
is a question that the literature has only partially answered.  A strong 
organisational identity can be beneficial; however it can also create problems 
within an organisation, most notably that it closes the organisation off to 
newcomers and is resistant to change and improvement.  The British Army 
infantry is experiencing a consistent training failure rate in excess of 30% 
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during its basic training phase.  Studies have identified that this transitional 
SHULRG LQWR PLOLWDU\ VHUYLFH FDXVHV D µFXOWXUH VKRFN¶ RU µUXSWXUH¶ (Mael and 
Ashforth, 1995, Hampson, 1997, Hale, 2008, Bleich and Levy, 1986) as 
recruits move from the known to the unknown.  Social identity theorists argue 
that during the period when a new identit\ LV DGGHG WR WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
established social identity, cognitive conflict will occur as the individual 
structures their identities hierarchically in terms of importance.  In the military 
context little is known as regards the psychological impact that this conflict has 
and why such a large number of recruits fail to place military identity in a 
prominent position within their social identity hierarchy. Previous studies have 
identified that life experience is associated with recruit training attrition (Mael 
and Ashforth, 1995), DQG WKDW DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V VRFLDO KLVWRU\ LQ WKH IRUP RI
biographical data has some potential in identifying those recruits that might 
experience difficulty in making the transition to military service (Mael and 
Ashforth, 1995, Hampson, 1997, Long, 1990). 
 
The literature review has identified a consensus of opinion as to why 
organisational newcomers may have a period of difficulty in adjusting to life 
within an organisation such as the military.  What is not clear is whether those 
that have the potential for failure can be predicted and what ultimately makes 
the individual decide to leave. Biographical questionnaires have been 
identified as having the potential to accurately predict training attrition in 
military recruits, but to date no study has used a biographical questionnaire to 
test this hypothesis on British Army recruits. In addition, previous studies into 
recruit attrition have identified the cumulative factors that are given as reasons 
for failure but have not explained the impact that those factors have on an 
individual.  What is of iQWHUHVW LV KRZ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V LGHQWLILFDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
organisation changes from enthusiastic recruit to failed recruit.  Understanding 
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this phenomenon could potentially inform the organisation of the impact that 
its organisational identity has on the individual during the transition into 
service, ultimately providing the organisation with the insight to evolve, and 
reduce training attrition. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1: Aims of the study 
The literature review was essential in informing the methodology for this 
research, ensuring that it was mindful of the research that had already been 
done and that the methodological approach met the aims of the study. On 
completion of the literature review it was evident that a single methodological 
approach was not going to be able to meet the aims of the study and that 
mixed methods would be required. Cox et al (2007) identified the requirement 
for mixed method explanatory models when considering how to understand 
and challenge problems such as work-related stress at an organisational level.  
This study aimed to explain the impact that enlistment into a military 
organisation (the British Army infantry) had on the individual recruit that failed, 
and to see whether prediction of that failure was possible from antecedent 
social and demographic information.  To effectively answer these questions a 
mixed method approach was required. 
 
The aims of this study were to: 
(1) identify antecedent personal, social and demographic factors 
associated  with training failure in British Army infantry UHFUXLW¶V; 
(2) investigate the possibility of prospectively identifying those at risk of 
failing to complete basic training; and 
(3) explore the reasons given by those recruits who fail to complete basic 
training in order to understand the journey to failure with a particular 
emphasis on the cumulative factors attributed to failure and the impact 
that they have on the individual. 
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2.2: Methodological consideration 
 
Combining positivist/empiricist and constructivist/phenomenological 
methodologies into a single mixed paradigm approach remains a contentious 
subject for debate.  Tashakkori and Teddie (1998) GHVFULEH KRZ µ3DUDGLJP
:DUV¶UHJDUGLQJYDOLGLW\RIWKHGLIIHULQJPHWKRGRORJLHVKDve raged for the last 
three decades.  What is clear though is that by the early 1990s the academic 
conflict between the two methodological approaches appeared to have run its 
course, with mixed methods being increasingly accepted. Authors called the 
IROORZHUVRI WKLVQHZSDUDGLJP µSUDJPDWLVWV¶ (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  
It has to be acknowledged that as recently as spring 2007, rather than 
µSUDJPDWLVP¶ EHLQJ a paradigm in its own right it is an ideological position 
available within any paradigm (Giddings and Grant, 2007).  However, what is 
clear is that most areas of research in the social and behavioural sciences 
have regularly used multiple methods as a matter of course (Brewer and 
Hunter, 1989).  However, SDUDGLJPµSXULVWV¶KDYHVXEVHTXHQWO\suggested that 
a mixed methodological approach to research is problematic due to the 
underlying incompatibility of the paradigms that underlie these two approaches 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).  Positivism bases knowledge solely on 
observed fact and rejects speculation about ultimate origins (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985). Most importantly positivists believe that there is a single reality 
and that inquiry is value free (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).  Post-positivism 
emerged in the 1950s with influential works by Hanson (1958) and Popper 
(1959).  Reichardt and Rallis (1994) formulated three post-positivist tenets that 
are now widely shared by both qualitative and quantitative researchers: 
Value-ladeness (sic) of inquiry: research is influenced by the values of the 
investigator 
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Theory-ladeness (sic) of facts: Research is influenced by the theory, 
hypothesis or framework that an investigator uses. 
Nature of reality: Our understanding of reality is constructed. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) believe that the marriage between the two 
methodologies is impossible due to naturalists believing that that there are 
multiple constructed realities as opposed to one single reality. Giddings and 
Grant (2007) bring an element of simplification to the argument.  They view 
µSUDJPDWLVP¶ DV DQ LGHRORJLFDO SRVLWLRQ DQG JR RQ WR GHILQH WKH WHUP
µmethodology¶ as the researcher¶s thinking tool and the term µmethods¶ as 
describing, WKH µGRLQJ¶ Wool.  Methodology is the researcher¶s guide to what 
methods and forms of data analysis to use, with methods being the tools that 
are used for collecting and analysing data.  They suggest that there is a critical 
confusion as regards the relative status of qualitative and quantitative methods 
in relation to mixed method research, with intimation that within current mixed 
method literature qualitative research cannot stand on its own and is only 
exploratory or supportive of the quantitative data.   
 
By the mid 90s Tashakkori and Teddie (1998) identify that many influential 
researchers had began to state that the schism between the two 
methodologies had been overstated by the purists. In further support of the 
usefulness of the mixed-method approach, Ritchie and Spencer (2002) 
identify that over the last two decades qualitative research is being used to 
explore and understand a diversity of social and public policy issues in 
combination with statistical inquiry.  The use of qualitative methods in 
conjunction with statistical inquiry lies in the persistent need in the social policy 
fields of research to understand complex behaviours, needs, systems and 
cultures.  With the above assertions and accepted beliefs Tashakkori and 
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Teddie (1998) argue that many social and behavioural scientists have created 
a paradigm distinct from positivism, post-positivism and constructivism and 
ODEHOOHG LWSUDJPDWLVP µa paradigm that allows the use of mixed methods in 
VRFLDODQGEHKDYLRXUDOUHVHDUFK¶(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). 
 
Within this study the mixed methods used were co-dependent.  The 
quantitative data was collected to identify aspects of pre-service existence that 
increase vulnerability or SURWHFWDJDLQVW µIDLOXUH¶ whereas the qualitative data 
was integral to identifying and understanding the cause of failure. As Giddings 
and Grant (2007) outline, it is the knowledge of a methodological approach 
that ensures that the correct method is selected for a study.  Not only did I 
want to search for factors associated with failure, but I also wanted to 
understand the impact that they had at an individual level, the cognitive 
process that took place within the individual, and search for areas in which 
vulnerable recruits could be assisted in succeeding. 
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2.3: Study design  
The study was conducted in three phases, a quantitative phase, a qualitative 
phase and finally a synthesis of both sets of results.  The first phase of the 
study was divided into two parts (phase 1a and 1b). Phase 1a  (Figure 3) was 
the entry point of the study for study recruits. On day one of British Army 
Infantry Training the new infantry recruits were given a presentation on the 
aims and objectives of the study and asked if they would be prepared to 
participate.  Those that volunteered to be a study recruit were then asked to 
provide written consent before filling out a biographical questionnaire.  Phase 
1b commenced on completion of all biographical data collection and once all 
study recruits had a definitive training outcome. The dataset was used to 
identify risk factors associated with failing to complete training and to build a 
scale designed to predict failure.  In phase 1b the scale was tested by 
estimating its predictive value, sensitivity and specificity.  
 
Figure 3: Study Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phase 1a 
 
Recruitment and prospective follow-up of 
consecutive Army Infantry recruits over a 
six month period to identify factors 
associated with failure to complete basic 
training and build a scale to predict failure. 
 
Phase 1b 
 
Retrospectively test scale on internal test 
dataset for its ability to predict failure to 
complete training amongst Army Infantry 
recruits 
 
Phase 3 
 
Synthesize phase 1 and 2 findings and 
discuss how they inform and improve the 
knowledge surrounding the infantry 
UHFUXLW¶VMRXUQH\MRXUQH\WRIDLOXUH 
Phase 2 
 
Consecutively select a sample of Study 
Recruits that fail Infantry Training for 
failure interviews and analyse textual data 
to develop a greater understanding of the 
reasons for failure in training 
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Phase 2 was the qualitative phase of the study and began when the first 
Phase 1 participants began to fail in training. Phase 2 ran parallel to phase 1a 
until all study recruits had a definitive training outcome.  Recruits that  failed to 
complete training were invited to take part in a semi-structured interview.  
Study recruits were selected for a phase two interview on a consecutive basis.  
Once all study participants had a confirmed training outcome (i.e. completed 
training or failed to complete training) the qualitative data was analysed. 
 
In phase 3 both sets of results were examined as a whole to see if failure to 
complete training could be predicted.  Then the data was brought together to 
FUHDWHDSLFWXUHRIDQLQIDQWU\UHFUXLW¶VMRXUQH\IURPOLIHSULRUWRPLOLWDU\VHUYLFH
to the point of failure, with the specific aim of identifying ways of reducing 
training failure.  
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2.4: Setting 
 
2.4.1: Military personnel structure 
 
7KH VWXG\ WRRN SODFH DW WKH %ULWLVK $UP\¶V ,QIDQWU\ 7UDLQLQJ &HQWUH DQG
consisted of study participants from training companies within the 1st and 2nd 
WUDLQLQJ EDWWDOLRQV 7KH %ULWLVK $UP\¶V SHUVRQQHO DUH RUJDQLVHG LQWR IRUPHG
units as laid out in Figure 4. The shaded areas depict the level that this study 
is focusing on, that is Battalion and below.  As can be seen in Figure 4 the 
Battalion is broken down into smaller personnel units, the smallest personnel 
structure being the Fire Team.  The Fire Team can consist of between four 
DQGHLJKWPHQVHYHQSULYDWHVROGLHUV%ULWLVK$UP\¶VPRVWMXQLRU5DQNDQGD
Lance Corporal in charge.  The Fire Team is the basic building block of any 
Infantry formation, and from this the Battalion formation is built, i.e. two Fire 
Teams make a Section (Corporal leads a section), three Sections make a 
Platoon (Platoon is led by a junior Lieutenant or a Sergeant), four Platoons 
make a Company (Company is led by a Major) and three Companies make a 
Battalion (approx 600 men and led by a Lieutenant Colonel), see Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Structure of the British Army10 
 
                                            
10
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2.4.2: Study environment 
 
Most training centres throughout the British Army have a two step approach to 
initial training; basic training, usually lasting eight weeks in duration is followed 
by specialist training at another establishment. For example, soldiers who join 
as Combat Medical Technicians would commence the first eight weeks of their 
army training at the Army Training Centre Pirbright in Surrey.  On successful 
completion of that first eight weeks they would graduate to the second phase 
of their training at Keogh Barracks, also in Surrey, where they would 
undertake a 36 week basic medical technician course.  With this system the 
initial impact of training eases after the first eight weeks of basic training as 
the army recruit begins to focus on learning their trade in the second phase.   
 
In contrast, the Infantry Training Centre, where this study took place, is a 
unique establishment in relation to all the other training units in the British 
Army. Infantry recruits have one continuous phase of training at Catterick for a 
six month duration.  Rather than an initial eight week period of high training 
intensity followed by a more relaxed period of specialist training, infantry 
recruits are subjected to a gradual increase in pace and pressure over the 
course of their time at Catterick culminating in a pass or fail test of a military 
exercise using live ammunition and explosive ordinance.   
 
The study was conducted at the Infantry Training Centre Catterick Garrison in 
North Yorkshire.  The Infantry Training Centre itself is a large establishment 
spread over two sites on the edge of the Yorkshire Dales.  It holds anything up 
to 3000 infantry recruits at any one time and with intakes of approximately 120 
recruits every 2-3 weeks.  The centre is divided into two Training Battalions, 
the 1st Battalion consisting of eight training companies based on the county 
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regiments of the British Army11 and the 2nd Training Battalion consisting of 
three companies that train specialist infantry units, Guards Regiments, 
Ghurkha Regiment and the Parachute Regiment (Training Company 
structures are as Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Infantry training centre structure12 
 
 
The two Infantry Training Battalions each specialise in specific infantry areas.  
The Common Infantry Course focuses on training the recruits in the Light 
Infantry role, which is infantry that move around on foot without the aid of 
armoured vehicles, mechanised vehicles or helicopters.  This course is 
common across both Training Battalions.  The specialist training Companies 
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 Each county in the UK has its own affiliated regiment, infantry recruits that enlist in 
the regular infantry are assigned to their county regiment 
12
 Guards Training Company of the 2nd Battalion undertakes exactly the same 
recruitment and training experience as the 1st Battalion, except they have an additional 
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of the 2nd Training Battalion have additional training requirements that are 
specific to their specialist role within the British Army, for example the Guards 
do everything the County Regiments of the 1st Battalion do, but in addition 
they have an extra two weeks of ceremonial drill training as they perform state 
ceremonial duties as part of their core role and provide the guard for the 
monarchy.  The Ghurkha Training Company has additional English Language 
training; however most of their training is done in their native tongue.  The 
Parachute Regiment is an elite regiment of the British Army and their training 
schedule is very different to that of any of the other training Companies as 
their main emphasis is on physical aggression, being able to move on foot 
with heavy personal equipment at speed and parachuting into combat.  Study 
recruitment included all Training Companies from the 1st Battalion and the 
Guards Training Company from the 2nd Battalion. 
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2.5: Phase 1a: Biographical data collection and development of 
predictive scale  
 
2.5.1: Phase 1a study sample 
 
The target population for the main study was infantry recruits (all male) who 
had enlisted and undertaken secondary school education in the UK.  In 
addition the population was further refined by focusing the study on the 
Training Companies with the greatest problem of attrition and self discharge 
from training. 
 
The highest rate of self discharge and failure for non-physical reasons among 
recruits was in the Training Companies of the 1st Battalion and the  Guards 
Training Company (2001).  High training failure rates from the infantry have 
been anecdotally linked by training staff to having one of the lowest 
educational entry requirements in the UK Armed Forces.  The British Army 
has over 100 trades to which recruits may apply.  To assist educational 
streaming for fitness to undergo training, recruits sit a test called the British 
Army Recruit Battery and are issued with a score called a General Trainability 
Index (GTI).  This score determines what job a recruit can do within the Army.  
A score of 60 or more gives the recruit access to apply for any trade within the 
Army with the skilled trades such as a mechanical engineer, combat medical 
technician, military police or intelligence corps requiring scores in the upper 
50s.  As the GTI score gets lower the options for the recruit become more 
manual rather than skilled and focus around the fighting element of the British 
Army such as artilleryman, combat engineer, pioneer, armoured corps and 
infantry.  The lowest GTI score is 26 and this is for infantry soldiers, a score 
below 26 would mean that the recruit was not suitable for training and they 
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would not be allowed to progress their application. When considering which 
units at the Infantry Training Centre to include in the study, advice was sought 
from Defence Science and Technology Laboratory Human Sciences (the 
Ministry of DHIHQFH¶s personnel research organisation) at a meeting in June 
2002.  All personnel research on all of the British Armed Forces is 
commissioned or overseen by this establishment.  Following this meeting it 
was decided that all Training Companies of the 1st Battalion and the Guards 
Training Company from the 2nd Battalion should be included in the study as 
they had a consistent path of training, and the most significant problem of 
failure through self discharge.  The decision was taken to exclude the 
Parachute Training Company and the Ghurkha Training Company for the 
following reasons:  
 
a. The Parachute Company was excluded as it is an elite formation of the 
British Army.  It has different selection criteria from other infantry recruits; a 
differing training schedule; and a different qualification test to determine 
FRPSOHWLRQ RI WUDLQLQJ µ3¶ &RPSDQ\13). In addition to this the attrition 
characteristics for the Parachute Regiment differed greatly from the Training 
Companies of the 1st Battalion and the Guards Company.  Failure within the 
Parachute training company was predominantly due to muscular-skeletal 
injury. 
 
b. The Ghurkha training company was excluded for cultural reasons.  
Attrition is not an issue for this group (the Ghurkhas had a 100% pass rate in 
the training period 2002-03).  Although the cultural differences as to why they 
                                            
13
 µ3¶&RPSDQ\LVDZHHNORQJVHULHVRIKLJKO\SK\VLFDOWHVWVLQFOXGLQJORQJGLVWDQFH
SDFNPDUFKHVKHLJKWFRQILGHQFHWHVWVDQGµPLOOLQJ¶UHFUXLWVDUHSDLUHGXSDQGKDYHWR
fight each other in a ring for one minute as a test of aggression). 
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do not drop out of training may be of interest; they are outside of the focus of 
this study which is to understand why UK recruits fail in training. 
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2.5.2: Phase 1a study recruitment and consent 
 
All infantry recruits in the 1st Training Battalion and the Guards Training 
Company from the 2nd Training Battalion were given the option of participating 
in the study.  The study recruitment process began with a set presentation to 
all potential study recruits in the absence of training staff. This was to ensure 
that the study recruits were aware of the purpose of the study and what was 
involved in taking part.  In addition this approach was also aimed at reducing 
the pressure on the volunteers so they did not feel coerced into participation.  
The initial presentation was always given by me and it covered the aims of the 
study, consent and assurance of confidentiality regarding data collected.  In 
addition to this all recruits were provided with an information sheet (see 
Appendix 1) outlining the purpose and nature of the study. This was to allow 
potential participants to have the information they needed to give informed 
consent or decline to participate.  Recruits were then given a period of time to 
consider participation during which the data collection team left the room. 
During this period those who did not want to participate were given the 
opportunity to leave the room. Directly prior to the study recruit filling out the 
biographical questionnaire, I reiterated the aims of the study and allowed 
participants to ask any further questions they may have had.   
 
Volunteers were then asked to complete a written consent form that covered 
Phase 1 and 2 of the study.  Following this they were provided with a unique 
identification number so that their biographical questionnaire response sheet 
could be linked to their training outcome without personal identification.   
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2.5.3: Phase 1a baseline data collection 
 
All recruits completed the questionnaire within 48 hours of enlistment to 
reduce the contamination of responses through contact with service life.  To 
achieve this, data collection was combined with their initial entry medical on 
their first morning at the Infantry Training Centre.  A system was set up with 
the medical centre personnel so that the study recruits entered a seamless 
process that collected the required data.  After consenting to take part in the 
study they would proceed to their entry medical with the Medical Officer.  They 
were given a form to have their physical measurements entered onto (height 
and weight) so that they had it ready for completion of the biographical data 
questionnaire.  On completion of the entry medical they came to a designated 
room where they were given the biographical data form marked with their 
unique identification number.  They were given a single desk to complete the 
form to ensure that responses were not discussed and confidentiality was kept 
to a premium.  The data collection team always consisted of three personnel, 
me and two assistants, to ensure that the study recruits always had someone 
on hand should they not understand any of the questions or have difficulty in 
completing the biographical data form. The same two assistants were used 
throughout the whole period of data collection and received a detailed 
presentation on the study design and data collection process prior to 
commencement of data collection.  
 
2.5.4: Phase 1a biographical questionnaire 
  
A structured biographical data questionnaire was administered to all recruits 
within 48 hours of joining Infantry Training Centre.  The questionnaire 
consisted of a total of 95 items adapted from that used by Mael and Ashforth 
(1995).  Permission to use the tool was granted by the American Military 
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Research Institute.  The biographical questionnaire was selected as Mael and 
Ashforth (1995) and Hampson (1997) concluded in their studies that 
biographical data had some potential to predict training attrition. The 
questionnaire had been used by Mael and Ashforth (1995) to study the 
association between a recruits biographical history and the extent to which 
they identified with the US military. The identified four interpretable 
biographical factors that were significantly related to organisational identity 
with the U.S. Army.  These were:  
 
 a. pre-enlistment participation in rugged outdoor activity.  
 b. solid citzen (evidence of good and dependable school and 
 employment  behaviour prior to enlistment),  
 c. participation in group orientated team sports.  
 d. intellectual and achievement orientated pursuits (non-physical 
 extracurricular intellectual pastimes).   
 
Although the Mael and Ashforth (1995) study demonstrated some ability to 
predict training outcome as a consequence of organisational identification, it 
did not examine the utility of biographical data alone to predict military recruit 
training attrition. The questionnaire was used to see if biographical factors 
could effectively predict failure amongst British Army infantry recruits. 
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2.5.5:  Phase 1a pilot study 
 
Prior to the biographical questionnaire being used for the main study it was 
anglicised (e.g. educational questions were changed to match the UK 
schooling system and examinations) and piloted on infantry recruits at the 
Infantry Training centre where the main study was conducted.  The pilot study 
was undertaken to assess: 
 
a. Quality issues surrounding, before, during and after administration of 
 the bio-data tool. 
b. Discrimination between populations for floor and ceiling effects. 
c. Response patterns. 
d. Frequency of missing values 
 
The cohort for the pilot study was a platoon (N=30) who completed the 
biographical questionnaire as a group in approximately 30-40 minutes. The 
group size of 30 was found to be appropriate for delivering the questionnaire 
as it was small enough to allow interaction with the study participants and 
assist when they had difficulty with some questions.  This was important, as 
throughout the data collection it was evident that the reading ability of 
participants varied considerably. For the main data collection there was 
always a minimum of three personnel in the data collection team so that one 
to one assistance could be given if required to complete the questionnaire.  
The size of the pilot group allowed for free movement of the research team 
amongst the sample group so that explanations to questions could be given 
when asked.  However there were practical issues that needed to be 
addressed before the main data collection.  The pilot group were closely 
packed into a small room with no desks, which led to the recruits becoming 
easily distracted and allowed discussion of answers.  It appeared that the 
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participants were discussing what answers to give, thus biasing and 
contaminating the data. For the main study individual desks were provided for 
each candidate and by incorporating the data collection with the entry medical 
it staggered the recruits through the questionnaire answering phase, which 
reduced the control problems experienced in the pilot study.   
 
The pilot study identified the importance of the timing of data collection.  The 
pilot study participants were three weeks into their training and it was evident 
that some were already dissatisfied with Army Infantry training and wanted to 
leave.  In addition to this the group was about to have their first weekend leave 
since joining the Army.  This led to an air of high spirits and low concentration.  
It became evident that the data should be collected as soon after entry into 
training as possible, and again this problem was resolved by incorporating 
data collection into the entry medical process.  All main study recruits 
completed their questionnaires within 24 hours of joining the Army. 
 
There were also elements within the data tool itself that caused difficulties for 
the cohort.  The main one being that the sample group used were a Scottish 
platoon and the educational questions reflected the English educational 
system.  To maintain continuity of the questionnaire Scottish GCSE 
equivalents were written on the white board during the data collection so that 
any recruit schooled in the Scottish system was able to respond in a way that 
would accurately reflect their educational achievements.   It was also found 
that certain wording needed simplifying as educational ability varied.   
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2.5.6: Phase 1a population and distribution (pilot study) 
 
 
The target population was the same as the main study but included a small 
contingent of South African recruits. For the main study the reason and 
importance of using UK troops only was explained to the training staff and the 
study recruits were double checked at the commencement of each data 
collection to ensure that no non-UK personnel were invited to participate by 
mistake.   
 
Pilot study data was entered into a dataset using SPSS version 11.5.  Three 
data errors were detected by using double data entry and a decision was 
made to double enter the data for the main study.  Descriptive analysis was 
used to analyse the frequencies of the data entered.  Within the data there 
was evidence of both floor and ceiling effects. These were mainly in the areas 
of schools attended and extracurricular activities at school.  After careful 
consideration it was decided to continue to include the questions identified.  
There were two main reasons for this: firstly the biographical data tool was 
loaned from the American Military Research Institute and it was felt that it 
should be used as completely as possible for the main study before questions 
were removed for an Anglicised model; and secondly the descriptive data was 
useful in building a background picture or profile of the modern infantry recruit 
and the floor to ceiling effects seen in variables such as schooling showed that 
none of the pilot group went to a single sex school. 
 
2.5.7: Phase 1a missing values (pilot study) 
 
The response patterns showed that problems with the questions and the 
responses given were minimal, and that these were mainly due to cultural 
differences caused by using an American designed tool on British Infantry 
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Recruits.   The combination of response patterns and missing values did 
highlight an area of concern with eight of the variables.  The higher than 
expected missing value score in these variables were caused by multiple 
answers to one question, leaving no choice but to record it as a missing value.  
The questions involved were re-ZRUGHGDQGDµWLFNRQHER[RQO\¶FDYHDWDGGHG
to each question in bold. 
 
The pilot questionnaire did not include questions about the particLSDQW¶V
ethnicity.  Also, it had been anecdotally identified by the training staff that 
soldiers who smoked had greater difficulty completing the 24 week course due 
to possible health reasons.  To address these issues, smoking habits and 
ethnicity were included in the final biographical questionnaire.  
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2.5.8: Phase 1a measure of potential risk factors 
 
The biographical questionnaire was designed to collect personal information 
from five aspects of the Infantry Recruits life prior to joining the Army; these 
areas are outlined in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Areas of enquiry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5.8.1: Demographics 
 
The demographic component of the biographical questionnaire was designed 
WRSDLQWDSLFWXUHRI WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VEDFNJURXQGDQGKRPHFLUFXPVWDQFHV ,W
identified personal information and physical measurements, as well as looking 
at family factors.  The personal information section identified the type of 
geographic location they grew up in, how many times they had moved house 
and if to new towns or cities.  In addition it identified their ethnicity, as well as 
smoking habits, musical taste and when they left school.  The family factors 
section focused on the size of their family, information about their parents and 
siblings and what employment their father and mother had whilst they were 
AREA OF ENQUIRY NUMBER 
OF ITEMS 
  
Demographic & Physical Measurements  
 Physical Measurements  4 
 Family Factors 5 
 Personal Information 7 
   
Education  
 Primary and Secondary Schooling 8 
   
Outdoor Education  
 Team Activity 3 
 Outdoor Activity 2 
 Individual Physical Activity 2 
   
Non Physical Activity  
 Individual Non Physical Activity 12 
   
Employment and coping behaviour  
 Employment History 7 
 Conduct and Behaviour 11 
 Coping 8 
 Group Affiliation 8 
 Drug and Alcohol 18 
   
 Total 95 
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growing up, e.g. he worked for someone, he was a manager, he was self 
emSOR\HG,GLGQ¶WNQRZKLPHWF 
 
2.5.8.2: Education 
 
This section of the questionnaire looked at the whole of their schooling career 
from primary education.  It enquired about the size of schools, number of 
schools attended and whether they were co-educational.  In addition it also 
looked at GCSE results, along with preferred subjects and subjects that were 
either dropped before examination and those failed at examination. 
 
2.5.8.3: Outdoor education 
 
This section was broken down into three key areas of enquiry (see Figure 6).  
The questionnaire (see appendix 2) focused predominately on the amount of 
time committed to participation in team sports and the extent of that 
participation (none, team member or team captain), the focus being to 
determine the extent to which the recruit participated in team sport activity.  
The questionnaire itemised each potential sport that they could have been 
involved in, which ultimately created problems during analysis as certain 
sports such as hockey had few participants.  As the focus of this section was 
about participation in team sport activity rather than what sport they were 
involved in the decision was taken during the analysis phase to collapse the 
individual team variables into one variable that reflected their team sport 
participation (none, team member or team captain).  
 
A similar process was adopted with the recording of outdoor activity.  The 
questionnaire included many questions regarding the type of outdoor activity, 
but as with the team activity section its focus was on whether they took part in 
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outdoor activity or not.  For analysis this was further broken down into two 
groups; rugged outdoor activity that looked at pursuits such as walking, 
canoeing, climbing etc. and practical activities such as car maintenance, 
looking after animals, electrical work etc. 
 
Finally within this section questions were included to ascertain if and when 
individual physical activity milestones were achieved, such as learning to swim 
and learning to ride a bike. 
 
2.5.8.4: Non physical activity 
 
As with physical activity, the non physical activity section was mainly focused 
on participation as well as what activities were undertaken.  It enquired about 
time spent playing computer games or watching television, reading, playing 
musical instruments, making models or playing chess as well as participation 
in domestic activities or babysitting. 
 
2.5.8.5: Conduct and behaviour 
 
This section was broken down into five parts.  The initial section looked at 
conduct and behaviour itself with questions relating to time spent at home with 
the family, classroom behaviour, truancy, expulsion and trouble with the 
police.  The coping section focused on coping strategies adopted, who they 
talked to about problems, amount of sleep required, sickness rate at school 
and what caused them the most amount of stress in their secondary school 
years.  To ascertain how the recruit had coped with stressful situations in the 
SDVWWKH\ZHUHDVNHGDERXWKRZWKH\µOHWRIIVWHDP¶ZKHQWKH\ZHUHDQJU\DQG
were given a choice of five answers to choose from.  These ranged from 
80 
 
µQHYHUJHWWLQJDQJU\¶WKURXJKµWDONLQJLWWKURXJK¶WRµILJKWLQJDQGVZHDULQJ¶DVD
response. 
 
The section that looked at group affiliation asked questions that would try to 
give insights into their group interests and levels of commitment.  It inquired 
DERXWWKHVL]HVRIJURXSVWKDWWKH\OLNHGWRDVVRFLDWHZLWKDVZHOODVµTXLWWLQJ¶
EHKDYLRXUµ4XLWWLQJ¶14 behaviour was recorded by asking them about activities 
that they had begun and then quit prior to completion.  There was also a 
section of questions here that aimed to measure the extent to which the recruit 
already identified with the Army. This section in the original questionnaire was 
textual.  The decision was taken to convert this variable so that it produced a 
score in relation to the level of identification with the Army. The score ranged 
from 0-20 with a higher score indicating greater identification. To achieve the 
score each response to the five items was numerically weighted from 0-4 and 
summed.  
 
Finally in this section they were asked about drug and alcohol behaviour.  The 
drug questions were aimed at recording drug taking history as well as recent 
drug taking behaviour.  As with previous government research into drug taking 
behaviour (Ramsay and Spiller, 1996) the fictitious drug Semeron was 
included to detect over reporting of drug taking behaviour.  To asses alcohol 
drinking behaviour and dependency, the World Health Organization Alcohol 
Use Disorders Identification Test tool (Babor et al., 2001) was used.  
 
  
                                            
14
 7KHWHUPµTXLWWLQJEHKDYLRXU¶ZDVWDNHQIURPWKH0DHODQG$VKIRUWKOLWHUDWXUHDQG
refers to individuals that do not complete tasks that they started, e.g. they commence 
a Duke of Edinburgh award scheme and then leave without completing it.  Mael, F. A. 
& Ashforth, B. E. 1995. Loyal From Day One: Biodata, Organizational Identification, 
and Turnover Among Newcomers. Personnel Psychology, 48, 309. 
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2.5.9: Outcome 
 
This study had a binary outcome measure of pass or fail at six months from 
the date of enlistment into the Army.  A pass was classified as a successful 
completion of the Common Infantry Course.  Any study recruit who failed to 
complete the course was classified as failing.  This included those that 
transferred to other trades within the Army as they were considered to have 
µfailed¶ the Common Infantry Course.  The recruits were discharged from 
training for a variety of reasons that were coded in one of nine ways (Figure 
7).  
 
Figure 7: Categorisation of reasons for discharge in training 
Reason  
Discharge As Of Right The recruit can leave the Army after 28 days up until the end 
of his Phase 2 Training 
Services No Longer Required The Army Discharges the Recruit as a result of a breach of 
discipline 
Released from Army Service The Army releases the Recruit from service (usually used for 
very unhappy recruits and those found to be incompatible 
with military life). A release from service by mutual consent 
and no blame apportioned. 
Absent Without Leave (AWOL) Recruits that leave the training camp without permission are 
dismissed on the grounds of being absent without leave 
Medical Discharge (physical) The recruit develops an injury or illness that is not 
compatible with military service and they are discharged on 
medical grounds. 
Transfer to Other Corps/Service Recruits who are not happy or incompatible with infantry 
service but wish to remain in the army may transfer to 
another trade within the scope of their original GTI score. 
Unsuitable for Army Service The recruit is found to be unsuitable for Army service and is 
released from training. 
Unable to meet medical requirements of 
service 
The recruit is unable to meet the medical standards for 
continuation of training i.e. reemergence of childhood 
asthma 
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2.5.10: Phase 1a data management 
 
All data was double data entered into SPSS (v11) and the two datasets were 
compared to highlight data inputting errors.  These errors were corrected and 
a main dataset for analysis was produced.  Stata 9 data analysis package was 
used for the main analysis. 
 
The dataset linking names to serial numbers was stored on a Ministry of 
Defence Computer and back up disk, which were kept in a locked office within 
the Royal Navy Department of Community Mental Health in Portsmouth.  Both 
the computer and the dataset were password protected and these passwords 
were changed in line with Ministry of Defence security protocols. The record of 
names could only be accessed by me to enable identification of recruits that 
were discharged.     
2.5.11: Phase 1a plan of statistical analysis  
 
2.5.11.1: Population characteristics 
  
Descriptive statistics were used to describe the study sample in terms of 
demographics, physical attributes and training outcomes. Descriptive statistics 
were expressed as proportions for categorical and ordinal variables, and 
means with standard deviations for continuous variables. 
 
2.5.11.2: Creating a developmental dataset  
 
To enable internal validation of the predictive model from the dataset it was 
randomly split into two datasets of unequal size (development dataset two-
thirds, test dataset one third).  The larger developmental dataset was used to 
develop a statistical model of factors predictive of failure that could be used as 
a scale to calculate risk of failure. This scale was then tested using the smaller 
83 
 
dataset, referred to here as the test dataset.  Prior to the splitting of the 
complete dataset all study participanWV¶ RXWFRPHV ZHUH UHFRUGHG DV HLWKHU
pass or fail.  A variable was created, fail=0, pass =1.  This became the 
GHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHIRUWKHVWXG\7KH6WDWD µVDPSOH¶FRPPDQGZDVXVHGWR
sample 668 cases to create the development dataset.  The remaining 332 
cases were use for the test dataset.  
 
2.5.11.3: Calculating univariable associations between independent variables 
and outcomes (developmental dataset)   
 
Independent variables were analysed in turn to test their association with 
whether the recruit passed or failed Basic Infantry Training.  To determine the 
univariable association between pass and failure the t test was used for 
continuous normally distributed variables, the Mann Whitney U test for ordinal 
and continuous variables that were not normally diVWULEXWHG DQG 3HDUVRQ¶V
chi-square tests were used for categorical variables. 
  
2.5.11.4: Calculating multivariable associations between independent 
variables and outcomes (developmental dataset)   
 
To adjust for confounding a multivariable logistic regression was developed 
using the binary outcome of pass/fail. An initial shortlist of variables was 
created by identifying those variables univariably associated with the study 
outcome with a two-tailed p value of less than or equal to 0.20. This liberal cut-
off was chosen to avoid excluding potential factors that might be more strongly 
associated with failure once other factors were adjusted for.  These variables 
were then used to build a multivariable logistic regression model.  All 
VKRUWOLVWHG YDULDEOHV ZHUH HQWHUHG LQWR WKH PRGHO DQG HDFK YDULDEOH¶V
contribution to the overall fit was estimated using likelihood ratio tests. The 
variable making the least contribution (as assessed by p values from the 
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likelihood ratio tests) was then discarded. This process was repeated until it 
was not possible to exclude a variable on the basis of a p value of less than 
0.05. This technique was used to select the most robust set of covariates for 
the risk score model for use on the test dataset. 
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2.6: Phase 1b: Analysis plan for retrospective testing of predictive scale 
on test dataset  
2.6.1: Phase 1b accuracy of prediction (test dataset)   
 
The final model created from Phase 1a was then used to create a risk score 
for each participant in the test dataset. The risk score was created by using 
the intercept and regression coefficients from the final model in the 
development dataset. This score was interpretable as the percentage risk of 
failing to complete training within six months of army recruitment; for 
transparency a worked example is given in the results section (Table 19). The 
risk scores on the test dataset were divided into deciles and the actual 
proportion failing to complete was plotted against the mean risk score to 
DVVHVVWKHPRGHOV¶DFFXUDF\RISUHGLFWLRQZLWKLQHDFKULVNVFRUHGHFLOHV 
 
2.6.2: Phase 1b sensitivity and specificity (test dataset)   
 
To determine the discrimination of the risk score an amalgamation of 
methodology was adopted from Driver et al (2007) and Nikolsky et al (2007).  
The observed training outcomes in the test dataset were compared with the 
predicted outcomes. The discrimination of the risk score was assessed by 
calculating the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, 
DOVR NQRZQ DV WKH µ& VWDWLVWLF¶ (Nikolsky et al., 2007). The area under the 
receiver operating characteristic curve is the probability that the predicted 
value for the subject who developed the outcome will be greater than that for 
the subject who did not develop the outcome (Driver et al., 2007). Sensitivity, 
specificity, positive predictive and negative predictive values at the ten cut-
SRLQWVZHUHFDOFXODWHGXVLQJWKHµGLDJW¶FRPPDQGLQ6WDWD  
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2.7: Calculation of phase 1 sample size 
In considering the sample size for this study certain key factors were taken 
into consideration.  It has been suggested that the rule of thumb for logistic 
models is ten cases per independent variable (Vittinghoff and Mcculloch, 
2007), with an absolute minimum of five cases per independent variable 
(Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989).  Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007) suggest that 
WKHUXOHRIWKXPERIWHQRUPRUHFDVHVSHULQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLVQRWDµZHOO
GHILQHGEULJKWOLQH¶DQGWKDWZKHQDVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWDVVRFLDWLRQLVIRXQG
in a regression model with five to nine cases per independent variable only a 
minor degree of extra caution is warranted.  The anticipated failure rate was 
greater than 30% attrition based on previous training output records (I.T.C, 
2001).  The sample size was calculated on a ratio of 10 cases per 
independent variables with 95 variables to be measured (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 1989).  This produced a sample size of 950 overall, and ultimately a 
sample of 1000 recruits was decided upon as this ensured that all 9 Training 
companies had an infantry recruit intake during the study period.  This also 
HQVXUHG WKDW LQIDQWU\ UHFUXLWV IURP DOO WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP¶V UHFUXLWPHQW
centres were included in the study, and was also mindful that it would take six 
months of data collection to achieve 1000 cases.  The planned splitting of the 
dataset to allow internal validation (n=667 in development dataset, n=333 in 
test dataset) was also taken into consideration as the cases to independent 
variable would reduce to seven cases per independent variable (n=665), 
which still sat within VittinghRII¶VDQG0F&XOORFK¶V(2007) acceptable range of 
5-9 cases per independent variable for use in logistic regression.   
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2.8: Phase 2: Textual data collection and plan of analysis 
2.8.1: Phase 2 sample inclusions and exclusions 
 
All recruits that participated in phase 1 of the data collection had their training 
progress monitored on a twice weekly basis, until they had passed the course 
or failed according to one of the eight reasons in Figure 7.  Those who failed in 
training were considered potential study recruits for phase 2 of the study. 
 
2.8.2: Phase 2 sampling 
 
The aim of recruitment for phase two was to adequately represent those within 
training that failed to complete Basic Infantry Training. The sample size was 
determined by the factors that the sample needed to represent.  It was 
important that the phase 2 sample was representative of social background 
across the United Kingdom as well as being representative of all the training 
companies.  If a sample size quota had been set prior to phase two data 
collection, the number of cases that would usually be recruited for this method 
of study would probably have been achieved very quickly from one or two 
training companies.  This would have presented two problems within the 
phase two data collection; initially the data collected would only be 
representative of two training companies as opposed to nine altogether and 
secondly, as training companies recruit from geographical areas of the United 
Kingdom the data would only be representative of a small proportion of the 
whole population recruited from. For example, I would have just been 
conducting interviews with recruits from Liverpool and Manchester and then 
the quota would have been met.  On the basis that the interviews were simple, 
structured, and short the decision was taken to interview all who consented 
from all training companies until every recruit had a definitive training 
outcome.  
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2.8.3: Phase 2 sample recruitment and consent 
 
As part of the initial recruitment and consenting process for phase 1 of the 
study, all study recruits were informed that as part of the study they would be 
asked to participate in an interview should they leave training.  During the time 
period that the data collection ran there were no more than three training 
companies within the study at any one time. Twice weekly the administration 
clerks for each of the participating training companies were contacted and if 
any recruits had entered the discharge from Army process they were invited to 
take part in an interview at the Infantry Training Centre.  On the morning of the 
interview the training company administration clerk would be contacted to 
confirm whether the recruit was going to attend or not.  In addition to this the 
study recruit supplied written consent in advance at phase one of the study 
regarding participation in the interview process, with the understanding that 
they did not have to agree to an interview and  the interview would be on a 
voluntary basis at the time. 
 
2.8.4: Phase 2 textual data collection 
 
A semi-structured interview was used to interview the recruits undergoing 
discharge to explore their reasons for leaving.  The use of a semi structured 
interview was a measured decision that reflected my own understanding of 
certain components of the phenomena prior to the study.  Morse (1992) 
identifies that it is acceptable to use a semi-structured questionnaire approach 
when the researcher is familiar with the boundaries, domain and components 
of a phenomena.  It allows the researcher to create a semi-structured 
interview template with the confidence that it contained questions that were 
comprehensive, valid and could be answered freely.  The key advantage to a 
semi-structured interview was that all participants were asked the same 
question, but most notably the freedom was there to expand and explore any 
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new phenomena that arose.  Another key advantage identified by Morse 
(1992) was that semi-structured interviews are useful when there is only 
limited time and access to the interviewee.  There was only a small window of 
opportunity available to me to have sole access for an interview, so it had to 
be brief and concise and target key areas of inquiry.  Faced with the dilemma 
of reduced interview data, semi-structured interviews were used to 
compensate by having a larger sample of participants (Morse, 1992).  The 
interviews were recorded with handwritten notes rather than recording 
equipment; this was a decision that was not taken lightly.  There was only a 
small window of opportunity available to have sole access to the recruit for an 
interview, and many interviews would have to be conducted to ensure that a 
representative sample was achieved.  Hoepfl (1997) believe that the choice of 
recording interviews with handwritten notes or electronic equipment is a matter 
of personal preference and Lincoln and Guber (1985) do not recommend 
recording equipment as they believe them to be intrusive. It was also felt that 
using recording equipment in this study would have made the recruits less 
inclined to speak openly as they were speaking intimately about their 
experiences and may have been reluctant to be critical of the training system 
and its staff if they believed the recording could be heard by someone other 
than me. A relaxed conversational approach was taken where notes were 
made during the interview and then comprehensively transcribed immediately 
after. I believed that this approach ensured a greater feeling of confidentiality 
which encouraged the recruits to speak freely. A balancing factor between 
both methods of data capture was that all interviews were carried out by me 
and I was able to decipher my detailed abbreviations and fill in gaps 
immediately after the interview.   
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2.8.5: Phase 2 area of enquiry 
 
The semi-structured questionnaire was devised to explore a number of 
phenomena that were believed to be associated with failure in training.  The 
selection of questions asked was guided by anecdotal evidence from training 
VWDIIDV WRZK\ UHFUXLWV OHDYHDQG+DPSVRQ¶V (1997) study of Army recruits 
who left training voluntarily.  The areas of potential interest identified were: 
x Why the recruit was leaving, with particular focus on their reasons for 
leaving and their thought processes in relation to leaving.  
x How the recruit would feel and behave should he not be able to leave 
and had to stay for a compulsory period.   
x The effect that choosing to leave or being told to leave has had on the 
recruit during the discharge period, and how they coped with the 
prospect of returning home having failed in training (mood was 
assessed using a Subjective Units of Disturbance scale15). 
x The impact that training failure has on their subjective mood. 
x The level of communication that they had with their family and whether 
they found this beneficial or counterproductive (i.e. made them more 
homesick). 
x  What changes or support could be given to increase the probability of 
recruits staying in training. 
  
                                            
15
 Subjective Units of Disturbance score taken from the Eye Movement Desensitization and 
Reprocessing Manual and is a score from 0-10.  For the purpose of this study the score was 
reversed so that 10=normal mood and 0 = the most unhappy they had ever felt, Shapiro, F. & 
Forrest, M. S. 2004. EMDR : the breakthrough therapy for overcoming anxiety, stress, and 
trauma, New York, NY, BasicBooks.. 
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2.8.6: Phase 2 data management 
 
When consent to participate in phase 2 of the study was obtained a set of 
research notes were created for that study recruit. The research notes were 
annotated with their name, Army service number, date of birth and their 
unique identification number that related to the biographical questionnaire that 
they had filled in as part of phase 1 of the study.  All interviews were recorded 
by hand written notes on a standardised interview template and on completion 
of the interview a copy of the CommandiQJ 2IILFHU¶V GLVFKDUJH UHSRUW ZDV
REWDLQHG IURP WKH WUDLQLQJ FRPSDQ\¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLYH FOHUN DQG SODFHG LQ WKH
file.  These files were stored in a locked office within a separate lockable filing 
cabinet obtained for the purposes of this study.   
 
2.8.7: Rationale for framework analysis (Applied Social Policy Research).  
  
The aim of this phase of the research was to elicit the process of failing and 
discharge from the army in order to understand its nature. With that 
understanding it was hoped that potential interventions to address army recruit 
attrition could be devised.  This exploration required a qualitative method able 
to elicit specific practical solutions to the problem.  Applied research 
concentrates on finding solutions to an immediate practical problem (Ritchie 
and Spencer, 2002), and has a key role to play in providing insight, 
explanations and theories of social behaviour (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002).  
Framework analysis of qualitative data sits at the heart of applied policy 
research methodology.  Framework analysis has been developed to help 
achieve specified aims and outputs as well as to facilitate systematic analysis 
of data (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002); it was chosen for its capacity to handle 
data from a large number of subjects in a rigorous, transparent and logical 
process of textual analysis.  
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A semi-structured interview template was developed to ensure that the 
perceived reasons for leaving held by training staff and those reported by  
Hampson (1997) were included.  Interviews also had to allow the individual to 
express their own reasons for leaving above and beyond the a priori 
knowledge of the researcher, so they were, in essence, invited to tell their own 
story within a framework of questions (see appendix 3).   
 
2.8.8: Framework Analysis 
 
The process of framework analysis has been described by Ritchie and 
Spencer (2002) and its use has been reported by Pope et al (2000) and 
Bryman and Burgess (1994).  The framework approach was developed in the 
UK specifically for applied or policy relevant qualitative research to meet set 
objectives of investigation within limited time periods (Pope et al., 2000).  The 
process consists of five phases: 
 
2.8.8.1: Familiarisation.  
 
Ritchie and Spencer (2002) identify that when undertaking research where 
extensive material is available, judgements have to be made as to how data 
for analysis is to be selected and broken down into a dataset of a manageable 
size.  This was achieved by random sampling of the interview notes of the 100 
interviewees on completion of data collection. One set of interview notes was 
randomly picked from each training company to create a multiple of ten.  The 
initial ten were used in the familiarisation process and further multiples of ten 
were added with random sampling until no new themes or relationships were 
emerging, i.e. data saturation was achieved16. 
 
                                            
16
 Files that were found to be incomplete i.e. Officer Commanding Reports (n=9) 
missing were removed from the selection and thereby excluded from analysis.    
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The initial stage of this method of analysis involves immersion in a pragmatic 
selection of the data by reading all of the data within the selection (Pope et al., 
2000).  To achieve this the initial set of 10 case notes were used in 
conjunction with a spreadsheet to begin to catalogue emerging themes.  As 
each set of notes were read in turn a new line was added to the spreadsheet 
so that verbatim text could be recorded.  This allowed text to be added to 
establish themes as well as adding any new emerging themes from the new 
case file.  When all 10 case files had been used the spreadsheet was printed 
out, stuck together and pinned to a wall.  This enabled some semblance of 
order to be bought to the data, as being able to see the patterns and 
groupings on paper assisted in establishing group headings for themes within 
the text.  These groupings of data were then transcribed onto diagrams to 
begin to map emerging themes. 
 
2.8.8.2 Identifying a thematic framework  
 
The next stage of the process involved taking the familiarised data and 
identifying the key issues, concepts and themes by which the data can be 
referenced.  This is achieved by returning to the aims and objectives of the 
study and reflecting on the prior issues as well as the recurring themes in the 
data (Pope et al., 2000).  By the end of this stage the initial data had been 
grouped into manageable chunks and a thematic framework established.  With 
the framework established, an index was then added to the data in preparation 
for passing all data through the indexing process. 
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2.8.8.3: Indexing   
 
µ,QGH[LQJ¶ UHIHUV WR WKHSURFHVV ZKHUHE\ WKH WKHPDWLF IUDPHZRUN RU LQGH[ LV
systematically applied to the data; it is not a routine exercise as it involves 
numerous judgments as to the meaning and significance of the data (Ritchie 
and Spencer, 2002).  It is this judgement process and interpretation that can 
allow bias to emerge in a study, as ultimately the researcher has been 
immersed in the data for a long period of time and preconceptions can 
inadvertently effect the interpretation of what is being read.  Qualitative data 
interpretation is very subjective; however, by applying a thematic framework or 
index to all the data the judgements and assumptions of what the data means 
to the researcher is made transparent for all to see (Ritchie and Spencer, 
2002).  It is this level of transparent and potentially replicable indexing and 
labelling of all data that adds robustness to this method of data analysis.   
 
It was evident from the outset of the phase 2 analysis that there was more 
data than required. In addition it was also evident that framework was not a 
linear process and that the thematic framework was constantly evolving as 
more data was added.  During this process the case files were read in turn 
and an index code from the index was annotated in the margin so that 
verbatim text could be lifted into the charts at the next stage.  As noted by 
Ritchie and Spencer (2002), this is not a routine exercise as judgements had 
to be made as to whether the emerging data fitted within the established 
framework, or the data was revealing a new theme within the framework.  To 
assist in this process the original spreadsheets developed to assist with the 
creation of the thematic framework were built upon and the indexed data was 
added.   
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This provided an enhanced pictorial view of the patterns within the data which 
included direct quotes as well as interpretations of what was being observed. 
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2.8.8.4: Charting   
 
Pope et al (2000) describes the charting stage as rearranging the data into the 
appropriate parts of the thematic framework.  Again, in reality this was not a 
distinct process in isolation from any other.  As the data was processed the 
charts appeared to spontaneously grow with the data naturally gravitating into 
its own charting area.  Clear initial chart titles were evident but what was most 
interesting is that very quickly both sub and supra themes emerged from the 
initial charts, reinforcing that one does not have to be dogmatic in applying a 
qualitative data analysis technique, but more importantly use the technique as 
a guide towards discovering the real meaning within the data.  It was very 
evident that if I had not allowed a looping process to occur (see Figure 8) 
between the thematic framework phase, indexing, and charting, then 
fundamental sub and supra themes would have been missed.  This process 
led to the construction of four initial charts from which three subsequent charts 
emerged. 
 
2.8.8.5: Mapping and interpretation   
 
By this stage of the process the data had been sifted and sorted into its core 
themes in preparation for interpretation and mapping. Guided by the six key 
objectives and features of qualitative analysis17 and guided by the original 
research aims the charted data was used to map the range of the recruit 
experience, as well as finding associations and typologies within the data.  
This was then ultimately used to map the recruit experience for those recruits 
that failed in training. 
 
                                            
17
 Key objectives and features of qualitative analysis: defining concepts, mapping 
range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing 
explanations and developing strategies. Ritchie, J. & Spencer, L. 2002. Qualitative 
Data Analysis for Applied Policy Research. In: Huberman, M. A. & Miles, M. B. (eds.) 
The Qualitative Research Companion. London: Sage Publications. 
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Figure 8: Framework analysis in practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.9: Validity of framework approach 
 
Framework not only provides a systematic approach to analysing large 
amounts of textual data, but also tackles a more fundamental obstacle for 
commissioners of qualitative research.  In the case of this study, it is the need 
of the Ministry of Defence to know how the findings of the research have been 
obtained (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002).  If policy makers are to implement 
change based on qualitative research findings, they need to have confidence 
in the validity of the findings. 
 
Validity in qualitative research conducted by a single field worker has always 
LQYLWHG WKH TXHVWLRQ µZK\ VKRXOG ZH EHOLHYH LW¶" (Bosk, 1979). Qualitative 
Identifying 
a Thematic 
Framework
IndexingCharting
Mapping and 
Interpretation 
Familiarisation 
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research is criticised for the absence of standard means for assuring validity.  
However,  this assumption of the lack of validity is based on the requirements 
for validity in quantitative research (Maxwell, 2002).  Maxwell (2002) argues 
that typologies developed for quantitative research cannot be directly applied 
to qualitative research without distorting the epistemological foundations of 
qualitative research. Maxwell (2002) proposes that qualitative research should 
not have to be made to fit the validity typologies of quantitative research, but 
WKDW µYDOLGLW\¶ DV D FRQFHSW QHHGV WR UHIOHFW DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI TXDOLWDWLYH
methods.  When conducting qualitative research there will never be one 
FRUUHFWREMHFWLYHDFFRXQWRU µ*RGVH\HYLHZ¶ (Putnam and Conant, 1990) as 
observers cannot step outside of the world to provide truly independent 
accounts:  The concept of validity that Maxwell (2002) presents does not 
depend on the existence of some absolute truth.  If the researcher can 
demonstrate the integrity of the data and the accuracy of its recording, then 
the data itself cannot be deemed invalid. It is the inferences and 
interpretations that are drawn from the data that raises questions. This study 
adoptV 0D[ZHOO¶V (2002) four points of validity in qualitative research: 
descriptive validity, interpretive validity, theoretical validity and 
generalizeability.  Descriptive validity, the foundation upon which qualitative 
research is built, relates to the accuracy of the recording of data and the 
integrity of the researcher to be factually accurate in their account of what is 
observed.  The strength of framework is that the observations lifted from the 
textual data are clearly evident at the familiarisation phase, the observations 
construct the thematic framework and index, and then all subsequent 
observations are applied to that index and framework to test the assumptions. 
The observations are then recorded verbatim into charts.   
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The interpretive validity is inherently a matter of inference from the 
observations recorded (Maxwell, 2002) and the charting process within 
framework provides a clear, transparent  picture of the inferences of the 
researcher prior to mapping.  The systematic process of theory construction in 
framework analysis clearly builds on evidence (within the data), and shows the 
development of links and relationships (within the data) that build up to 
theories.  Thus, the integrity and validity lies in the transparency of the 
approach. 
   
Maxwell (2002) acknowledges that most qualitative research is not designed 
to allow systematic generalisation. However, one of the benefits already 
identified in applied policy research and the framework analysis is that it has 
the capability to manage large amounts of qualitative data and therefore any 
findings are based on multiple case observations and not singular ones.  In 
this study the accounts of recruits who failed in training were analysed through 
the framework process and cases were added until theoretical saturation was 
achieved (that is no new issues were emerging from additional cases. 
Saturation was achieved at 33 cases). The sample is representative of infantry 
recruits that fail in training as the observations relate directly to infantry 
recruits that fail, giving the results good internal generalizeability.  
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2.9: Ethical issues 
2.9.1: Ethics 
 
Ethical considerations for this research are in line with Ministry of Defence 
medical research policy which adheres to the World Medical Association¶s 
Declaration of Helsinki (1996).   The study gained full ethical and scientific 
approval from Defence Medical Services Clinical Research Committee on 20th 
January 2003 and has been assigned the unique project number 082.  This 
was achieved by submission of a research proposal to the above committee 
and a presentation to the Army Recruitment and Training Division Scientific 
Committee.   
 
2.9.2: Consent and Coercion 
 
Informed consent is a legal obligation in any research and no investigator may 
involve a human being as a research subject before obtaining informed 
consent.  Prospective subjects must have time to decide whether to participate 
or not and there must be no coercion of the subject to take part (Lobiondo-
Wood and Haber, 2002).  Informed consent is of particular importance when 
dealing with service personnel, as they live and operate within a hierarchical 
system where coercive pressure could be applied by rank to obtain consent to 
participate in the research study.  To reduce the risk of a feeling of coercion by 
the recruits steps were taken to de-militarise the information presentation.  
During this presentation the research team wore civilian clothing, all the 
training staff were asked to leave and although the research team identified 
that they were military, they stressed they were medical personnel and they 
introduced themselves by their first name and surname and did not use any 
form of rank.   
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2.9.3: Benefits of the research 
 
It is important for any research participant to be reassured that participation in 
UHVHDUFK LV IRU WKH JUHDWHU JRRG DQG QRW MXVW IRU WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V RZQ
academic advancement.  It was explained to all participants that the aim of the 
research was to look at how to reduce the high levels of training attrition 
experienced within infantry training and that the information that they provided 
would benefit recruits in the future as the Army was constantly reviewing and 
developing its training methods. 
 
2.9.4: Confidentiality 
 
It is imperative when undertaking any research to maintain confidentiality, but 
when conducting biographical research on service personnel there is an extra 
dimension to confidentiality as the information that they are providing could 
prejudice their career should it become available to their chain of command.  
To achieve the aims of the study it was essential that the participants were 
totally open and had confidence that only I could link a name to a completed 
questionnaire.  This was achieved by each study participant being assigned a 
unique number that the biographical questionnaire was annotated with.  This 
number was recorded on a database on my military computer account.  The 
case files produced for the qualitative study were again made anonymous 
XVLQJ WKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VXQLTXHQXmber and stored in a medical records store 
within my department. 
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CHAPTER 3: PHASE 1 RESULTS 
 
3.1: Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the biographical questionnaire that was 
completed by 999 British Army Infantry recruits (during data cleansing one 
case was found to be a duplicate and removed from the study dataset). The 
results are divided into two parts: (1), the initial analysis carried out on the 
developmental dataset to establish a model that could be used to devise a risk 
score to preGLFW µIDLOXUH¶DQG  UHVXOWVRI WKH WHVWLQJRI WKDWVFRUHRQD WHVW
dataset. The development and test datasets were created by randomly 
splitting the 999 cases into two thirds one third split respectively. 
 
3.2: Study Recruitment and Population Characteristics Prior to 
Enlistment 
British Army infantry recruits were recruited into the study between September 
2002 and March 2003.  Collection of biographical data was completed by 
March 2003, however each study participant had to be monitored for the 
duration of their six month training period until they had successfully 
completed training or failed.  The outcome data for all participants was 
completed by January 2004.  The sample is described in Table 1. 
 
The study population was all male18 with a mean age of 20.0 years and an age 
range of 17.2 years to 27.4 years.  The ethnic mix was predominately white 
British (95.6%, n=853) with only 25 (2.8%) recruits recording themselves as 
%ODFN %ULWLVK  7KH FDWHJRU\ ODEHOOHG µRWKHU¶ FRQVLVWHG RI  UHFUXLWV ZKR
recorded their ethnicity as Indian (n=2), Pakistani (n=1), Chinese (n=1) and 
mixed race (n=7).  The relatively large number of missing values for ethnicity 
                                            
18
 All personnel within the British Infantry are male. 
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was caused by some study participants ticking more than one box, and 
therefore a decision was made to recode the variable as missing. 
 
Within the entire population, 11.3% (n=112) did not know their father; however 
84.3% (n=834) came from homes where their father was in employment, with 
only 4.4% (n=43) of fathers having not worked.  The majority of the sample 
(53.1%, n=517) achieved GCSE results of grade C or below, with only 14.8% 
achieving grade B or above in all subjects.  Most notable was that over half of 
all respondents (53.3%, n=533) reported being in trouble with the police prior 
to enlistment. 
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Table 1: Demographic and social characteristics of sample (n=1000) 
 
 
Mean age in years (SD) 20.0 (2.3) 
 Missing 
 
0 
Mean height in meters (SD) 1.77 (0.08) 
 Missing 
 
32 
Mean weight in kilograms (SD) 70.2 (11.6) 
 Missing 
 
30 
Mean BMI (SD) 22.5 (3.5) 
 Missing 
 
45 
Ethnicity n (%)  
 White 853 (95.95) 
 Black 25 (2.81) 
 Other 11 (1.24) 
 Missing 
 
111 
Fathers job n (%)  
 Supervised 234 (23.66) 
 Manager 353 (35.69 
 Worked alone 115 (11.63) 
 Had partners 132 (13.35) 
 ,GRQ¶WNQRZKLP 112 (11.32) 
 +HGLGQ¶WZRUN 43 (4.35) 
 Missing 
 
11 
GCSE Results n (%)  
 As 30 (3.08) 
 As & Bs 48 (4.93) 
 Bs 66 (6.78) 
 Bs & Cs 173 (17.78) 
 Cs & below 517 (53.13) 
 'LGQ¶WWDNHH[DPV 139 (14.29) 
 Missing 
 
27 
Been in trouble with the police n (%)  
 Never 467 (46.7) 
 Warning 237 (23.7) 
 Once 113 (11.3) 
 2-3 times 123 (12.3) 
 4 or more times 60 (6.0) 
 Missing 
 
0 
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3.3: Outcomes 
Table 2 shows the training outcomes for all 999 study recruits,  over a third of 
whom failed to complete infantry training (36.2%, n=362).  Within the failure 
group 59.4% (n=215) left at their own request and 13.9% (n=50) were 
dismissed as Service No Longer Required or were deemed Unsuitable for 
Army Service.  Collectively 74.4% (n=269) of training attrition was attributable 
to difficulties in adapting to service life, with either the individual choosing to 
leave or the Army discharging them from service. Of those that failed Army 
Infantry Training (n=362) 4.4% (n=16) went on to transfer to other branches or 
trades within the Army. 
 
Table 2: Training outcomes with reason for failure 
 
 
Outcome 
n (%) 
Passed 637 (63.8%)  
Failed 362 (36.2%)  
 Discharge as of Right  170 (47%) 
 Services No Longer Required (discipline)  21 (5.8%) 
 Services No Longer Required (drugs)  2 (0.6%) 
 Released from Army Service  45 (12.4%) 
 Absent Without Leave (AWOL)  4 (1.1%) 
 Medical Discharge (physical)  58 (16%) 
 Transfer to Other Corps/Service  16 (4.4%) 
 Unsuitable for Army Service  27 (7.5%) 
 Unable to meet medical requirements of 
service  
19 (5.2%) 
  
Total 362 (100%) 
  
 
3.4: Splitting Dataset 
 
The dataset containing all the participants was split randomly into two 
separate datasets, so that two thirds (66.8%, n=667) of the study population 
were placed in the development dataset and one third (33.2%, n=332) were 
placed in the test dataset.  As can be seen in Table 3, the study recruitment 
and population characteristics prior to enlistment variables were used to check 
that the development dataset and the test dataset had consistent 
characteristics prior to analysis beginning on the development dataset. 
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Table 3: Comparison of distribution of key factors in development 
(n=667) and test datasets (n=362) 
  
 
 
Development Data 
Set (n=667) 
Test Data 
Set (n=332) 
 
Outcome 
  
 Passed  n (%) 428 (64.1) 209 (63.0) 
 Failed n (%) 239 (35.8) 
 
123 (37.1) 
Mean age in years (SD) 
 
20.0 (2.4) 20.0 (2.2) 
Mean height in meters (SD) 
 
1.8 (0.09) 1.8 (0.08) 
Mean weight in kg (SD) 
 
70.5 (11.4) 69.6 (11.9) 
Mean BMI (SD) 
 
22.5 (3.5) 22.4 (3.6) 
Ethnicity n (%)   
 White 568 (96.1) 284 (95.6) 
 Black 15 (2.5) 10 (3.4) 
 Other 
 
8 (1.4) 3 (1.0) 
Fathers job n (%)   
 Supervised 148 (22.4) 85 (26.0) 
 Manager 233 (35.2) 120 (36.7) 
 Worked alone 84 (12.7) 31 (9.5) 
 Had partners 89 (13.44) 43 (13.2) 
 ,GRQ¶WNQRZKLP 77 (11.6) 35 (10.7) 
 +HGLGQ¶WZRUN 
 
30 (4.5) 13 (4.0) 
GCSE results n (%)   
 As 24 (3.7) 6 (1.9) 
 As & Bs 33 (5.1) 15 (4.7) 
 Bs 43 (6.6) 23 (7.1) 
 Bs & Cs 116 (17.8) 57 (17.7) 
 Cs & below 342 (52.6) 174 (54.0) 
 'LGQ¶WWDNHH[DPV 
 
92 (14.1) 47 (14.6) 
Been in trouble with the police n (%)   
 Never 312 (46.7) 155 (46.7) 
 Warning 
 
146 (21.9) 90 (27.1) 
 Once 82 (12.3) 31 (9.3) 
 2-3 times 81 (12.1) 42 (12.7) 
 4 or more times 
 
46 (6.9) 14 (4.2) 
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3.5: Phase 1a: Analysis of development dataset  
 
3.5.1: Demographics 
 
Body mass and physical characteristics such as height and weight were not 
associated with the likelihood of failure (see Table 4).  However those recruits 
who grew up in a family unit without female siblings had an increased risk of 
failure compared with those with female siblings (69.2% vs 30.8%, p=0.025), 
(see Table 5). Within the development dataset as a whole, 85.2% (n=568) of 
study participants classified themselves as White British (Table 6) and the 
proportions were similar in both pass and failure groups. Ethnicity was not 
associated with success or failure in training (p=0.13).   
 
Smoking was considered initially by the training personnel to be a factor that 
increased the likelihood of failure due to poor physical condition. However, 
Table 6 shows that there was no indication that smoking influenced training 
outcomes. Being under the age of 18 on enlistment (Table 6) was identified as 
a factor associated with failure (p=0.048) as 39.3% (n=141) of recruits within 
the group that failed were between the age of 16-18 years, compared with 
60.7% (n=218) who passed.   
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Table 4: Comparison of physical measurements by outcome in 
development dataset  
 
 Pass mean (sd) Fail mean (sd) p Value 
Height in meters 1.77 (0.08) 1.77 (0.11) 0.65 
Weight in kg 70.1 (9.6) 71.3 (13.8) 0.51 
Body mass index 22.4 (3.05) 22.6 (4.06) 0.52 
 
 
Table 5: Comparison of family factors by outcome in development 
dataset  
 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 Birth Order 
   
0.34 p 
 Only child 22 (52.4) 20 (47.6)  
 First born 153 (63.8) 87 (36.2)  
 Second born or later 158 (67) 78 (33.0)  
 Youngest 
 
94 (63.5) 54 (36.5)  
 Siblings 
  
0.025 p 
 Male siblings only 78 (56.5) 60 (43.5)  
 Female siblings only 128 (69.2) 57 (30.8)  
 Both male and female siblings 201 (66.1) 103 (33.9)  
 Only child 
 
19 (50.0) 19 (50.0)  
 
Fathers view on military 
career 
  
0.52 p 
 Very Much in favour 209 (65.3) 111 (34.7)  
 In favour 103 (60.9) 66 (39.1)  
 Neutral 49 (68.1) 23 (31.9)  
 Opposed 6 (54.6) 5 (45.4)  
 Very Opposed 4 (100) 0 (0.0)  
 I GRQ¶WNQRZP\IDWKHU 
 
51 (62.2) 31 (37.8)  
 
)DWKHU¶V-RE 
  
0.87 p 
 Supervised 97 (65.5) 51 (34.5)  
 Manager 144 (61.8) 89 (38.2)  
 Worked alone 53 (63.1) 31 (36.9)  
 Had partners 58 (65.2) 31 (34.8)  
 ,GRQ¶WNQRZKLP 49 (63.6) 28 (36.4)  
 +HGLGQ¶W work 
 
22 (73.3) 8 (26.7)  
 
0RWKHU¶VURXWLQHGXULQJ
school 
  
0.46 p 
 At home full time 111 (60.7) 72 (39.3)  
 Worked part-time outside the 
home 
169 (66.0) 87 (34.0)  
 Worked full time outside the 
home 
128 (64.0) 72 (36.0)  
 Did not live with mother as a 
child 
 
18 (75.0) 6 (25.0) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two 
Sample 
Wilcoxon 
(Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V
Chi² 
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 Table 6: Comparison of personal information by outcome in 
development dataset 
  
 
 
                                            
19
 Test calculated on a 2x2 contingency table (white/non-white) 
  Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Geographic location 
 during education 
   
0.57 p 
 Rural Village or Town 114 (68.3) 53 (31.7)  
 City 222 (63.4) 128 
(36.6) 
 
 Metropolitan 75 (70.0) 48 (39.0)  
 Moved around 
 
17 (68.0) 8 (32.0)  
Number of cities or 
 towns lived in 
  
0.78  p 
 1 to 2 335 (64.6) 184 
(35.4) 
 
 3 or more 
 
93 (63.3) 54 (36.7)  
Ethnicity 
 
0.13 p19 
 White 360 (63.4) 208 
(36.6) 
 
 Black 13 (86.7) 2 (13.3)   
 Other 
 
4 (50.0) 4 (50.0)  
Smoking 
  
0.14 m 
 Daily 194 (61.0.) 124 
(39.0) 
 
 Occasionally 34 (69.4) 15 (30.6)  
 Ex-smoker 56 (67.5) 27 (32.5)  
 Never smoked 
 
141 (66.8) 70 (33.2)  
Musical Taste 
  
0.56 p 
 Classical or Jazz 7 (70.0) 3 (30.0)  
 Rock or Pop 96 (66.2) 49 (33.8)  
 Hard rock/heavy metal 49 (73.1) 18 (26.9)  
 Rap music 259 (62.9) 153 
(37.1) 
 
 Folk 
 
8 (72.7) 3 (27.3)  
Age on leaving school 
  
0.53 m 
 13 & under 4 (44.4) 5 (55.6)  
 14-17 409 (64.3) 227 
(35.7) 
 
 18 & over 
 
10 (62.5) 6 (37.5)  
Age on enlistment 
  0.048 
m 
 16-18 218 (60.7) 141 
(39.3) 
 
 19-21 136 (69.4) 60 (30.6)  
 22 & over 
 
71 (67.6) 34 (32.4) t = Two Sample T 
Test 
m = Two 
Sample 
Wilcoxon 
(Mann 
Whitney) 
Test 
p = 
3HDUVRQ¶V
Chi² 
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3.5.2: Education 
 
 Those pupils who had a disturbed education were at a much higher risk of 
failure (p<0.001).  Table 7 shows that those recruits who attended two or more 
schools were associated with an increased risk of failure in training, the risk 
appearing to increase linearly with a greater number of schools.  Achievement 
of two GCSEs above grade D (71.6% vs 28.4%) or four or more GCSEs 
above grade D (71% vs 29%) was a protective factor and was associated with 
training success (p=0.009). Achieving no GCSEs above grade D was 
associated with failure (59.5% vs 40.5%) 
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Table 7: Comparison of education factors by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
  
Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Size of secondary school 
year 
   
0.45 m 
 Under 50 14 (46.7) 16 (53.3)  
 50-99 46 (59.7) 31 (40.3)  
 100-299 161 (67.9) 76 (32.1)  
 300-499 73 (64.0) 41 (36.0)  
 500 or more 
 
134 (64.4) 74 (35.6)  
Number of schools attended 
  
<0.001 m 
 1 331 (67.6) 159 (32.4)  
 2 73 (58.4) 52 (41.6)  
 3 or more 
 
22 (45.8) 26 (54.2)  
Co-educational 
  
0.58 p 
 No 21 (60.0) 14 (40.0)  
 Yes 
 
406 (64.7) 222 (35.3)  
GCSE Results 
  
0.12 m 
 As 13 (54.2) 11 (45.8)  
 As & Bs 22 (66.7) 11 (33.3)  
 Bs 28 (65.1) 15 (34.9)  
 Bs & Cs 83 (71.6) 33 (28.5)  
 Cs & below 224 (65.5) 118 (34.5)  
 'LGQ¶WWDNHH[DPV 
 
50 (54.4) 42 (45.6)  
GCSE Results above grade D 
  
0.009 m 
 None 206 (59.5) 140 (40.5)  
 1 64 (67.4) 31 (32.6)  
 2 48 (71.6) 19 (28.4)  
 3 36 (66.7) 18 (33.3)  
 4 or more 
 
71 (71) 29 (29.0)  
Preferred academic subjects 
  
0.92 p 
 Numeracy 199 (64.4) 110 (35.6)  
 Literacy 
 
217 (64.8) 118 (35.2)  
Skip subjects at school  
  
0.46 p 
 No 299 (65.3) 159 (34.7)  
 Yes 
 
117 (62.2) 71 (37.8)  
Failed subjects at school  
  
0.71 p 
 No 160 (65.3) 85 (34.7)  
 Yes 
 
256 (63.8) 145 (36.2) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
 
 
3.5.3: Outdoor Education 
 
The categories surrounding outdoor education focused on whether the recruit 
participated in outdoor activity such as team sports or hiking, and if so what 
was their level of participation.  The results indicated that there was no 
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evidence of difference between the pass and failure groups with regard to 
participation in rugged outdoor activities and sports.  This suggests that 
participating in outdoor activity has no effect on training outcome (Table 8, 
Table 9 and Table 10). 
 
Table 8: Comparison of team activity factors by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Hours of Sporting 
 participation per week  
  
 
0.51 m 
5 hours or less 127 (66.2) 65 (33.8)  
6 or more 
 
300 (63.4) 173 (36.6)  
What activity did you 
prefer 
  0.51 p 
Team sports 340 (65.1) 182 (34.9)  
Individual Sports 
 
80 (62.0) 49 (38.0)  
Team sport 
participation 
  0.30 p 
Did not participate 43 (57.3) 32 (42.7)  
Did participate 245 (66.2) 125 (33.8)  
Team captain 
 
138 (62.7) 82 (37.3) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample Wilcoxon 
(Mann Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
 
 
 
Table 9: Comparison of outdoor activity factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Participation in rugged  
outdoor activity 
   
0.51 m 
Never 23 (53.5) 20 (46.5)  
Once or twice 98 (66.2) 50 (33.8)  
Few times a year 137 (63.1) 80 (36.9)  
Regularly 
 
168 (65.4) 89 (34.6)  
Participation in 
practical  
outdoor activity 
  0.55 m 
Never 86 (59.3) 59 (40.7)  
Once or twice 141 (66.5) 71 (33.5)  
Few times a year 85 (66.9) 42 (33.1)  
Regularly 
 
114 (63.3) 66 (36.7) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample Wilcoxon 
(Mann Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 10: Comparison of individual physical activity factors by outcome 
in development dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
Individual sport 
participation 
   
Began swimming   0.22 m 
Age 5 years 151 (66.5) 76 (33.5)  
6-9 191 (64.8) 104 (35.2)  
10-13 58 (64.4) 32 (35.6)  
13+ 14 (58.3) 10 (41.7)  
&DQ¶WVZLP 
 
14 (50.0) 14 (50.0)  
Began riding a bike 
  
0.46 m 
Age 5 years 286 (65.0) 154 (35.0)  
6-9 130 (64.4) 72 (35.6)  
10-13 12 (57.1) 9 (42.9)  
13+ 0 (0.0) 2 (100)  
&DQ¶WULGHDELNH 
 
0 (0.0) 1 (100) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample Wilcoxon 
(Mann Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
 
 
 
3.5.4: Non-Physical Activity 
 
Table 11 shows all those categories that were identified as individual non-
physical activity. Participation in non-physical activity such as playing on 
computer games or watching television did not influence training outcomes. 
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Table 11: Comparison of Individual non-physical activity factors by 
outcome in development dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Participated in non-physical 
extracurricular activity 
   
0.56 p 
No 153 (35.1) 283 (64.9)  
Yes 
 
86 (37.4) 144 (62.6)  
Played a musical instrument 
  
0.87 m 
No 211 (63.9) 119 (36.06)  
Took a few lessons but never 
learned 
150 (64.1) 84 (35.9)  
Yes 
 
65 (65.0) 35 (35.0)  
Hours spent working or 
playing on a computer 
  
0.56 m 
Less than 1 100 (66.7) 50 (33.3)  
1-2 137 (62.0) 84 (38.0)  
3-5 103 (67.3) 50 (32.7)  
5 or more 
 
85 (60.7) 55 (39.3)  
Number of school magazine 
articles published 
  
0.45 m 
0 376 (64.6) 206 (35.4)  
1 33 (63.5) 19 (36.5)  
2-3 14 (63.6) 8 (36.4)  
4 or more 
 
4 (40.0) 6 (60.0)  
Participated in babysitting 
  
0.46 m 
Never 96 (61.2) 61 (38.8)  
Once or twice 102 (63.0) 60 (37.0)  
Few times a year 127 (70.6) 53 (29.4)  
Regular 
 
99 (61.1) 63 (38.9)  
Participated in domestic 
activity 
  
0.38 m 
Never 23 (62.2) 14 (37.8)  
Once or twice 92 (62.2) 56 (37.8)  
Few times a year 85 (62.5) 51 (37.5)  
Regular 
 
226 (65.7) 118 (34.3)  
Library use 
  
0.96 m 
Once a week 44 (73.3) 16 (26.7)  
Few times a month 31 (54.4) 26 (45.6)  
Few times a year 70 (63.1) 41 (36.9)  
Almost never 
 
281 (64.6) 154 (35.4)  
Participated in Collecting 
  
0.63 p 
No 379 (63.7) 216 (36.3)  
Yes 
 
27 (67.5) 13 (32.5)  
Participated in Chess 
  
0.54 p 
No 357 (64.8) 194 (35.2)  
Yes 
 
49 (61.2) 31 (38.8)  
Participated in Model making 
  
0.84 p 
No 337 (64.6) 185 (35.4)  
Yes 
 
75 (63.6) 43 (36.4)  
Participated in cultural events 
  
0.98 p 
No 340 (64.2) 190 (35.8)  
Yes 
 
72 (64.3) 40 (35.7) t =  Two Sample T Test 
m =  Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 11: Comparison of Individual non-physical activity factors by 
outcome in development dataset (cont.) 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
TV watched on an average 
weekday 
   
0.91 m 
Less than 1 hour 37 (8.6) 29 (12.2)  
1-2 115 (26.9) 55 (23.1)  
3-5 149 (34.8) 81 (34.0)  
More than 5 
 
127 (29.7) 73 (30.7) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
 
 
  
116 
 
3.5.5: Employment and coping behaviours 
 
This area of investigation was broken down into four areas, employment 
history, behavioural history, coping and group affiliation and commitment.  
There were no differences between the pass and fail group relating to 
employment history, indicating that employment prior to enlistment in the 
infantry had no influence on training outcomes (Table 12).   
 
Table 12: Comparison of employment history factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Age of first paid job 
   
0.56 m 
12 or younger 25 (71.4) 10 (28.6)  
13-14 93 (64.6) 51 (35.4)  
15-16 234 (63.9) 132 (36.1)  
17 or older 53 (61.6) 33 (38.4)  
Never had a paid job 
 
22 (66.7) 11 (33.3)  
Did voluntary work 
  
0.85 p 
No 238 (63.8) 135 (36.2)  
Yes 
 
189 (64.5) 104 (35.5)  
Number of part-time hours 
worked during secondary 
education 
  
0.13 m 
None 176 (62.0) 108 (38.0)  
1-5 67 (59.8) 45 (40.2)  
6 or more 
 
184 (68.2) 86 (31.8)  
Full time employment in the 
school holidays 
  
0.17 p 
No 217 (61.8) 134 (38.2)  
Yes 
 
211 (67.0) 104 (33.0)  
Had a paid job supervising 
others 
  
0.77 p 
No 271 (64.5) 149 (35.5)  
Yes 
 
156 (63.4) 90 (36.6)  
Dismissed from a job 
  
0.91 p 
No 290 (64.0) 163 (36.0)  
Yes 
 
138 (64.5) 76 (35.5)  
Occupation prior to 
enlistment 
  
0.14 p 
In school 30 (52.6) 27 (47.4)  
Not employed, looking for work 116 (67.1) 57 (32.9)  
Not employed, not looking for 
work 
21 (65.6) 11 (34.4)  
Employed 229 (66.2) 117 (33.8)  
Something else 
 
31 (54.4) 26 (45.6) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 13 shows the areas of enquiry surrounding behavioural history and 
indicates that those excluded from school three or more times had an 
increased risk associated with failing infantry training (p=0.032).  
 
The study also examined the recruits¶ behaviour with regards to the way that 
they cope with stressful situations and what situations caused them anxiety 
during their school years (Table 14).  Recruits that reacted to stress 
aggressively had a statistically greater chance of failure in comparison to 
those who adopted a more measured approach to stressful situations (56.6% 
vs 43.4% p=0.022).  In addition, not missing any days of school due to 
sickness in the last year of education was a protective factor and associated 
with training success (73% vs 27%). Those taking more than 15 days sickness 
absence during their last year of school have a statistically increased risk of 
failure (58.3% vs 41.7% p=0.022).  
 
The fourth area of enquiry within the conduct and behaviour group of 
questions related to group affiliation and commitment behaviour (Table 15) 
and showed no statistically significant differences between pass and fail, 
indicating that affiliation and commitment behaviour did not have an 
association with training outcome.  
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Table 13: Comparison of behavioural history factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
 
Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Evenings per week spent at 
home  
   
0.19 m 
0-1 98 (56.7) 75 (43.3)  
2-3 192 (68.3) 89 (31.7)  
4-5 93 (65.5) 49 (34.5)  
6-7 
 
43 (62.3) 26 (37.7)  
Volunteered to be School  
prefect / head of year etc. 
  
0.79 m 
Never 352 (64.2) 196 (35.8)  
Once 48 (64.9) 26 (35.1)  
Twice 16 (66.7) 8 (33.3)  
Three times 3 (50.0) 3 (50.0)  
Four or more times 
 
7 (53.9) 6 (46.1)  
Spoken to by school staff 
for  
unacceptable behaviour 
  
0.83 p 
No 96 (63.6) 55 (36.4)  
Yes 
 
329 (64.5) 181 (35.5)  
Hours per week spent  
on homework 
  
0.29 p 
Less than 5 323 (63.3) 187 (36.7)  
5-10 92 (64.8) 50 (35.2)  
11 or more 
 
13 (92.9) 1 (7.1)  
Stayed up all night to  
complete homework 
  
0.62 m 
Never 236 (63.8) 134 (36.2)  
Once or twice 146 (62.7) 87 (37.3)  
Three or four times 21 (72.4) 8 (27.6)  
Five or more times 
 
24 (70.6) 10 (29.4)  
Classroom behaviour in  
history course 
  
0.06 p 
Daydreamed 120 (63.8) 68 (36.2)  
Quietly paid attention 67 (54.9) 55 (45.1)  
Occasionally asked questions 142 (71.0) 58 (29.0)  
Often asked questions 52 (65.0) 28 (35.0)  
Challenged the opinion of the 
teacher 
 
41 (61.2) 26 (38.8)  
Classroom behaviour in  
science course 
  
0.68 p 
Daydreamed 117 (62.6) 70 (37.4)  
Quietly paid attention 78 (60.9) 50 (39.1)  
Occasionally asked questions 115 (67.3) 56 (32.7)  
Often asked questions 82 (66.7) 41 (33.3)  
Challenged the opinion of the 
teacher 
 
31 (59.6) 21 (40.4)  
Played truant 
  
0.16 m 
Never 104 (67.1) 51 (32.9)  
1-2 days 98 (62.4) 59 (37.6)  
3-5 days 65 (68.4) 30 (31.6)  
6-10 days 41 (77.4) 12 (22.6)  
More than 10 days 
 
117 (57.4) 87 (42.6) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 13: Comparison of behavioural history factors by outcome in 
development dataset (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Pass  n(%) Fail  n(%) p Value 
 
Given detention 
   
0.60 m 
Never 43 (55.8) 34 (44.2)  
Once or twice 181 (65.8) 94 (34.2)  
Once a year 31 (70.5) 13 (29.5)  
Every 3 months or more 
 
171 (63.6) 98 (36.4)  
Expelled from school 
  
0.032 m 
Never 211 (67.6) 101 (32.4)  
Once  107 (64.9) 58 (35.1)  
Twice 46 (64.8) 25 (35.2)  
3 times 23 (53.5) 20 (46.5)  
4 or more times 
 
41 (55.4) 33 (44.6) 
 
 
Been in trouble with the 
police 
  
0.16 m 
Never 205 (65.7) 107 (34.3)  
Warning 83 (56.9) 63 (43.1)  
Once 55 (67.1) 27 (32.9)  
2-3 times 59 (72.8) 22 (27.2)  
4 or more times 
 
26 (56.5) 20 (43.5) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 14: Comparison of coping behaviours by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
  
 
Pass  n(%) Fail  n(%) p Value 
Coping strategies 
  
0.022 p 
Aggressive strategies 94 (56.6) 72 (43.4)  
Non aggressive strategies 
 
324 (66.5) 163 (33.5)  
Person talked to most about 
problems 
  
0.39 p 
Parents 163 (61.3) 103 (38.7)  
Relative 37 (61.7) 23 (38.3)  
Friend 178 (64.5) 98 (35.5)  
Teacher, counsellor, religious 
advisor 
3 (100) 0 (0.0)  
'RHVQ¶WFRQILGH 
 
30 (73.2) 11 (26.8)  
Religion 
  
0.89 p 
Did attend religious services 165 (64.5) 91 (35.5)  
Rarely or never attended 
 
262 (63.9) 148 (36.1)  
Sleep required to feel refreshed 
  
0.07 m 
Less than 5 hours 5 (71.4) 2 (28.6)  
5 - 5.5 35 (68.6) 16 (31.4)  
6-6.5 117 (68.4) 54 (31.6)  
7-8 199 (62.6) 119 (37.4)  
More than 8 
 
71 (59.7) 48 (40.3)  
Average sleep per night 
  
0.19 m 
Less than 5 hours 11 (55.0) 9 (45.0)  
5 - 5.5 62 (66.0) 32 (34.0)  
6-6.5 152 (67.9) 72 (32.1)  
7-8 152 (63.9) 86 (36.1)  
More than 8 
 
49 (55.7) 39 (44.3) 
 
 
Causes of anxiety in 1st year of 
secondary school 
  
0.41 p 
Doing well in school 125 (68.7) 57 (31.3)  
Being attractive to the opposite sex 62 (62.6) 37 (37.4)  
Doing well in sports 47 (64.4) 26 (35.6)  
Doing well in acting, music, 
debating etc. 
18 (52.9) 16 (47.1)  
I was never anxious 
 
170 (62.3) 103 (37.7)  
Causes of anxiety during 
secondary school 
  
0.44 p 
Getting into a good university 21 (61.8) 13 (38.2)  
Being attractive to the opposite sex 84 (64.1) 47 (35.9)  
Doing well in sports 75 (67.0) 37 (33.0)  
Doing well in acting, music, 
debating etc. 
35 (53.9) 30 (46.1)  
I was never anxious 
 
208 (65.6) 109 (34.4)  
Sickness during last year of 
school 
  
0.022 m 
Did not miss  a single day 54 (73.0) 20 (27.0)  
1-4 days 140 (65.7) 73 (34.3)  
5-10 days 77 (67.0) 38 (33.0)  
11 to 15 days 38 (62.3) 23 (37.7)  
More than 15 days 
 
119 (58.3) 85 (41.7) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶VChi² 
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Table 15: Comparison of group affiliation behaviours by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
 
Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Magazine articles most likely to 
read 
   
0.77 p 
Ways to relax 108 (65.9) 56 (34.1)  
Better ways to make friends with 
strangers 
80 (63.0) 47 (37.0)  
How to get on in employment 68 (68.7) 31 (31.3)  
How to organise your life 110 (62.2) 67 (37.8)  
How to play the stock market 
 
55 (61.1) 35 (38.9)  
When attending an event they 
would go 
  
0.94 m 
Alone 7 (100) 0 (0.0)  
With one friend 51 (52.6) 46 (47.4)  
With 2-3 friends 155 (70.8) 64 (29.2)  
With 4-6 friends 92 (60.5) 60 (39.5)  
With a group of 7 or more 
 
118 (64.1) 66 (35.9)  
When working on a project they 
worked 
  
0.19 m 
Alone 62 (56.4) 48 (43.6)  
With one friend 119 (65.4) 63 (34.6)  
With 2-3 friends 164 (66.4) 83 (33.6)  
With 4-6 friends 
 
81 (65.3) 43 (34.7)  
Favourite T-shirt logo 
  
0.63 p 
School logo 3 (42.9)  4 (57.1)  
College or pro-sports team 135 (66.2) 69 (33.8)  
A place 13 (68.4) 6 (31.6)  
A saying, phrase, quote or cartoon 77 (60.6) 50 (39.4)  
No logo 
 
197 (64.2) 110 (35.8)  
Number of times they quitted a 
sports team in secondary school 
  
0.71 m 
Never 306 (64.6) 168 (35.4)  
Once 59 (64.1) 33 (35.9)  
2 or more times 13 (54.2) 11 (45.8)  
Never in a sports team 
 
49 (64.5) 27 (35.5)  
Number of times they quitted a 
camp in secondary school 
  
 
Never 283 (65.5) 149 (34.5) 0.21 m 
Once 46 (66.7) 23 (33.3)  
2 or more times 66 (59.5) 45 (40.5)  
Never in a sports team 
 
31 (58.5) 22 (41.5)  
Number of classes dropped in 
secondary school before 
completion 
  
0.08 m 
Never 289 (66.4) 146 (33.6)  
Once 73 (64.0) 41 (36.0)  
2 or more times 
 
66 (56.9) 50 (43.1)  
Organisational affiliation with 
the army score20 
  
0.38 t 
Mean Score (SD) 14.02 (3.0) 13.80 (3.2)  
   
t = Two Sample T 
Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
 
                                            
20
 Score range from 0-20, with higher score indicating greater affiliation to the Army 
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3.5.5.1: Drug and Alcohol Use 
 
Results showed that using certain drugs was common amongst the recruits in 
the development dataset, with 61.6% (n=411) of them having used cannabis 
prior to joining the Army.  The most common drug used within the 
development dataset was cannabis with 31.5% (210) of recruits having used it 
in the year prior to joining. From Table 16 it can be seen that hard drug use 
was relatively rare amongst recruits, and their drug-taking history (before 
adjustment for confounders) was not associated with training.  Alcohol 
consumption was assessed using the World Health Organisation Alcohol Use 
Disorders Identification Test (Babor et al., 2001).  Within the entire 
development dataset population 38.8% (n=259) scored between 8 and 15, 
which indicated hazardous drinking prior to enlistment; 6.6% (n=44) scored 
between 16 and 19 indicating the need for brief intervention and continued 
monitoring, DQG  Q  VFRUHG   LQGLFDWLQJ WKH QHHG IRU GLDJQRVWLF
evaluation for alcohol dependence.  Alcohol consumption prior to service was 
not associated with training outcomes.  
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Table 16: Comparison of Drug and alcohol use history by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
 Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Cannabis 
   
0.57 m 
In the last year 130 (61.9) 80 (38.1)  
More than a year ago 132 (65.7) 69 (34.3)  
Never 
 
163 (64.7) 89 (35.3)  
Amphetamines 
  
0.32 m 
In the last year 27 (60.0) 18 (40.0)  
More than a year ago 47 (60.3) 31 (39.7)  
Never 
 
347 (65.0) 187 (35.0)  
LSD 
  
0.91 m 
In the last year 6 (54.6) 5 (45.4)  
More than a year ago 29 (65.9) 15 (34.1)  
Never 
 
385 (64.3) 214 (35.7)  
Ecstasy 
  
0.19 m 
In the last year 42 (70.0) 18 (30.0)  
More than a year ago 53 (68.0) 25 (32.0)  
Never 
 
330 (63.0) 194 (37.0)  
Semeron 
  
0.20 m 
In the last year 1 (01.0) 0 (0.0)  
More than a year ago 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0)  
Never 
 
419 (64.3) 233 (35.7)  
Poppers 
  
0.56 m 
In the last year 31 (67.4) 15 (32.6)  
More than a year ago 51 (65.4) 27 (34.6)  
Never 
 
340 (63.6) 195 (36.4)  
Tranquillisers 
   
In the last year 7 (77.8) 2 (22.2) 0.75 m 
More than a year ago 13 (61.9) 8 (38.1)  
Never 
 
402 (64.0) 226 (36.0)  
Heroin 
  
0.85 m 
In the last year 1 (100) 0 (0.0)  
More than a year ago 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0)  
Never 
 
418 (64.1) 234 (35.9)  
Magic Mushrooms 
  
0.31 m 
In the last year 8 (72.7) 3 (27.3)  
More than a year ago 32 (69.6) 14 (30.4)  
Never 
 
382 (63.5) 220 (36.5)  
Methadone 
  
0.46 m 
In the last year 1 (100) 0 (0.0)  
More than a year ago 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3)  
Never 
 
419 (64.1) 235 (35.9)  
Crack 
  
0.71 m 
In the last year 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0)  
More than a year ago 8 (72.7) 3 (27.3)  
Never 
 
412 (64.2) 230 (35.8) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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Table 16: Comparison of Drug and alcohol use history by outcome in 
development dataset (cont.) 
 
 
Pass n(%) Fail n(%) p Value 
 
Cocaine 
   
0.84 m 
In the last year 34 (61.8) 21 (38.2)  
More than a year ago 34 (65.4) 18 (34.6)  
Never 
 
356 (64.4) 197 (35.6)  
Anabolic Steroids 
  
0.51 m 
In the last year 4 (80.0) 1 (20.0)  
More than a year ago 5 (45.5) 6 (54.5)  
Never 
 
414 (64.5) 228 (35.5)  
Glue or Solvents 
  
0.89 m 
In the last year 4 (100) 0 (0.0)  
More than a year ago 13 (59.1) 9 (40.9)  
Never 
 
405 (64.3) 225 (35.7)  
Any other drug 
  
0.69 m 
In the last year 5 (71.4) 2 (28.6)  
More than a year ago 8 (66.7) 4 (33.3)  
Never 
 
408 (64.1) 229 (35.9)  
Any Illegal Substance 
  
0.68 m 
In the last year 148 (62.2) 90 (37.8)  
More than a year ago 128 (66.7) 64 (33.3)  
Never 
 
151 (64.0) 85 (36.0)  
Any Illegal Substance 
other than Cannabis 
  
0.98 m 
In the last year 70 (62.5) 42 (37.5)  
More than a year ago 84 (66.7) 42 (33.3)  
Never 
 
272 (64.0) 153 (36.0)  
Alcohol Audit Score 
  
0.36 m 
0-7 176 (64.5) 97 (35.5)  
8-15 177 (68.3) 82 (31.6)  
16-19 21 (47.7) 23 (52.3)  
20+ 22 (56.4) 17 (43.6) t = Two Sample T Test 
m = Two Sample 
Wilcoxon (Mann 
Whitney) Test 
S 3HDUVRQ¶V&KLð 
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3.5.6: Adjusted Model 
 
Those variables considered to be potentially associated with pass or failure 
after adjustment for confounding were selected by drawing up a shortlist of 
variables. To avoid overlooking variables associated with recruitment pass or 
failure that were not predictive until after adjustment for confounders, a liberal 
p value cut-off was used. Variables selected for potential inclusion in the 
model to be used as a basis for risk score calculation were those where the p 
YDOXHIRUXQLYDULDEOHDVVRFLDWLRQVZHUH,QWKHDGMXVWHGPRGHOIROORZLQJ
a process of removing variables in turn, only those variables with a p YDOXH
0.05 remained in the adjusted model.  Table 17 shows the original 22 
variables that made up the shortlist before the modelling process began. 
 
Table 17: Variables shortlisted for inclusion in the multivariable logistic 
regression model (development dataset) 
 
Variable p Value 
Weight 0.16 
Siblings 0.03 
Smoking 0.14 
Age on enlistment 0.04 
Number of schools attended 0.00 
GCSE Results 0.12 
GCSE Results above grade D 0.01 
Number of part-time hours worked during secondary education 0.13 
Full time employment in the school holidays 0.17 
Occupation prior to enlistment 0.14 
Evenings per week spent at home  0.19 
Classroom behaviour in history course 0.06 
Played truant 0.16 
Been in trouble with the police 0.16 
Expelled from school 0.03 
Coping strategies 0.02 
Sleep required to feel refreshed 0.07 
Average sleep per night 0.19 
Sickness during last year of school 0.02 
When working on a project in secondary school they preferred to: 0.19 
Number of classes dropped in secondary school before completion 0.08 
Ecstasy 0.19 
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Following the removal of 15 variables through the modelling process the final 
model included seven variables (Table 18). A statistical decision had to be 
taken as regards the inclusion of the classroom behaviour variable as on the 
final round of modelling this variable returned a p value of 0.052. As this value 
was clearly on the threshold for inclusion the decision was taken to include it 
in the final model with the acknowledgement that its relevance must not be 
overplayed. The model suggests that there are four areas that influence 
training outcome: demographic factors, educational background, response to 
schooling and drug taking.   
 
Table 18 shows that for recruits who grew up in a family with sisters (OR 0.54, 
95% CI 0.33 to 0.88) or brothers and sisters (OR 0.54 95% CI 0.34-0.84) the 
odds of failure decreased by just over a half of that of the reference group.  
This would indicate that growing up in a family with female siblings was a 
protective factor and was associated with training success.  Recruits that 
adopted non-aggressive coping strategies also reduced their odds of failure by 
over a half compared to those who adopted aggressive coping strategies (OR 
0.6 95% CI 0.41-0.9).  
 
In addition, the number of evenings spent in the family home was also a 
protective factor, as those spending 2-3 evenings a week in the family home 
(OR 0.53 95% CI 0.34-0.81) reduced their odds of failure by just over a half 
compared to the reference group and those spending 4-5 evenings in the 
family home (OR 0.58 95% CI 0.35-0.97) slightly increased those odds. 
 
Recruits who attended three or more schools (OR 1.98 95% CI 1.04-3.78) and 
those recruits who quietly paid attention in their history class  
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(OR 1.92 95% CI 1.15-3.22) nearly doubled their odds of failure compared to 
the reference groups. However, as already mentioned, the p value (p=0.052) 
for classroom behaviour in history was on the threshold for inclusion in the 
model so this odds ratio should not be overplayed. 
 
Table 18: Predictive model factors associated with training outcome 
after adjustment for each other (development dataset). 
 
 Odds Ratio (95%CI) P Value 
Siblings 
 
 
Same sex 1.0 
0.005 
Opposite sex 0.54 (0.33-0.88) 
Same & opposite sex 0.54 (0.34-0.84) 
Only child 
 
1.35 (0.61-2.96) 
Coping strategies 
 
 
Aggressive strategies 1.0 
0.013 Non aggressive strategies 
 
0.6 (0.41-0.9) 
Ecstasy 
 
 
In the last year 1.0 
0.02 More than a year ago 0.96 (0.43-2.11) Never 
 
1.87 (0.97-3.59) 
Evenings per week spent at 
home  
 
 
0-1 1.0 
0.032 
2-3 0.53 (0.34-0.81) 
4-5 0.58 (0.35-0.97) 
6-7 
 
0.64 (0.34-1.23) 
Played truant 
 
 
Never 1.0 
0.039 
1-2 days 1.3 (0.79-2.16) 
3-5 days 0.91 (0.5-1.65) 
6-10 days 0.56 (0.26-1.2) 
More than 10 days 
 
1.54(0.94-2.53) 
Number of schools attended 
 
 
1 1.0 
0.046 2 1.45 (0.94-2.24) 3 or more 
 
1.98 (1.04-3.78) 
Classroom behaviour in history 
course 
  
Daydreamed 1.0 0.052 
Quietly paid attention 1.92 (1.15-3.22)  
Occasionally asked questions 0.91 (0.56-1.45)  
Often asked questions 1.11 (0.61-2.03)  
Challenged the opinion of the 
teacher 
 
1.19 (0.64-2.23)  
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3.6: Phase 1b: Analysis of test dataset  
 
3.6.1: Accuracy of prediction 
 
To assess the predictive value of the model created on the development 
dataset a risk score of failure was produced for each recruit in the test data 
set.  To retain the LQWHJULW\ RI WKH PRGHO WKH µLQWHUFHSW¶ DQG µUHJUHVVLRQ
FRHIILFLHQWV¶ ZHUH IL[HG IURP WKH PRGHO FUHDWHG LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW GDWDVHW
DQGGXPP\YDULDEOHVFUHDWHGXVLQJWKHµ[L¶IXQFWLRQLQ6WDWDVee Table 19). 
 
Table 19: Logistic regression model intercept and regression 
coefficients of ࢞ respectively 
 
 Intercept ߚ଴=-0.26 Explanatory variables  
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
co
e
ffi
cie
nt
s 
ߚଵ=-0.62 ईଵ= sisters (1=yes 0=no) ߚଶ=-0.62 ईଶ= brother and sisters (1=yes 0=no) ߚଷ=0.30 ईଷ= only child (1=yes 0=no) ߚସ=0.37 ईସ= attended two different schools (1=yes 0=no) ߚହ=0.69 ईହ= attended three or more different schools (1=yes 0=no) ߚ଺=-0.64 ई଺= spent 2-3 evenings at home per week (1=yes 0=no) ߚ଻=-0.54 ई଻= spent 4-5 evenings at home per week (1=yes 0=no) ߚ଼=-0.44 ई଼= spent 6-7 evenings at home per week (1=yes 0=no) ߚଽ=0.65 ईଽ= quietly pain attention in history class (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵ଴=-0.09 ईଵ଴= occasionally asked questions in history class (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵଵ=0.11 ईଵଵ= often asked questions in history class (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵଶ=0.18 ईଵଶ= challenges the opinion of the teacher in history 
class 
(1=yes 0=no) ߚଵଷ=0.27 ईଵଷ= was truant 1-2 days in last year of school (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵସ=-0.09 ईଵସ= was truant 3-5 days in last year of school (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵହ=-0.59 ईଵହ= was truant 6-10 days in last year of school (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵ଺=0.43 ईଵ଺= was truant 10 or more days in last year of school (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵ଻=-0.51 ईଵ଻= copes with stress using non-aggressive 
strategies 
(1=yes 0=no) ߚଵ଼=-0.04 ईଵ଼= taken ecstasy more than a year ago (1=yes 0=no) ߚଵଽ=0.62 ईଵଽ= never taken ecstasy (1=yes 0=no) 
 
The intercept in Table 19 shows the value of ݖ (-0.26) when the value of all 
independent variables is zero.  Each of the regression coefficients describes 
the size of the contribution of that risk factor, a positive coefficient meaning 
that the explanatory variable increases the probability of failure in training and 
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a negative coefficient meaning that the explanatory variable decreases the 
probability of failure in training. A large regression coefficient means that the 
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of the outcome and a 
near zero regression coefficient means that the explanatory variable has little 
influence on the outcome. Each coefficient represents the log odds of failure 
and when exponentiated produce the odds ratios reported in Table 18. The 
model developed in the development dataset predicts the potential risk of a 
recruit failing in training. To determine the risk of failure in the test dataset the 
following equation was used: ଵଵା௘ష೥ , where ݖ = -0.26+(-0.62)(ईଵ)+(-0.62)(ईଶሻ+(0.30) (ईଷሻ+(0.37) 
(ईସሻ+(0.69)(ईହሻ+(-0.64) (ई଺ሻ+(-0.54)(ई଻ሻ+(-0.44)(ई଼ሻ+(0.65)(ईଽሻ+ 
(-0.09)(ईଵ଴ሻ+(0.11)(ईଵଵሻ+(0.18)(ईଵଶሻ+(0.27)(ईଵଷሻ+(-0.09)(ईଵସሻ+ 
(-0.59)(ईଵହሻ+(0.43)(ईଵ଺ሻ+(-0.51)(ईଵ଻ሻ+(-0.04)(ईଵ଼ሻ+(0.62)(ईଵଽሻ 
 
Below is an example of a calculation (regression coefficients and explanatory 
variables taken from Table 19) for a recruit who grew up in a family with 
brothers and sisters, attended three or more different schools, spent six to 
seven nights a week in the family home, challenged the opinion of their 
teacher in history class, was truant for more than ten days in the last year of 
school and had taken ecstasy more than a year ago. The calculation produces 
a risk score of 0.64 indicating that this recruits potential risk of failure is 64%. ଵଵା௘ష೥ , where ݖ = -0.26+(-0.62)( )+(-0.62)( ?ሻ+(0.30) ( ?ሻ+(0.37) 
( ?ሻ+(0.69)( ?ሻ+(-0.64) ( ?ሻ+(-0.54)( ?ሻ+(-0.44)( ?ሻ+(0.65)( ?ሻ+(-0.09) 
( ?ሻ+(0.11)( ?ሻ+(0.18)( ?ሻ+(0.27)( ?ሻ+(-0.09)( ?ሻ+(-0.59)( ?ሻ+(0.43)( ?ሻ+ 
(-0.51)( ?ሻ+(-0.04)( ?ሻ+(0.62)( ?ሻ 
 
Table 20 shows how the logistic model performed when applied to the test 
dataset. The predicted risk was divided into deciles and a mean risk calculated 
for each deciles. The predicted outcome of training was then tabulated with 
the actual outcome of training to demonstrate how the model performed.  
Table 20 shows that there was greater variation between observed and 
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predicted outcomes for participants with higher predicted scores and a 
fluctuation above and below the predicted line throughout the deciles. 
 
Table 20: Accuracy of prediction in test dataset 
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3.6.2: Sensitivity and Specificity 
 
After the recruits in the test dataset were placed in predictive value deciles the 
results were tested for how well the model differentiated between pass and fail 
with a Receiver Operation Characteristic Curve (Table 21).  The area under 
the curve on the test dataset was 0.58 (95% CI 0.501-0.65), indicating that 
although the predicative ability of the model is better than chance (with the 
lower confidence interval just excluding 0.5) the proportion of recruits whom it 
could correctly predict a training outcome for is too small to recommend its 
use in routine practice .  
 
Table 21: Receiver operating curve on test dataset   
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To calculate sensitivity, specificity, and the correctly classified value the cut 
point at greater than and equal to 38.0 (cut point 05) is used as an example 
(Table 22). 
 
Table 22: Sensitivity and specificity example at cut point 05 (>=38.0) 
 
Ac
tu
al
 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
 
Cut point 05 (>=38.0) 
 
 Positive Negative Total 
Abnormal (fail) 62 53 115 
Normal (pass) 79 121 200 
Total 141 174 315 
 
The positive column demonstrates that the model at the selected cut point 
correctly predicted 62 recruits who failed in training, giving a sensitivity of    ? ? ? ? ?ൗ  or 53.9%.  The negative column demonstrates that at the selected cut 
point 121 were correctly identified as not being at risk of failing and 
subsequently passed training, giving a specificity of  ? ? ? ? ? ?ൗ  or 60.5%. In 
addition the model identified 79 recruits who subsequently passed and missed 
53 recruits who failed.   
 
To generate the positive predictive values the sum of those correctly identified 
as failing is divided by the total of all those predicted to fail, generating a 
positive predictive value of   ? ? ? ? ?ൗ or 44%. To generate the negative 
predictive value the sum of those correctly predicted to pass training is divided 
with the total of all those who passed, generating a negative predictive value 
of  ? ? ? ? ? ?ൗ or 69.5%.  To generate a correctly classified outcome for each cut 
point the true positive (n=62) and true negative (n=121) were added together 
and divided with the entire total of recruits in the observation, giving a correctly 
classified value of  ? ?൅  ? ? ? ? ? ?ൗ or 58.1%.   
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Table 23: Sensitivity and specificity (test dataset) 
 
Score Cut 
Point 
Sensitivity Specificity Correctly 
Classified 
PPV NPV 
>=14.9   96.5%    4.5%    38.1% 36.8% 69.2% 
>=21.6   89.6%    18.5%    44.4% 38.7% 75.5% 
>=25.3   80.0%    29.5%    47.9% 39.5% 72.0% 
>=29.0 71.3%    38.5%    50.5% 40.0% 70.0% 
>=33.3   64.3%    51.0%    55.9% 43.0% 71.3% 
>=38.0   53.9%    60.5%    58.1% 44.0% 69.5% 
>=40.7  39.1%    68.5%    57.8% 41.7% 66.2% 
>=44.0  29.6%    78.5%    60.6% 44.2% 66.0% 
>=49.8  14.8%    86.0% 60.0% 37.8% 63.7% 
>=62.3   4.3%    95.5%    62.2% 35.7% 63.5% 
 
Table 23 shows the positive and negative predictive values at deciles cut 
points.  The highest positive predictive value was 44.2%, at the cut-point 
greater than or equal to 44.0, which would indicate that if the model was used 
to predict training failure, 55.3% of recruits would be incorrectly classified as 
potential training failures when they would have passed.  As with the results of 
the receiver operating curve, this positive predictive value further supports the 
evidence that the model does not have an acceptable enough degree of 
accuracy for predicating training outcome for it to be recommended as a 
training selection tool. 
 
3.7: Summary 
The aim of this phase of the study was to identify the role that antecedent 
personal, social and demographic factors play in predicting a British Army 
UHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\WRFRPSOHWHEDVLFWUDLQLQJDQGWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
identifying those at risk of being unable to cope with the psychological 
transition to life in the British Army.  
 
The biographical questionnaire has identified seven personal, social and 
demographic variables associated with training outcome, and provided an 
insight into the demographic and educational background as well behavioural 
traits that are associated with training failure. 
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The predictive ability of the logistic model was relatively poor, and even 
though the predictive ability of the model is better than chance, the proportion 
of recruits that it could incorrectly predict a training outcome for is too great to 
recommend its use as a screening tool.  
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CHAPTER 4: PHASE 2 RESULTS 
 
 
4.1: Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the interviews that were undertaken with 
100 recruits who failed to complete training.  As explained earlier, framework 
analysis was used to build up the findings over five stages (familiarisation, 
thematic framework, indexing, charting and mapping and interpretation). One 
of the charts has been included in the text as an example to illustrate the 
process and the remainder are included in the appendices. 
 
4.2: Familiarisation 
 
The familiarisation process was systematically applied to the interview notes 
to ensure full immersion in the textual notes once data collection had been 
completed.  The case notes from each interview consisted of the hand written 
QRWHVRIWKHLQWHUYLHZWKDW,FRQGXFWHGDQGHDFKUHFUXLW¶V&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU
leaving report.  Initially, these two sets of data were read separately and 
patterns of responses were mapped in two separate familiarisation 
frameworks (see Figure 9 and Figure 10) show the early groupings of data 
that helped to explain more about the recruit journey and why infantry recruits 
were leaving training21.  
  
Figure 11 demonstrates the initial process of framework analysis 
(familiarisation), using the original areas of enquiry as a starting point (see Box 
1 of Figure 11,QEROGFDQEHVHHQLQLWLDOWKRXJKWVDERXWWKLVGDWD¶VPHDQLQJ
                                            
21
 Figure 9 shows a group heading for bullying, which was specifically asked about because of 
adverse media publicity surrounding the mistreatment of recruits prior and during the study 
period.  Each recruit interviewed was asked if he had been bullied and as can be seen from 
Table 1 there were no reports of bullying. 
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which were eventually grouped into emerging themes and the basis for a 
thematic framework (Box 2 of Figure 11).  
 
As the emerging themes developed there was evidence that they overlapped. 
In Figure 9 Group 2 the recruits talk about their experience not being what 
they expected, and in Figure 9 Group 3 the recruits again discuss the 
demands of training and the concept of fitting into service life.  It is clear they 
were not expecting the harshness of the discipline and the extent of the 
physical training, and these observations suggest recruits were unprepared for 
the impact of enlistment.   
 
Group 4 Figure 9 came about after reading through the data numerous times.  
There was a feeling that some recruits started interviews with a clear reason 
for leaving such as family illness or their girlfriends having problems in 
pregnancy.  The recruit expressed that they had no control over that decision 
and that they had to sacrifice their employment to return home.  Underlying 
that however was evidence that this group of recruits experienced the same 
difficulties that all the other recruits did.  It appeared that there was a sense of 
embarrassment for failing and that the individual was constructing a mitigation 
to save face amongst his peers.  To further get a feel for this at this phase of 
the analysis a brief cross reference with the objective data (Commanding 
Officer reports) revealed that there was definitely a conflict between the story 
the recruits told to the me and the reasons given to the Commanding Officers.  
This was an unexpected phenomenon and therefore was carried through as 
part of the thematic framework.  
 
Group 5 Figure 9 addressed a question posed by training staff who believed 
that if recruits were made to stay for the duration of the basic training then 
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there would be an increase in self-harming behaviour or an escalation of bad 
behaviour to force discharge.  To test that assumption, recruits who were 
leaving were asked to reflect on compulsory National Service and how they 
would feel if they had to serve a minimum time.  The response received was 
XQH[SHFWHGDVPDQ\VWDWHGWKDWWKH\ZRXOG³MXVWJHWRQZLWKLW´ 
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Figure 9: Familiarisation of subjective data (recruit interviews) 
 
 
 
 
Leavers were experiencing stress, 
unhappiness and low mood that was 
linked to the situation that they 
found themselves in and the 
perception of being trapped. 
 
 
Subjective evidence in all 
of a level of distress at the 
thought of remaining in the 
army 
Feelings of failure 
Loss of freedom of choice 
SUD scale showed a 
degree of distress in all 
those that wanted to leave 
± this was relieved as soon 
as they were released from 
service 
All had good frequent 
contact with family ± no 
restrictions or control and 
had weekend leave 
No contact with home or 
reduced contact would 
make things worse 
Unhappy to a point where 
not feeling like their usual 
self 
Letting family down 
Not letting family down, 
it is what he wants / 
individualism Wants individual time 
and be able to do 
their own thing 
Feeling of imprisonment 
Nostalgic thoughts, both feeling of 
homesickness and a realisation that 
reality of army life did not match the 
pre-conceived fantasy 
Did not think properly about joining prior to 
enlistment 
Not like the Army Cadets 
Thought it would be more interesting 
Preferred old job 
Leavers talked about an inability 
to fit in to the culture that they 
found themselves in 
Not yet ready or 
mature enough for 
Army life 
Physical training and 
physical demands too 
much 
Mentally demanding 
Describes anxiety prior to 
certain lessons µFDQ¶WFRSH¶
pressure to much 
Difficulty in coping with 
discipline, this is their first 
ever exposure to discipline 
at this level 
Did not feel that he as an 
individual was suited to the Army 
Disliked the communal living 
Did not fit in with Peer group 
Found younger members of the 
platoon irritating, fed up of group 
punishment due to the infractions of 
the few 
If made to stay, i.e. 
National Service 
Would escalate behaviour 
to effect release, i.e. self-
harm / AWOL 
Would get on with it 
and make the best 
Did not enjoy the work, it was 
boring / not interesting 
No evidence or reports of bullying 
Relationship failure / childcare 
issues / sick relatives / must 
leave to care for problems at 
home 
Too many problems to stay ? Legitimatisation of failure 
Performance reports suggest poor 
performance, ? looking for a face 
saving escape without loss of 
credibility (see Table 2) 
1
. 
2
. 
3
. 
4
. 
5
. 
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Figure 10: Familiarisation of objective data (Commanding Officer reports)
  
The recruit struggled with the 
physical and mental demands of 
training 
Poor performer 
Lack of commitment 
Not applied himself to his full 
potential 
 
 
Lack of mental robustness 
Immaturity 
Convinced self that he could not pass 
Not committed or supported in 
joining 
Not supported by 
significant other to remain 
in the Army 
-RLQHGDJDLQVWIDPLO\¶V
wishes 
Immaturity 
Does not have the maturity to 
meet the demands of training 
Questionable whether he has ability to 
cope with training 
Homesickness 
Preferred job outside 
Misses family / Girlfriend 
Performed well ± but home sickness 
has prompted DAOR 
The recruit did not identify 
with Army culture 
Failed to conform to discipline 
Failed to fit in 
Failed to adapt to army 
life 
Multiple presentations to the medical 
centre / avoiding training with medical 
appointments 
Performing well but could no longer 
cope with the course or the 
environment 
Boredom 
Training unchallenging 
Does not like routine 
1. 
2
. 
3. 
4. 
5. 6. 
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Figure 11: Process of analysis: Familiarisation 
2 
Areas of Enquiry 
 
Reason for leaving 
 
Psychological impact of failure 
 
Stability of mood related to failure 
 
Expectations of service 
 
Motivators to stay 
 
Benefit of close family contact in early 
training 
 
Objective view of causative reasons for 
failure from training staff 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
1. Recruits were describing difficulties in coping 
with the situation they found themselves in with 
evidence of deterioration in mood 
 
2. Recruits described the feeling of not fitting in 
to the environment they found themselves in 
 
3. Recruits described loss of freedom, 
harshness of discipline and the changes that 
they had to make.  This described journey with 
obstacles that they had to overcome  
 
4. Legitimisation of failure 
 
 
1 
Familiarisation Thematic Framework 
with index Charting Mapping
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An important theme that did emerge in the familiarisation process can be seen 
in Figure 9, group 1. There was evidence from the Subjective Units of 
Disturbance scores that recruits (n=33) experienced a level of distress as a 
result of their military experience. The stress caused by joining the Army was 
an important factor for many of the recruits, and there was evidence that in the 
majority of the cases of those interviewed, the recruit had experienced some 
degree of lowered mood (mean Subjective Units of Disturbance score was 3.8 
(SD=2.5) where 10 = normal mood and 0 = most unhappy they had ever felt).  
 
The objective data was less easy to group during this phase as can been seen 
in Figure 10. Many of the emerging themes appear to be interlinked and 
separating them out or de-contextualising them would probably remove the 
subtle but important relationships that this data shows.  The Commanding 
Officers did, however, give a number of distinct reasons for these recruits 
leaving:  
 
1. Physical and mental demands of training too challenging 
2. Lack of commitment 
3. Immaturity 
4. Homesickness 
5. Lack of identification with Army culture 
6. Failure to fit in 
 
7KHVH REVHUYDWLRQV FRQFXU ZLWK WKH UHFUXLW¶V RZQ DFFRXQWV WR VXJJHVW
unrealistic expectations amongst the recruits that failed and a lack of 
preparation for training - both physically and psychologically.  Very much 
linked to the perception of lack of commitment were the notion of 
psychological immaturity within the recruit; the element of childlike surrender 
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ratheU WKDQ WKH H[SHFWHG ³PDWXUH´ DSSURDFK RI VXIIHULQJ WKH KDUGVKLS RI
training for the eventual gain of success.  What was clearly observed in both 
sets of data was the underlying notion that the individual must adapt to the 
$UP\DQG µILW-LQ¶ WR WKHFXOWXUH failure to do so seemed to precede failure of 
Army Infantry training. 
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4.2: Thematic Framework 
The evidence provided by the familiarisation process (Figure 9 and Figure 10) 
led to the formulation of four emerging themes (coping, fitting in, transition and 
legitimisation of failure) that were used to establish the thematic framework 
headings and subsequently the index.  It is fully accepted that at the stage of 
creating the thematic framework not only should the areas of enquiry and 
familiarisation be drawn upon, but the researcher should also reflect on a priori 
knowledge to ensure that the aims of the research that constructed the 
questions are tested for validity in the data (Ritchie and Spencer, 2002). 
 
4.2.1: Coping 
The familiarisation data identified that a transitional phase occurs, where the 
recruit either adapts to service life or fails in training.  To adapt, the recruit 
appears to need an emotional resource to cope with the transitory phase. 
When recruits fail to cope with the adaptation, there is a visible deterioration in 
their emotional wellbeing and training performance, as they acknowledge that 
they have reached the limit of their ability to cope.  This emotional or 
psychological deterioration was observed in the majority of those interviewed.  
The thought processes that the recruit expressed as their mood deteriorated 
ZDVLPSRUWDQWDVWKHVXEVHTXHQWVKLIWLQWKLQNLQJIURP³,DPQRWFRSLQJ´WR³,
FDQ¶WFRSH´DSSHDUVWREHWKHGHILQLWLYHSRLQWDWZKLFKWKHUHFUXLWDFFHSWVKLV
fate and fails in training. It was evident that the deterioration in mood and 
decline in performance was gradual, and the reasons that recruits gave to 
explain their unhappiness and disillusionment were multiple (Figure 12, Box 3 
(1.1 ± 1.6)).  The effect on mood appeared to be progressive until a point of 
realisation that they could no longer cope with the environment they found 
themselves in.  In order to fully understand this process, the impact on mood 
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DQGWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\WRFRSHZDVH[DPLQHGZLWKLQHDFKRI WKHWKHPDWLF
groupings. 
 
4.2.2: Fitting In 
The concept of fitting in was a global notion given in conjunction with another, 
more specific reason.  For example a recruit would talk about not being 
allowed out and would then conclude that they did not fit into the Army or the 
Infantry Training Centre because they had lost their freedom.  Figure 12, Box 
3 (2.1-2.5) identifies the reasons given within the thematic group for not fitting 
in. At this sWDJHRIWKHDQDO\VLVLWZDVDOUHDG\HPHUJLQJWKDWWKHQRWLRQRIµQRW
ILWWLQJLQ¶FDUULHGIDUPRUHZHLJKWWKDQWKHGDWDPLJKWKDYHILUVWVXJJHVWHG 
 
4.2.3: Transition 
A clear picture of a recruit journey was emerging.  This started with ambition 
and excitement and concluded with failure to achieve their ultimate goal: to 
successfully pass out of training as a trained infantry soldier.  It appears that 
failure occurred dXULQJWKLVWUDQVLWLRQDOSHULRGZKHQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDGDSWDWLRQ
to service life was blocked or when they perceived the challenges of the 
situation to be too great.  During the familiarisation process it became clear 
that a key causative factor in the indiYLGXDO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGMXVW WR WKLV QHZ
culture was poor preparation, secondary to unrealistic or uninformed 
expectations.   Figure 12 Box 3  shows how µILWWLQJLQ¶DORQJZLWKWKHQRWLRQRI
µWUDQVLWLRQ¶ KDYH EHHQ JLYHQ HTXDO SULRULW\ ZLWK µFRSLQJ¶ LQ WKH WKHPDWLF
IUDPHZRUNDVWKH\DSSHDUWRGHILQHNH\TXDOLWLHVLQWKHUHFUXLWV¶MRXUQH\ 
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4.2.4: Legitimisation of Failure 
As described above, a separate theme that emerged unexpectedly from the 
familiarisation data was the phenomenon that some recruits were creating 
institutionally acceptable reasons as to why they had to leave when in reality 
they were struggling to cope in the same way as their peers.  In addition to this 
there was some suggestion by Commanding Officers that some individuals 
were also manufacturing their own discharge by deliberately behaving in a 
way that would get them dismissed.   
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Figure 12: Process of analysis: Thematic Framework and Index 
2 
Areas of Enquiry 
 
Reason for leaving 
 
Psychological impact of failure 
 
Stability of mood related to failure 
 
Expectations of service 
 
Motivators to stay 
 
Benefit of close family contact in early 
training 
 
Objective view of causative reasons for 
failure from training staff 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
1. Transitional period when adapting to new 
social environment with poor expectation of 
what military life entailed 
 
2. An inability to cope with the impact of 
transition to military life within a closed 
institution 
 
3. Deterioration in psychological wellbeing and 
performance of the individual as they begin to 
acknowledge that they can no longer cope 
 
4. Legitimisation of failure 
 
 
Thematic Headings with Index 
 
Coping 
 
1.1 Deterioration in Mood 
1.2  Homesick 
1.3  Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
1.4 Immaturity 
1.5 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick relative 
1.6 Contact with Family 
 
Fitting In 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
2.5  Inappropriate recruitment 
 
Transition  
 
3.1 Psychologically and physically 
unprepared for transition to 
service 
3.2 Option to leave made too easy 
(National Service Ethos) 
3.3 Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Legitimisation of failure 
 
4.1 Bad behaviour to ensure 
dismissal 
4.2 Create a demand that 
necessitates exit from service 
 
 
1 3 
Familiarisation Thematic Framework 
with index Charting Mapping
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4.3: Index 
The initial index was applied to the data and developed as each additional 
multiple of 10 case files were added.  This process continued until data 
saturation was reached (n=33 case files) and no additional index headings 
appeared.  Figure 12 Box 3 shows the completed index for the study.   
 
4.4: Charting 
The charting process involves rearranging the data according to the 
appropriate part of the thematic framework to which they relate and forming 
charts (Pope et al., 2000). The textual data was systematically labelled using 
the index and initially organised into tables (or charts) under the headings in 
Box 3 of Figure 12.  This then enabled the data to be constructed so that the 
whole picture of what the data was describing could be seen (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 2002).  This process of refining the initial thematic (chart) groups into 
a mature stage of analysis required a considerable degree of abstraction and 
synthesis, as the charts were constructed from distilled summaries, views and 
experiences from within the textual data (Pope et al., 2000).    
 
As the charting process progressed, it became apparent that the recruit was 
subjected to situational stressors on enlistment (this is stress caused by the 
physical environment that they find themselves in).  These stressors or 
situational demands can be divided, as shown on Figure 13 Box 4, into 
institutional or individual demands, each with their own particular stressors.  
The individual demands on the recruit were relatively straight forward, i.e. their 
girlfriend became pregnant or a relative was ill.  However, the institutional 
demands were far wider ranging and the impact that the institution had on the 
recruit was dependent on how that individual recruit coped with that particular 
stressor.   
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Figure 13: Process of analysis: Charting 
2 
Areas of Enquiry 
 
Reason for leaving 
 
Psychological impact of failure 
 
Stability of mood related to failure 
 
Expectations of service 
 
Motivators to stay 
 
Benefit of close family contact in early 
training 
 
Objective view of causative reasons for 
failure from training staff 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
1. Transitional period when adapting to new 
social environment with poor expectation of 
what military life entailed 
 
2. An inability to cope with the impact of 
transition to military life within a closed 
institution 
 
3. Deterioration in psychological wellbeing and 
performance of the individual as they begin to 
acknowledge that they can no longer cope 
 
4. Legitimisation of failure 
 
 
Thematic Headings with Index 
 
Coping 
 
1.2 Deterioration in Mood 
1.2  Homesick 
1.3  Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
1.7 Immaturity 
1.8 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick relative 
1.9 Contact with Family 
 
Fitting In 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
2.5  Inappropriate recruitment 
 
Transition  
 
3.1 Psychologically and physically 
unprepared for transition to 
service 
3.2 Option to leave made too easy 
(National Service Ethos) 
3.3 Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Legitimisation of failure 
 
4.1 Bad behaviour to ensure 
dismissal 
4.2 Create a demand that 
necessitates exit from service 
 
 
Situational Demand 
 
Institutional Demands 
 
1.1 Deterioration in Mood 
1.3 Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
1.4  Immaturity 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
3.3  Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Individual Demands 
 
1.2 Homesick 
1.5 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick relative 
1.6 Contact with Family 
 
 
1 3 
4 
Familiarisation Thematic Framework 
with index Charting Mapping
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4.5: Mapping and Interpretation 
As the analysis entered the mapping and interpretation process clear themes 
had already emerged.  It became apparent that enlistment into the Army 
Infantry was a journey, and during that journey the recruit had to cope and 
adapt psychologically and physically to fit into their new surroundings.  What 
was also clear was that during the journey or transitional process they had to 
cope with multiple situational demands.  Those demands were situational 
stressors of an institutional or individual nature (see Figure 14) and their 
FXPXODWLYHHIIHFWDSSHDUHGWRHURGHWKHUHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\ WRFRSHZLWK WUDLQLQJ 
Figure 14 illustrates two points: (1) it appears that it is the psychological 
response to the situational stressors that causes failure, and (2) it rarely 
appears to be a single situational stressor in isolation that impacts on the 
individual, but multiples of stressors that have a cumulative effect.  The 
cumulative effect of these stressors is that the recruit reaches a point where 
WKH\ IHHO WKDW WKH\FDQQR ORQJHUFRSH  ,W LVDW WKLVSRLQWZKHQ WKH UHFUXLW¶V
capacity to cope is exhausted, that they seem to make the decision that they 
no longer belong or (as described by many recruits) they feel they no longer 
µILW-LQ¶  
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Not Fitting InNot Coping
Difficulty in 
Coping
Institutional 
Demands
Physical
Unable to cope 
psychologically 
with the physical 
demands
Emotional
Deterioration in 
Mood
Immaturity
Cultural
Loss of Freedom
Failure of 
Expectation
Failure to adapt to 
culture
Breech of 
discipline
Lack of 
determination
Lack of maturity to 
cope with the 
transitional period
Individual 
demands
Social
Relationship 
Failure / problems 
at home / sick
Pregnancy
Family Illness
No support from 
significant  others
EmotionalHome sickness
Figure 14,PSDFWRIPXOWLSOHVLWXDWLRQDOVWUHVVRUVRQWKHUHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\to complete training 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSE 
IMPACT OF CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
SITUATIONAL STRESSORS 
CUMULATIVE EFFECT 
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Figure 15: Process of analysis: Mapping and Interpretation 
2 
Areas of Enquiry 
 
Reason for leaving 
 
Psychological impact of failure 
 
Stability of mood related to failure 
 
Expectations of service 
 
Motivators to stay 
 
Benefit of close family contact in early 
training 
 
Objective view of causative reasons for 
failure from training staff 
 
Emerging Themes 
 
1. Transitional period when adapting to new 
social environment with poor expectation of 
what military life entailed 
 
2. An inability to cope with the impact of 
transition to military life within a closed 
institution 
 
3. Deterioration in psychological wellbeing and 
performance of the individual as they begin to 
acknowledge that they can no longer cope 
 
4. Legitimisation of failure 
 
 
Thematic Headings with Index 
 
Coping 
 
1.3 Deterioration in Mood 
1.2  Homesick 
1.3  Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
1.10 Immaturity 
1.11 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick relative 
1.12 Contact with Family 
 
Fitting In 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
2.5  Inappropriate recruitment 
 
Transition  
 
3.1 Psychologically and physically 
unprepared for transition to 
service 
3.2 Option to leave made too easy 
(National Service Ethos) 
3.3 Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Legitimisation of failure 
 
4.1 Bad behaviour to ensure 
dismissal 
4.2 Create a demand that 
necessitates exit from service 
 
 
Situational Demand 
 
Institutional Demands 
 
1.3 Deterioration in Mood 
1.4 Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
1.4  Immaturity 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
3.3  Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive 
dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Individual Demands 
 
1.4 Homesick 
1.5 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick relative 
1.7 Contact with Family 
 
 
Institutional Demand 
 
Physical Demands 
 
1.3 Unable to cope psychologically 
with physical demands 
Emotional Demands 
 
1.1 Deterioration in Mood 
1.4  Immaturity 
 
Cultural Demands 
 
2.1  Loss of freedom 
2.2  Failure of expectation 
2.3  Failure to adapt to culture 
2.4  Breech of discipline 
3.3  Lack of determination  
3.4 Lacking the emotional maturity 
to cope with the transitional 
period 
 
Individual Demand 
 
Emotional 
  
1.2 Homesick 
 
Social 
 
 
1.5 Relationship Failure / problems 
at home  / sick 
 
 1.5a  Pregnancy 
 1.5b  Family Illness 
 1.5c  No support from significant 
other(s) 
 
  
1 3 
4 
5 
6 
Familirisation Thematic Framework 
with index Charting Mapping
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4.5.1: Coping 
 
Within the mapping process the data analysis identified the situational 
demands placed on the individual recruit.  During this process it was 
imperative that whilst examining the textual data at such a detailed level, the 
more broad overarching factors were not lost.  The concept of coping and 
fitting in are both broad concepts within the textual data, whereas the 
situational demands that have been identified give the reasons as to why the 
recruit did not fit in and ultimately did not cope.  Whilst progressing through the 
mapping process each situational demand was considered in relation to fitting 
in and coping.   
 
,WKDVDOUHDG\EHHQ LGHQWLILHG WKDWWKHUHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\RU LQDELOLW\ WRFRSHZLWK
the situational stressors or demands of the enlistment journey is fundamental 
to their success or failure.  The impact of those demands was not linear; they 
appeared to have a cyclic action on each other, leading to a domino effect as 
HDFKGHPDQGLQWXUQFKDOOHQJHGWKHUHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\WRFRSH 
 
This association is most prominent in the data when observing the effect that 
performance and mood appear to have of each other.  By looking at the 
UHVSRQVHRIWKHUHFUXLWVDQGFRPSDULQJWKHPZLWKWKHLU&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU¶V
assessments, it was possible to distinguish a cycle of behavioural decline 
taking place (Figure 16).   
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³'R,EHORQJ
here / is this 
IRUPH"´ 
Figure 16: Cycle of decline 
 
 
Figure 16 demonstrates the typical pattern observed as the recruit began to 
IDLOLQWUDLQLQJ7KHGDWDVXJJHVWHGWKDWDVDUHFUXLW¶VPRRGGHFOLQHG so did his 
training performance, which in turn made him question his reasons for being 
there. There was no clear starting point of the decline, because it appeared 
that the institutional and individual stressors subtly started the cycle as each 
stressor eURGHGWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\WRFRSH7KHVHVWUHVVRUVDSSHDUHGDV
PXOWLSOHV LQHDFKUHFUXLW¶VVWRU\IRU OHDYLQJ 7KHVWUHVVRUVEXLOWXSWRDSRLQW
when the individual could no longer cope with how they were feeling. The time 
that this level was reached was clearly different in each individual, as 
demonstrated by the timings when recruits left (some after four weeks, some 
after four months).  What was clear was that self doubt began to creep in and 
impacted on both mood and performance.  The outcome of this cyclic process 
was that the recruit made the conscious decision that the Army was not for 
him (or alternatively that he did not belong there or fit in). 
 
Each reason for leaving was unique and the data demonstrated that small 
stressors, if isolated, would most probably not have caused the recruit any 
difficulty.  However the stressors were multiple and they were associated with 
Deteriorating 
mood
Deteriorating 
Performance
Deteriorating 
mood
Deteriorating 
Performance
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the recruit being away from their normal social support network. The 
psychological and physical combination resulted in the situation becoming 
overwhelming: 
 
µ,IRXQGWKHWUDLQLQJYHU\KDUG,ZDVDOZD\VSOD\LQJFDWFKXS¶ 
Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ,GRQ¶WOLNHEHLQJDZD\IURPKRPHIRUORQJSHULRGV«,IHHOKRPHVLFN«,PLVV
P\VRQ¶ 
Recruit 11 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
 
µ,ILQGWKHWUDLQLQJDQGGLVFLSOLQHKDUG«,DPLQWURXEOHPRVWGD\V«,PDNHORWV
RIPLVWDNHVDQGWKHSODWRRQJHWVEHDVWHG¶22 
Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
,IH[WUDFWVIURPWKH&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU¶VUHSRUWVDUHH[DPLQHGIRU5HFUXLWV
and 15 it is possible to detect that not only did their ability to cope decline and 
their mood deteriorate, but also their ability to perform and achieve the most 
basic demands of training declined to such an extent that if they had not 
decided to leave then that decision would have been made for them: 
 
µ«KDVIDLOHGWRDGDSWWR$UP\OLIH«SUHVHQWHGKLPVHOIWRWKHPHGLFDOFHQWUH
GDLO\IURPZHHNRQHZLWKDUDQJHRIDLOPHQWV«,VXVSHcted there was nothing 
ZURQJ«MXVWDYRLGLQJWUDLQLQJ¶ 
Commanding Officer of Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 
                                            
22
 µ%HDVWLQJ¶LVDWHUPXVHGE\VROGLHUVWRGHVFULEHEHLQJJLYHQH[WUDSK\VLFDOWUDLQLQJ
as a punishment for the platoon or individuals within the platoon not achieving the 
desired standards. 
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 µ«KDVLUULWDWHGLQVWUXFWRUVDQGSHHUVWRVXFKDQH[WHQWWKDWKHKDVEHHQ
UHPRYHGIURPWUDLQLQJDQGVXSHUYLVHGLQ+HDG4XDUWHUV««WUDLQLQJWKDWKH 
did complete was poor with no determination to succeed  no chance of him 
HYHUSDVVLQJEDVLF«VKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWRUH-HQOLVW¶ 
Commanding Officer of Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
As Recruit 15 described, his performance began to deteriorate which caused 
him to get the whole platoon punished for his mistakes.  His peers then 
ostracised him as they very quickly became irritated by his inability to keep up 
with training.  This resulted in him questioning his compatibility with the 
infantry, which led to him being further ostracised as he began to question the 
reason for being there. Ultimately he made the conscious decision that he did 
not belong, and this appears to be the point at which all attempts to cope 
ceased and Recruit 15 gave up.  This suggests that once a recruit reaches the 
point where they have decided that they no longer can cope then the cycle of 
decline, Figure 16, becomes terminal. 
 
4.5.2: Fitting In 
 
7KHVHQVHRIQRWµILWWLQJ-LQ¶FDQEHDUHDVRQJLYHQIRUQRWFRSLQJWKHHQGUHVXOW
of not coping or an amalgam of all factors relating to coping.  What is clear is 
that when a recruit decides he no longer fits in it is the critical factor in 
deciding whether he stays or goes.  The data shows that once recruits 
decided that they no longer fitted in, leaving was inevitable.  However what 
was also apparent was that there was very rarely any singular reason for why 
the recruit believed that they did not fit-in.   Rather, it was a complex 
framework of personal beliefs and thoughts stimulated by the multiple 
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stressors that they have been exposed to.  It was the complex collection of 
thoughts and beliefs behind the decision to leave that was of primary interest, 
as they provide the understanding and evidence of commonality of thought 
process in most of the recruits that left training, most notably the belief, for 
whatever reason, that they did not fit into life in the Army.  
  
µ,GRQRWILWLQZLWKDUP\FXOWXUH,ILQGLWWRRPHQWDOO\GHPDQGLQJ««,KDYH
WULHGWRJHWRQZLWKLW¶ 
Recruit 1 (Discharge as of Right) 
µ,GRQ¶WOLNHLW«,GRQ¶WHQMR\WKHZRUN«,GRQ¶WILWLQWRWKHOLIHVW\OH«,KDYHOHW
P\IDPLO\GRZQE\OHDYLQJEXW,IHHO,UXVKHGP\GHFLVLRQWRMRLQ¶ 
Recruit 5 (Discharge as of Right) 
µWKLVZDVDELJPLVWDNH,GRQRWILWLQWRWKHKRXUOLIHVW\OH± 24 hour job.  I 
ILQGRWKHUUHFUXLWVLPPDWXUH¶ 
Recruit 7 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
 
µDUP\OLIHLVQRWIRUPH,GRQ¶WOLNHLW«,ZDVQRWUHDG\IRULW«LWZDVKDUGHU
WKDQ,WKRXJKW¶ 
Recruit 12 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
 
µ,GRQ¶W¶OLNHWKHZD\WKDWWKH\VSHDNWRPH««,GRQ¶WILWLQWRDUP\OLIH,KDYH
PDGHIULHQGVEXW,GRQ¶W OLNHWKHFXOWXUHKHUH¶ 
Recruit 13 (Discharge as of Right) 
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Recruit 4 found the training hard and felt that he was always physically playing 
catch up. A point came when he began to feel that he did not fit in and 
became increasingly homesick, wanting to return to his family. Ultimately he 
requested to Discharge as of Right.  His Company Commander however 
made the following observations: 
 
µKHZDVYHU\KRPHVLFN««IDLOHGWRDGDSWWR$UP\OLIH«KHKDVWKHFDSDELOLW\
to pass but would need to show far more commiWPHQW¶ 
Commanding Officer Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
4.5.3: Institutional Demands 
 
4.5.3.1: Physical Demand 
7KHUHFUXLW¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWWKH\IRXQGWKHPVHOYHVLQWKHZD\
in which they thought about that situation and how they tried to cope with it 
became important factors within the data.  All the study recruits were exposed 
to similar situational and environmental stressors; however each recruit 
reacted differently to the situation that they found themselves in as they tried 
to make sense of what was happening to them. It appeared that the recruits 
who failed had difficulty in understanding or comprehending why they were 
being subjected to certain rules and expectations. For example, recruit 6 could 
not understand why discipline was so hard and why this experience was so 
different to what he had experienced in the Army Cadets.  
 
µ,GRQ¶WOLNHWKHDUP\«,GRQ¶WOLNHWKHKDUGQHVVRIWKHSK\VLFDOWUDLQLQJ««IDU
more disciplined than the Army Cadets¶ 
Recruit 6 (Discharged as of Right) 
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The psychological impact of activities such as physical training appeared to 
erode the recruits¶ resolve to continue.  At the point where they could no 
longer find any relevance in their own mind for the tasks they were being 
asked to perform, the situation became overwhelming very quickly.   
 
Alternatively, initial training is also about ensuring that unsuitable candidates, 
who would not cope with the Infantry role, are excluded at an early stage.  
There are always going to be recruits who could never meet the physical 
demands as they were unsuitable for Army services from the outset.  Recruit 9 
is a JRRGH[DPSOHRI WKLVDVKLV&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU¶VUHSRUWVVXJJHVW WKDW
he lacked the emotional maturity and robustness to make the transition to 
Army life and succeed in training. Recruit 9 clearly made a distinct adverse 
impression on his Commanding Officer: 
 
µ,PLVVP\JLUOIULHQG«««P\IUHHGRP«,DPWRR\RXQJIRUWKLVOLIHDWWKH
PRPHQW¶ 
Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 
 
µKHLVVHYHUHO\GHSUHVVHGDQGcannot handle the regime within the training 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW««KHLVQRWSK\VLFDOO\RUPHQWDOO\VWURQJHQRXJKIRUWKH$UP\
DQGVKRXOGQRWEHDOORZHGWRUHMRLQDVKHLVQRWVXLWHGLQDQ\VKDSHRUIRUP¶ 
Commanding Officer Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 
 
4.5.3.2: Emotional Demands 
The lasting impact that the situational stressors had on the recruits mood was 
an unexpected finding. Personal experience of treating situational mental 
health problems in the military had led me to assume that a low mood was to 
be expected whilst the individual was experiencing the situational stressor; 
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once removed from that stressful situation the mood would recover 
spontaneously to normal. This was not the case with all the recruits 
interviewed. Chart 123 (see Figure 17) shows two Subjective Units of Disorder 
(SUD) scores for each recruit interviewed, firstly at the point that they were 
thinking about leaving and secondly when they knew they could go.  Prior to 
making the decision to leave, the mean SUD score was 3.8 (SD = 2.5) for the 
32 recruits recruits interviewed (one recruit refused to give a score).  This 
score was not unexpected as recruits had been in a stressful environment, 
which on the whole they probably did not enjoy.  What was unexpected was 
that in just under half of those interviewed (n=16) the mood score remained 
below eight even though they had been removed from training and knew that 
they were returning home. In seven of the cases the mood score failed to 
recover above five. The recruits made the following comments: 
 
µ,ILQGWKHWUDLQLQJKDUG«GLVFLSOLQHKDUG«,DPLQWURXEOHPRVWGD\VIRU
PDNLQJPLVWDNHVDQGWKHQWKHZKROHSODWRRQJHWVSXQLVKHG«,GRQ¶WILWLQ«,
have been crying myself to  
VOHHSDWQLJKW¶ (SUD score 5/10 on leaving) 
Recruit 15 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ«,IRXQGWUDLQLQJWRKDUG««,ZDVDOZD\VSOD\LQJFDWFKXS«(SUD score 
3/10 on leaving) 
Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
These findings suggest that in just under half of those interviewed (n=16) the 
experience of training and failure has an impact on their mood which is not 
automatically alleviated by removing them from a stressful situation.  In just 
                                            
23
 All charts can be found in Appendix 4. 
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under a quarter of those interviewed (n=7) the impact on the mood is arguably 
moderate to severe, as their mood does not recover above five prior to 
leaving. This raises a question that was not anticipated by this research as 
UHJDUGVWKHORQJHUWHUPLPSDFWWKDWWUDLQLQJIDLOXUHKDVRQWKHUHFUXLW¶VPHQWDO
health after leaving training. 
 
Although in the mapping process the demands of the situation have been split 
between individual and institutional (Figure 14) the reasons for leaving were 
not confined to any single area.  In all the recruits interviewed there were 
numerous reasons for leaving across the demands of the situation and, as 
identified, it is the accumulation of those reasons that overwhelmed the ability 
to cope.  For example, Recruit 3 was identified by his Commanding Officer as 
having all the ability to complete basic training, but had very little support from 
his mother or girlfriend as regards enlistment.  The Commanding Officer also 
observed that Recruit 3 lacked the maturity to overcome the pressures of 
HQOLVWPHQWDVZHOODVKLVPRWKHU¶VDQGJLUOIULHQG¶VIHHOLQJV,IKHZDVLPPDWXUH
but had full family support he would possibly have been able to get through 
the initial distress of enlistment; however the lack of support coupled with his 
observed level of immaturity were a combination for failure, as Recruit 3 was 
an individual who appeared to still be very dependent on the support of his 
family, who on the whole were not supportive of him joining the Army.  The 
pressure on him from his mother and girlfriend caused him a great deal of 
confusion.  He clearly wanted to join the military and he felt guilty about letting 
his father and himself down: 
 
 µ,JHWRQZHOOZLWKWKHODGVDQGWKHLQVWUXFWRUVEXWQRWZKDW,ZDVUHDOO\
H[SHFWLQJ««,KDYHSUREOHPVDWKRPH«P\JLUOIULHQGGRHVQRWZDQWPHWR
stay here and my mum  
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ZDQWVPHWRFRPHKRPH«P\IDWKHUIHHOV,KDYHOHWKLPGRZQE\OHDYLQJ«,
IHHO,KDYHOHWP\VHOIGRZQ¶  
Recruit 3 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
His Commanding OfILFHU¶VVXFFLQFWUHSRUWVXPVXSWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOGLOHPPD
this recruit faced: 
 
µVWUXJJOHGWRFRPHWRWHUPVZLWKWKHUHDOLW\RIWUDLQLQJQRWDSSOLHGKLPVHOI
ZHOOSRRUOHYHOVRIFRQFHQWUDWLRQKHIHOOEHKLQGLQWUDLQLQJ«ODFNRI
FRPPLWPHQWIROORZLQJSUHVVXUHIURPKRPH«IDFHGFRQVLGHUDEOHSUHVVXUH
from girlfriend and family to leavH«KHLVD\RXQJLPPDWXUH\HDUROGZKR
does not have the character to force through his initial desire to join the 
LQIDQWU\¶ 
Commanding Officer Recruit 3 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
His Commanding Officer acknowledges that he was under an immense 
amount of psychological pressure as he came to terms with training and life in 
the Army, however he did not possess the emotional maturity to succeed.  
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Figure 17: Chart 1: Coping 
Case 
Number 
1.1 Deterioration in 
Mood 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score in 
training + week 
+ cognition 
when stated 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score on 
interview + 
cognition 
when stated 
1.2 
Homesickness 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with 
physical demands  
1.4 Immaturity  *3.4 Lacking 
the emotional 
maturity to 
cope with the 
transitional 
period 
1.5 Problems at 
home 
*4.2 Create a demand the 
necessitates exit from 
service 
1.6 Contact 
with Family 
Recruit 1 
  3/10  felt 
overwhelmed 
with the 
pressure of 
training 
8/10 pressure 
relieved, going 
home 
  feels overwhelmed by 
the pressure of 
training, experiencing 
anxiety before certain 
lessons 
        phoned home 
every 4/7 and 
had W/E leave 
Recruit 2 
  3/10 on 2nd & 
3rd Week 
8/10 misses his family 
and friends 
  enjoys the 
fitness but does 
not feel he is 
ready for army 
life yet, feels he 
is letting himself 
down by leaving 
    missing his family and 
girlfriend and social life, 
parents support his 
decision to leave 
phoned family 
every 2-3 days 
and has been 
home twice 
Recruit 3 
  1/10 @ week 4, 
went home on 
:(SDVVGLGQ¶W
want to come 
back, felt very 
homesick and 
tearful 
5/10       he is a young 
immature 
immature 17 
year old who 
does not have 
the character to 
force through his 
initial desire to 
join the infantry 
problems at home, 
his girlfriend has 
asked him to 
leave, she is not 
supportive of him 
serving, mum 
wants him home, 
father feels he has 
let him down by 
leaving, he feels 
he has let himself 
down 
faced considerable 
pressure from girlfriend and 
family to leave 
Contacted 
family x2 week 
and phoned 
girlfriend x5 a 
day.  Also had 
24hr pass 
Recruit 4 
  2/10 3/10 mood 
remains low, 
fed up 
feels very 
homesick, weepy 
just wants to go 
home 
found training very 
hard, always playing 
catch up 
      very homesick  
Recruit 5 
  3/10 week 4/5 8/10 not 10 as 
he is still here 
waiting to go. 
             
Recruit 6 
  2/10 following 
W/E pass, did 
not want to 
come back 
9/10 now as he 
is leaving 
Feels homesick does not like army life, 
does not like the 
hardness of the 
physical training 
  very immature 
and lacked the 
commitment 
necessary to get 
through the 
course 
  felt homesick throughout 
the course 
 
Recruit 7 
  4/10 lowest 
point day 5 
9/10              
*Shaded areas denote comments made by Commanding Officer
163 
 
 
Case 
Number 
1.1 Deterioration in 
Mood 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score in 
training + week 
+ cognition 
when stated 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score on 
interview + 
cognition 
when stated 
1.2 
Homesickness 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with 
physical demands  
1.4 Immaturity  *3.4 Lacking 
the emotional 
maturity to 
cope with the 
transitional 
period 
1.5 Problems at 
home 
*4.2 Create a demand 
the necessitates exit 
from service 
1.6 Contact with 
Family 
Recruit 8 very difficult interview, 
very guarded, 
discharged 2 yrs 
previous on medical 
grounds 
 Would not give 
score 
 Would not give 
score 
        needs to leave 
army to care for 
son, split with 
girlfriend who no 
longer wishes to 
care for son, he 
will have custody. 
   
Recruit 9 
  8/10 8/10 has not 
disliked the 
experience, just 
prefers to be at 
home 
    feels he is too 
young for army 
life at this time 
       
Recruit 
10 
hated being in 
training, and wanted 
to leave, felt low and 
now his CO has told 
him he must stay for 
another 2 weeks until 
he can DAOR 
 1/10  9/10 missed parents, 
girlfriend and 
family, feels 
homesick 
           
Recruit 
11 
finds communal living 
hard at times 
3/10 lowest 
point was 
evenings 
7/10 now knows 
that he is 
leaving 
does not like 
being away from 
home for periods 
of time, homesick 
misses son 
does not like drill and 
weapons lessons finds 
them too difficult 
      has been homesick 
throughout the course 
and misses young son 
phoned 3 times 
per week, no visits 
Recruit 
12 
  3/10 when he 
did not know 
how or when he 
could leave 
10/10 now he 
knows he is 
going 
misses civilian 
life, misses 
friends and family 
  was not ready 
for it 
has struggled 
with different 
aspects of the 
course and has 
shown a high 
level of 
immaturity 
    phones daily and 
has been home x6 
W/Es 
Recruit 
13 
  3/10 felt weepy 
low and sad 
3/10 still here   found the PT hard         daily by phone and 
family visited 
Recruit 
14 
  2/10 4/10       would support 
his return to the 
army in the 
future when he 
matures 
    phoned daily + 
WEL 
Recruit 
15 
has cried himself to 
sleep most nights 
3/10 when 
continually 
shouted at for 
messing up 
5/10 feels very 
homesick 
finds training hard, 
discipline hard, in 
trouble most days, 
infantry not for him, has 
made lots of mistakes 
and the Plt has been 
punished 
    mother disabled, 
difficult family 
dynamics, feels he 
needs to be at 
home 
  phone daily 
*Shaded areas denote comments made by Commanding Officer
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Case 
Number 
1.1 Deterioration in 
Mood 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score in 
training + week 
+ cognition 
when stated 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score on 
interview + 
cognition 
when stated 
1.2 
Homesickness 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with 
physical demands  
1.4 Immaturity  *3.4 Lacking 
the emotional 
maturity to 
cope with the 
transitional 
period 
1.5 Problems at 
home 
*4.2 Create a demand 
the necessitates exit 
from service 
1.6 Contact with 
Family 
Recruit 
16 
considered DSH but 
believed it was wrong 
and he must leave the 
right way 
4/10 4/10 as he is 
still here 
  parents want him to 
stay, believes that he 
has let them and 
himself down, believed 
he could succeed 
  his 
homesickness 
has been 
exacerbated by 
his lack of 
maturity 
    phone daily 
Recruit 
17 
does not like it here, 
has wanted to leave 
since day1, hates 
poor block facilities, 
does not like food 
6/10 10/10 when he 
leaves here 
  found PT hard, gets 
shin splints 
  he believes he 
made a mistake  
in joining the 
army and 
believes that he 
has a lot more 
growing up to do 
before he re-
enlists 
    speaks with home 
every 2-3 days 
Recruit 
18 
  10/10 1/10 devastated 
to be leaving 
              
Recruit 
19 
  2/10 5/10             spoke x2 per week 
plus long W/E at 
home 
Recruit 
20 
   4/10 8/10 knows he 
is going home 
10/10 now that 
he knows he is 
leaving 
feels homesick finds ITC depressing, 
not the life he is looking 
for, feels he cannot 
hack it, does not like 
weapons handling & 
PT as he feels he has 
not got it 
        has had contact 
with relatives, did 
not want to return 
from W/E pass 
Recruit 
21 
   10/10  10/10         girlfriend pregnant 
with twins 
girlfriend sick in hospital 
carrying twins, feels he 
should be there 
supporting her, can not 
cope any more in the 
army due to worrying 
about his girlfriend 
Speaks daily, has 
been home once 
Recruit 
22 
  8/10 8/10           misses his family and 
friends and 
homesickness has set in 
phones most 
nights, has been 
home most 
weekends 
Recruit 
23 
  4-5/10 when he 
decided that he 
wanted to leave 
7/10 feels homesick     immature   slightly homesick phones home x2 
per week and has 
been home once 
*Shaded areas denote comments made by Commanding Officer
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Case 
Number 
1.1 Deterioration in 
Mood 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score in 
training + week 
+ cognition 
when stated 
1.1 Likert 
Mood Score on 
interview + 
cognition 
when stated 
1.2 
Homesickness 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with 
physical demands  
1.4 Immaturity  *3.4 Lacking 
the emotional 
maturity to 
cope with the 
transitional 
period 
1.5 Problems at 
home 
*4.2 Create a demand 
the necessitates exit 
from service 
1.6 Contact with 
Family 
Recruit 
24 
felt sad 1/10 felt sad, 
very weepy 
5/10 homesick, misses 
his son and 
girlfriend 
          daily by phone, no 
visits home, no 
contact would 
have made things 
worse 
Recruit 
25 
  1/10 
contemplated 
self harm and 
suicide 
 4/10           he considers himself to 
have considerable 
personal problems 
little or no contact 
with home 
Recruit 
26 
  8/10 now and 
all along 
 8/10           suffered outside 
pressures to leave 
during the course 
phones daily and 
has been home 
once 
Recruit 
27 
   3/10 7-8/10 now he 
knows he is 
leaving 
        prefers to be 
nearer home to 
support his family 
  phones home 
every 3 days and 
has visited once 
Recruit 
28 
  3/10 10/10 now that 
he knows he is 
leaving 
does not like 
army life, 
homesick 
        he is homesick and has 
enjoyed no part of the 
course to date 
phones every 2-3 
days 
Recruit 
29 
  2/10 10/10 now he 
knows he is 
going 
homesick, does 
not like the way 
Scots are treated 
          phones every night 
Recruit 
30 
  2-3/10 
contemplated 
self harm to 
effect release 
due to feeling of 
entrapment 
8-9/10 now that 
he knows he is 
leaving 
  has been having 
medical tests since 
week one unable to 
train 
        phones regularly 
and has WEL 
Recruit 
31 
   4/10 6-7/10 will be 
happier when 
he leaves 
misses girlfriend 
and son 
      girlfriend wants 
him to come home 
has suffered 
KRPHVLFNQHVVPLVVHV¶
partner and child. 
WEL + phones 
daily 
Recruit 
32 
  4/10 feels down 
about being 
here, thinks he 
will feel better 
once he leaves 
 9/10 Homesick     he is immature 
and young, he is 
homesick and 
misses the 
relative 
freedoms of 
home life 
    texts home 
regularly + WEL 
Recruit 
33 
feels tearful all the 
time 
 4/10  6/10 Homesick finds discipline side of 
things hard as well as 
communal living 
  very young and 
relatively 
immature 
  very homesick phones daily, and 
mother has visited 
* Shaded areas denote comments made by Commanding Officer   
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4.5.3.3: Cultural Demands 
The concept of freedom and the loss of it were very prominent amongst the 
institutional factors.  The military is easily defined as a closed institution 
(Goffman, 1961), especially during the basic training phase where recruits are 
not allowed to leave the establishment and live together 24 hours a day.  This 
restriction of movement and an inability to come and go when they pleased 
had a detrimental effect on those that were clearly used to being in control of 
their own daily routine and movements. 
 
µ,ZDQWWREHP\RZQSHUVRQ,GRQ¶WZDQWWREHWROGZKDWWRGRDOOWKHWLPH«,
GRQ¶WOLNHWKHODFNRISULYDF\¶ 
Recruit 7 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ,KDWHEHLQJFRQILQHGLQWKHEDUUDFNVDQGWKHSHRSOH,KDYHWRPL[ZLWK«WKH
Army has prevented me from making friends as we are always in competition 
ZLWKHDFKRWKHU¶µ,GRQ¶WILWLQKHUHWKHVDFULILFHVDUHWRo JUHDW«WKHWUDLQLQJLV
EXOOVKLW«WKHEORNHVDUHLGLRWVZKR,ZRXOGQHYHUDVVRFLDWHZLWKRXWVLGHRI
KHUH¶ 
Recruit 30 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ,DPILQGLQJWKHFRPPXQDOOLYLQJDQGWKHORVVRIIUHHGRPGLIILFXOW««LW¶V
difficult to be around younger recruits who mess around a lot and cause 
WURXEOH¶ 
Recruit 27 (Services no Longer Required) 
 
These responses convey the variety of meanings attached to the loss of 
freedom.  Some recruits focus on the lack of privacy and the communal living, 
others find the fact that they cannot do what they want when they want the 
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hardest.  What is most interesting is that all these reasons seem to be over-
DUFKHGE\WKHTXHVWLRQRIZKDWWKHUHFUXLW¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRIOLIHLQEDVLFWUDLQLQJ 
was.  It is evident that amongst the recruits who failed there was a either a 
nostalgic view or little comprehension of what to expect on enlistment.  Recruit 
6 reflects on the discipline and his experiences in the Army Cadets and is 
genuinely surprised that he finds it too hard; he also finds it difficult to 
understand why enlistment in the regular Army is so different.  Recruit 9 
reflects on his experiences in the Territorial Army:   
 
 
µ,IHHOWUDSSHG«,KDYHORVWP\IUHHGRP«7KH$UP\LVDOZD\VRQP\PLQG
the discipline is too KDUG«IDUPRUHGLVFLSOLQHWKDQWKH$UP\&DGHWV¶ 
Recruit 6 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ,XVHGWREHIXOOWLPHLQWKH7HUULWRULDO$UP\«WKLVLVYHU\GLIIHUHQW
heUH««ZHJHWSLFNHGRQIRURWKHU¶V PLVWDNHV««,IHHO,DPPRUH
H[SHULHQFHGWKDQDORWRIWKHSHRSOHKHUH¶ 
 
Recruit 9 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 
 
 
It is evident that Recruit 9 had created an image of what training was in his 
own mind, and in that image the instructor recognised his experience and 
maybe set him above his peers.  In reality he was treated no differently to his 
peers and had great difficulty comprehending this perceived injustice, which 
eventually led to him choosing to leave. 
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When recruits talked about the lack of privacy, the confinement in the 
establishment, or the difficulty getting along with peers in such close proximity, 
they appear to have failed to anticipate or prepare for the environment that 
they were going to live in.  They seem to have had no idea what to expect.  
When confronted with the environmental reality of what life in a training 
barracks entailed they were unable to adapt and cope, Recruit 16 is an 
example of the results of those stressors when they become overwhelming: 
 
µ,GRQRWZDQWWREHLQWKHDUP\,ILQGLWWoo hard and would rather not do 
LW«P\SDUHQWVZDQWPHWRVWD\««WKH\IHHO,DPOHWWLQJP\VHOIGRZQ«OHW
them down.  I have thought of harming myself but I know it is wrong, I just 
QHHGWROHDYHQRZ¶ 
Recruit 16 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
 
To succeed in training, the findings suggest that the recruits must possess the 
psychological and physical capability to face the challenges and stressors 
related to enlistment.  The recruit begins the journey of enlistment full of 
motivation to succeed; they enter training where a single or numerous 
stressors have an impact on them, which in turn begins a cycle of decline both 
in mood and performance.  Finally they feel unable to stay any longer as they 
believe that they do not belong and become de-motivated and exit service 
(Figure 18).  Figure 18 identifies three phases on the journey to failure; the 
coping phase, the difficulty in coping phase and the not coping phase. This 
structural view is important as it identifies key gates within the process of 
recruit failure where recruits could possibly be helped to succeed rather than 
fail in their training.  What the data also shows is that when the de-motivated 
stage is reached, the recruit appears to have entered a journey of no return 
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and exit appears to be the only solution to the way they feel, indicating that 
early recognition of potential failure is imperative for training success.   
 
During the process of analysing reasons for leaving, timing became a 
recurrent theme when talking to training staff. More junior staff believed that 
leaving was made too easy and too soon, and more senior staff were worried 
that if recruits were made to stay then they would engage in whatever 
behaviour was necessary to effect discharge, be that through self harm or 
breech of discipline.  Amongst senior officers this was a real worry in light of 
media attention surrounding suicide and dissuaded officers from making exit 
from service more difficult than it already was.  To look at the impact that early 
release at day 28 of training had on their ability to continue, and on their 
decisions to stay or go, recruits were asked to compare their service to 
national service in the 1950s, and to consider what they would do if they had 
not got the option to go and that they must stay by law for 2 years.  When that 
question was posed to the leavers interviewed, of the 33 recruits interviewed 
over two thirds (n=24) reflected that they would not feel happy about staying 
but µZRXOGMXVWJHWRQZLWKLW¶ 
 
µ«LI,KDGWRVWD\,ZRXOGSUREDEO\JHWRQZLWKLWDV,JHWRQZLWKSHRSOH«¶ 
 
Recruit 1 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ«ZRXOGIHHOGRZQKRZHYHUZRXOGMXVWJHWRQZLWKLWZRXOGQRWWDNHDQ\
GUDVWLFDFWLRQ«¶ 
 
Recruit 5 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
µ«ZRXOGIHHOEDGEXWZRXOGJHWRQZLWKLWEHFDXVH,¶GKDYHWR«¶ 
Recruit 5 (Discharge as of Right) 
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Two separate issues were drawn from these responses, initially, feelings of 
self harm were relatively rare amongst respondents, only three recruits 
expressed that they would consider self harm and of those three only one 
expressed that he would use self harm as a method of manipulating a release 
from service, even though he could have exercised his right to discharge at 
that time: 
 
µLI,KDG WRVWD\,GRQ¶WNQRZZKDW,¶GGR«,ZRXOGSUREDEO\WU\DQGHVFDSHE\
WDNLQJDQRWKHURYHUGRVH¶ 
Recruit 10 (Unsuitable for Army Service) 
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Figure 18: Journey to discharge 
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It is questionable whether recruit 10 was suitable for service from the outset, 
as he was expressing a desire to leave by week two.  His behaviour was not 
that of someone who was becoming depressed and withdrawn as a result of 
the environment.  On the contrary, during that brief period of service he was 
involved in two fights, one resulting in his opponent suffering facial fractures.  
The Commanding Officer believed that his overdose was a direct act to try to 
avoid criminal charges being brought against him for assault.  What is not 
clear in this case is whether the recruit got into trouble and then wanted to 
leave to escape the consequences, or behaved like this to affect a release.  
However, it was clear on interview that he was not depressed but was willing 
to use whatever behaviour was required to get his own way.  I believe that this 
is the type of case that training staff were anecdotally referring to when they 
were explaining extremes of behaviour to effect release.  What appears 
evident is that it is the extreme of behaviour that makes it notable, not the 
frequency of the behaviour: this behaviour seems to be the exception and not 
the rule. 
 
The other two recruits who expressed intent to self harm were clearly very 
affected by their experience of service life and had become so desperate that 
they could not see beyond the misery that they were feeling at that time: 
 
µLI,FRXOGQRWOHDYH,ZRXOGSUREDEO\WU\DQGNLOOP\VHOI¶ 
Recruit 4 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
Recruit 4¶s despair was identified by his Commanding Officer, who also 
recognised that he was extremely homesick and low in mood. 
 
173 
 
The other respondents who disclosed that they would escalate their behaviour 
in order to leave talked about going Absent Without Leave; again there was 
evidence of despondency and doubt over their ability to cope and going 
absent might be one of the ways to relieve how they were feeling. 
 
The majority response to this question was that if faced with this dilemma they 
would press on and complete their training.  There was good evidence that 
they would not be happy about this and that their experience to date had 
affected their mood, but it appears that these recruits were choosing to leave 
because they had been given the choice.   
 
Returning to Figure 14, it is apparent that culture was referred to as one of the 
institutional demands, and the elements of cultural demand are indentified in 
Figure 15, Box 5.  However what became evident as the mapping process 
developed was that the demands that enlistment placed on the recruit were 
UHODWHG WR LWV SULPDU\ DQG VHFRQGDU\ UXOHV RI REOLJDWLRQ WKDW LV WKH $UP\¶V
goals and values that construct its organisational identity.  It is this identity that 
underpins the Army culture and as a consequence creates the environment 
that produces the institutional stressors.  The primary and secondary rules of 
obligation also prevent the recruit from having the freedom to resolve 
individual demands due to the closed nature of the organisation and its 
expectations of recruit behaviour. Reflecting on all of the identified situational 
demands in Figure 15, it raises the question as to which of these demands 
would cause the individual difficulty if he worked outside of the Army or any 
other military institution.  The very fact that the recruit is joining the Army is a 
cultural demand in its own right, as they are expected to live their lives 
differently from the point of recruitment. 
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Figure 19: Hierarchy of demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To simplify, Figure 19 shows how the Army as an organisation creates an 
overall situational demand on the recruit in which all the other demands sit.  All 
the demands are caused by enlistment into the Army; if the recruits had not 
enlisted they would either not have experienced these demands in such an 
intense time frame or would have had the social support network in place to 
better cope with the demands.  Most significantly, it appears that within the 
situational demand that is created by the Army culture, adapting to the norms 
and values of the Army appears the most stressful. 
 
  
Army 
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4.5.4: Individual Demands 
 
4.5.4.1: Homesickness 
Homesickness was reported in just under half of those interviewed (n=15) but 
was never given as the primary cause for leaving.  Homesickness was always 
presented as an aside to other reasons and was in most cases related to 
missing parents and girlfriends.  This raises the question as to whether the 
individual was missing the physical environment of home, or more probably 
the support and companionship of those at home.  This appears to 
corroborate with the textual data, as in all the interviews undertaken the 
recruits who stated that they were homesick would provide a primary reason 
for leaving first before saying that they were homesick, e.g.  Recruit 12 is 
finding training hard and has decided to leave, giving the following reason: 
 
µDUP\OLIHLVQRWIRUPH«,GRQ¶WOLNHLW«QRWUHDG\IRULW«KDUGHUWKDQ,
WKRXJKW¶ 
 
He then goes on to say: 
 
µ,PLVVP\IULHQGVDQGIDPLO\¶ 
Recruit 12 (Discharge as of Right) 
 
This suggests that as the recruit begins to have difficulty in training and finds it 
harder to cope he begins to become homesick for his usual social support 
network.  Prior to enlistment this would have been the friends and family that 
he would turn to in times of difficulty; however on enlistment he leaves them 
behind.  Therefore it appears that homesickness is a general word used to 
cover many things, but what it actually means in this study is that the recruit is 
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missing his social support network at a time when they are struggling to cope 
with training. 
 
4.5.4.2: Family Problems 
 
The stress of family problems is not unlike homesickness.  In all of the cases 
where family problems were cited as a reason for leaving (n=6), they were 
accompanied by other institutional reasons for not continuing.  As mentioned 
earlier in the chapter, this gave rise to the notion that family problems may 
have been used as an acceptable reason for leaving instead of the admission 
of failure.  Recruit 27 is a good example of this phenomenon: 
 
µ,SUHIHUWREHQHDUHUKRPHWRVXSSRUWP\IDPLO\¶ 
Recruit 27 (Service No Longer Required) 
 
He also states that he found the younger recruits hard to live with as they 
messed around a lot and caused trouble.  There is no acknowledgement in his 
account that he behaved in a way that was unacceptable, he just wanted to be 
nearer home.  His Commanding Officer provided the following report: 
 
µDGDPDQWWKDWKHGRHVQRt want to be in the Army and has adopted a 
FRPSOHWHO\QHJDWLYHDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKHWUDLQLQJUHJLPH««VKRXOGEH
discharged Unfit for Army Service and should not be allowed to re-HQOLVW¶ 
Commanding Officer Recruit 27 (Service No Longer Required) 
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In his interview with me, Recruit 27 created a picture of the Army not being for 
KLPDQGKLVQHHGWREHZLWKKLVIDPLO\,QKLV&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHU¶VRSLQLRQ
his behaviour was so disruptive he was discharged Services No Longer 
required, which equates to a dismissal from employment on discipline 
grounds.  
 
Of the six cases where family problems were cited as the reason for leaving 
RQO\ RQH FDVH ZDV FRUURERUDWHG E\ WKH &RPPDQGLQJ 2IILFHU  5HFUXLW ¶V
girlfriend was expecting twins when he enlisted and became very unwell 
during training.  His Commanding Officer acknowledges that she was in 
hospital and states in his report that Recruit 21 can no longer cope with his 
training due to worry, and he was released under Discharge as of Right. 
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4.6: Summary of Findings 
 
What the data describes is a journey of extreme situational demands that the 
recruits experience throughout their transition from civilian life to service in the 
British Infantry.  It is the cumulative effect of the situational stressors, 
combined with the recruit being dislocated from their established support 
network, that appears to be the catalyst for failure amongst recruits.  Failure 
occurs when the recruit can no longer cope with the situational stressors.  It is 
WKH UHFUXLW¶VSVychological response to the cumulative effect of the stressors 
that makes him leave. The situational demands that the recruit experiences 
can be divided into two categories: 
x Institutional Demands 
x Individual Demands 
 
Multiple combinations of both of these types of demands were reported by 
those interviewed. They did not fail as a direct result of the demands, but more 
importantly as a result of how the demands made them feel. Once the stress 
of the demands became too much for them to cope with it triggered a 
sequence of thought processes that led into an irreversible cycle of events 
and ultimately training failure.  All leavers, both those who chose to leave and 
those whose services were no longer required, discussed a pivotal point in 
their recruit journey when they made the conscious decision that they did not 
µILW-LQ¶WRWKHFXOWXUHDQGHQYLURQPHQWRIWKHPLOLWDU\,WDSSHDUVWKDWRQFHWKLV
belief had been adopted it became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Performance 
was observed to deteriorate and the recruit reported a subjective lowering of 
mood, which in turn compounded the belief that they did not belong and 
subsequently alienated them from their peers.  The data suggested that once 
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the recruit goes into the cycle of decline (Figure 16) it appears to be 
irreversible.  What is encouraging, however, is that there appears to be a 
domino effect process which provides key points or gates where a possible 
intervention could take place to either break this cycle or prevent its initiation. 
  
180 
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
5.1: Introduction 
The overall aims of this study were: to achieve an understanding of the role 
that antecedent personal, social and demographic factors play in a British 
AUP\UHFUXLW¶VDELOLW\WRFRPSOHWHEDVLFWUDLQLQJWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI
identifying predictive factors that would identify infantry recruits who were at 
risk of being unable to cope with the transition to life in the British Army; and to 
explore the reasons given by those recruits who failed to complete basic 
training in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of why 
recruits fail. 
 
Of the 999 recruits in the study cohort, 36.2% (n=362) failed.  Factors 
associated with higher odds of failure were: absence of female siblings, 
aggressive coping strategies, use of ecstasy, evenings per week spent at the 
family home, truancy, an increased number of schools attended and 
classroom behaviour.  The area under the receiver operating characteristic 
curve on the test dataset was 0.58. The predictive ability of the logistic model 
was relatively poor, and the proportion of recruits that it could correctly predict 
a training outcome for is too few to recommend its use as a screening tool.  
However, it was identified that there were important differences between the 
socio-personal identity of recruits who failed training and the organisational 
identity of the British Army Infantry.  These differences in beliefs, values and 
goals coupled with the nature of the infantry training organisation caused 
varying levels of cognitive dissonance and disordered mood in those recruits 
who failed.  For nearly three quarters (74.4% [n=269]) of those recruits, failure 
was attributable to difficulties in adapting to infantry training and living at the 
infantry training centre. 
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The discussion in this chapter begins with the consideration of identity and the 
disparity between military identity and the social identity that recruits are 
drawn from.  With the setting established, the difficulties of transition into a 
closed institution are explored, ultimately returning to the question of whether 
predicting training outcome through the use of biographical questionnaires is 
possible. In conclusion, the discussion will consider the implications of the 
findings in relation to other branches of the Armed Service and wider society 
as well as identifying areas for further research.   
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5.2: Bridging the gap: Transition from socio-personal identity to military 
identity  
 
Military identity is timeless because its reason for existence never changes.  
Clausewitzian (Clausewitz, 1832) theory considers the military as an institution 
which has one overarching primary purpose, to deliver war as an extension of 
the political will of a nation state. The nature of war is enduring and never 
changes; it will always involve violence, destruction and death.  The aim of 
war is to further political aim through the defeat of an enemy, preventing that 
enemy from being able to wage any further war (Clausewitz, 1832).  However, 
the character of wars has changed dramatically over the last six decades. 
There has been a move away from wars of attrition, such as the First and 
6HFRQG:RUOG:DUVGHVLJQHGWRGHVWUR\QRWRQO\WKHRSSRQHQW¶VPLOLWDU\EXW
DOVR WKHLUQDWLRQ WRPDQRHXYUHLVWZDUVDLPHGDW UHPRYLQJDQDWLRQ¶VDQG LWV
PLOLWDU\¶VZLOO WRILJKW 7KHVHVWHSFKDQJHVKDYHPDGH OLWWOHGLIIHUHQFHWR the 
role of the infantry soldier. The nature of war provides the values and beliefs 
that underpin the organisational identity of the infantry because its values, 
goals and beliefs are shaped by the role in war that it must undertake. Infantry 
training prepares the recruit solely for war fighting, and so the infantry training 
centre is totally immersed in infantry organisational identity.  This identity is 
maintained through its primary rules of obligation, which are deeply rooted in 
its social structure.  These are the unwritten codes and laws (Hart, 1961) that 
underpin tradition and expected behaviour.  This study has identified the 
differences between the organisational identity of the Army and the social 
identity of the incoming infantry recruit.  The Armed Forces have a unique if 
not antiquated identity, constructed over many decades or even centuries in 
order to fulfil its role.   
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Goffman (1961), in his essays on asylums, identifies the military as a total 
institution within his list of five groupings of total institutions in society (see 
Figure 20). He explains the pre-requisites of defining a total institution by 
focusing on key aspects of daily living.  Individuals within society will usually 
sleep, play and work in different places, with different co-participants, under 
different authorities and without an overall rational plan. It can be argued that 
the military as a whole is a quasi-closed institution, that is it fulfils some 
DVSHFWVRI*RIIPDQ¶V(1961) five principles of a total institution, with its identity 
only really being understood by those who experience it from within.  Figure 
20 demonstrates how $UP\ LQIDQWU\ WUDLQLQJ IXOILOV *RIIPDQ¶V (1961) five 
SULQFLSOHVRI D WRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQZKHQFRPSDUHG ZLWK WKH UHFUXLW¶V OLIHSULRU WR
enlistment. The findings of the biographical questionnaire give a generalised 
picture of the experience recruits have had prior to service and living within a 
formal, hierarchical, total institution.  Figure 20 demonstrates the contrast 
between the social identity which a recruit is coming from and the 
organisational expectations which the Army expects the recruits to fit. 
 
The findings of the study demonstrate that the values, beliefs and attitudes of 
recruits raised in modern British society differ vastly from the expected values, 
EHOLHIVDQGDWWLWXGHVRIWKHLQIDQWU\$VUHFRJQLVHGLQFKDSWHURQH*RIIPDQ¶V
(1961) theory of the total institution is not without its critics who believe that 
both his methods and his claims for external validity were flawed (Scott, 2010, 
Weinstein, 1994, Perry, 1974, Levinson and Gallagher, 1964).  Perry (1974) 
DFNQRZOHGJHV *RIIPDQ¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW PDQ\ RI WKH DWWULEXWHV RI WKH WRWDO
institution are not exclusive to a closed community such as a psychiatric 
hospital. What is unique is the intensity of these attributes within a total 
institution. 
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Figure 20: Comparison of the infantry training institution and recruits 
pre-enlistment youth culture within the five principles of Goffman's total 
institution24 
 
 
 
 
Perry (1974) DUJXHV WKDW ZLWKLQ D SV\FKLDWULF LQVWLWXWLRQ µLQPDWHV¶ DUH QRW
subjected to one single authority, as observed by Goffman, but at least a 
minimum of two (medical staff and hospital administrators).  He argues that 
UDUHO\ ZLOO DQ LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V PHPEHUV KDYH RQH VLQJOH DLP DUJXLQJ WKDW D
merchant ship with 35 men onboard would be divided into approximately 20 
different occupational titles each with its own aim.  What Perry (1974) does 
UHFRJQLVH LV WKDW *RIIPDQ¶V REVHUYDWLRQV RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQV FRQWURO RI GDLO\
activity and enforced activity to achieve the aims of the institution are more 
akin to the military and concentration camps than a psychiatric institution.  
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 ITC: Infantry Training Centre 
Goffman's five 
principles of a total 
institution
Life is conducted in the 
same place under one 
single authority
Family life , schooling 
and socialising would be 
conducted in many 
different places, with 
numerous authority 
figures with little power 
of discipline
Duration of training is 
conducted at ITC under the 
command of one individual
Each phase of that daily 
life is carried out in the 
immediate company of 
large batches of other 
individuals
Group size and affiliation 
would be a personnel 
choice with no 
obligation to asscoiate 
with the other 
individuals or large 
groups
Throughout training 
individuals will will live, eat 
sleep and train with the same 
group of individuals
All phases of daily 
activities are tightly 
scheduled, with one 
leading into another at 
pre-arranged times
Permissive society with a 
high degree of choice.  
Timings in place but 
losely imposed with little 
repercussion if not 
adheared to.
Daily timings are rigidly 
controlled with harsh 
punishments for lateness and 
absenteeism
This is all imposed by a 
system of explicit formal 
rulings and a body of 
officials.
Family and school rules 
and discipline varied 
greatly with little or 
formal repercussions if 
not adheared too.
On enlistment all recruits 
come under military law with 
its own judical system and 
punishments for any 
infringement
All activities are designed 
to fulfil the official aims 
of the institution
Societal and schooling 
activity strvies to meet 
many aims, these aims 
vary from town to town, 
and region to region.  
Little expectation is 
placed on the individual
ITC has one aim and that is to 
produce infantry soldiers
Recruits pre-
enlistment 
experience of 
organisational life 
Recruits post-
enlistment 
experience of the 
military organisation 
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Perry (1974) PDNHVWKHDUJXPHQWWKDW*RIIPDQ¶VWKHRU\RIWKHWRWDOLQVWLWXWLRQ
is valid, if overstated in the psychiatric institution setting.  If Goffman had 
applied his theory to military initial training, he might have seen a better fit for 
KLV WKHRU\  5HWXUQLQJ WR 3HUU\¶V (1974) arguments, the soldier in the larger 
Army may have multiple authorities, but in training is under the command of 
one person.  Each daily activity is tightly controlled with one activity leading 
into the next and the Infantry Training Centre has only one aim, which is to 
produce infantry soldiers.   
 
$QRWKHU FRQWHVWHG DVSHFW RI *RIIPDQ¶V REVHUYDWLRQ LV KLV DVVHUWLRQ WKDW
members of a total institution are passive and lack autonomy to determine 
their own fate (Scott, 2010). It is argued that organisational structures shape 
WKHEHKDYLRXURILQGLYLGXDOVEXW*RIIPDQ¶VSHVVLPLVWLFYLHZRIWKHµDFWRU¶DVD
passive participant controlled by the institution overlooks the ways in which 
µLQPDWHV¶ZLWKLQDQLQVWLWXWLRQQHJRWLDWHDQGGHILQHWKHLU own reality. In fact one 
RI3HUU\¶V(1974) key criticisms of Goffman is that his observation of the total 
LQVWLWXWLRQ LV RQH VLGHG RQO\ WKH LQPDWHV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH DQG GLVWRUWV UHDOLW\
Recruits do control their own fate, they can leave after 28 days and if they 
wish to leave beforehand they can engage in behaviour that will ensure that 
they are discharged (taking drugs or severe indiscipline). Alternatively they 
can choose to conform and adapt to the institution. Scott (2010) argues that 
the total institution is a dynamic entity and reshapes and redefines an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V LGHQWLW\ VR WKDW WKH\ FRQVWUXFW D QHZ UHDOLW\ ZLWKLQ ZKLFK WKH\
IXQFWLRQ  7KLV UHGHILQLQJ LV UHIOHFWHG LQ -HQNLQV¶ (1996) and Ashforth and 
0DHOV¶(1989) arguments regarding the construct of social identity.  Individuals 
will adapt their social identities to the situation that they find themselves in by 
adding or removing identities so that they function in their current 
environment.  In nearly two thirds of the study population we see this happen, 
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recruits construct a new reality that is their existence within the infantry 
training centre and adjust and renegotiate their social identity to encompass 
infantry identity. As identified in chapter 1 (Figure 1 WKH UHFUXLW¶V VRFLDO
identity is formed from many social categorisations within society with each 
FDWHJRU\LQIOXHQFLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VYDOXHVDQGEHOLHIV,QWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\
by the point of entry into training, these individual belief systems were well 
established and formed the core beliefs of the individuals.  
 
It is of concern that a third of the recruit population were unable to adapt to 
military life. It would appear that the military and infantry identity forms a 
VRFLHW\RI LWV RZQ WKHQRUPVDQGYDOXHVRIZKLFKFKDOOHQJH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
established beliefs, creating psychological turmoil and cognitive dissonance.  
The challenge that enlistment and military identity can make to a UHFUXLW¶VRZQ
personal identity has been explored by the Israeli armed forces.  Although the 
British and Israeli military differ in the fact that Israel has a conscript army, the 
experiences of the Israeli recruit are not dissimilar to the experiences 
indeQWLILHG LQ WKLV VWXG\¶V SRSXODWLRQ /HY\ HW DO (1987) identify the drastic 
change in lifestyle that the recruit undergoes, the transition occurring in a 
matter of hours where they instantly become soldiers.  Levy et al (1987) 
identify  (without explicitly making the connection) the five principles of 
*RIIPDQ¶V (1961) total institution within their description of the enlistment 
process and their description of the training environment.  British studies 
(Hampson, 1997, Sirett, 1999) also inadvertently describe a total institution 
and the impact that it has on British recruits.   
 
The military, with its unique organisational identity, arguably sits on the edge 
RIWKHQDWLRQ¶VVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOLGHQWLW\7KHPLOLWDU\HVSHFLDOO\WKHLQIDQWU\
cannot afford to be drawn into reflecting the wider society as this would 
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confuse its identity and potentially cause a level of organisational dissonance 
where the organisation (and, arguably those working within it) would become 
confused about its roles and functions.  In recent times an example of a 
collapse in military identity and a loss of direction as regards primary purpose 
ZDVWKH'XWFK$UP\¶VPLssion in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War.  Dutch 
and United Nations commanders allowed political decision making to influence 
their tactical decisions, resulting in the lives of 100 Dutch soldiers being 
judged worth more than the lives of 8000 Muslim men and boys (Van Der 
Wind, 1995)25.  What was observed  to have occurred with the Dutch troops 
supports %DXPHLVWHU¶V (1986) assertion that if the goals and values of the 
group become inadequately defined and the group loses its sense of self, this 
in turn leads to a lack of commitment to goals and values and the basis for 
consistent decisions and actions is lost. Ashforth and Mael (1996) argue that 
there is a balance to be struck in relation to how an organisation manages its 
identity as organisations are always under pressure to evolve.  This is the crux 
of the argument with infantry identity as Ashforth and Mael (1996) recognise 
that strong organisational identities can be resistant to change.  Organisations 
are built on values and goals that form their identity, and to move away from 
those values and goals would present a weakness in the identity and possibly 
introduce conflict into the organisation.  The military has to be a servant of 
politics and observe neutrality at all times; it can never afford to be part of the 
political process as this would politicise the military (as seen with the Dutch 
military example) and introduce not only conflict into the organisation but loss 
of identity as to what the essence of its existence is. It can be argued that the 
                                            
25
 During the United Nations intervention in the Bosnian war of 1991-1994, the Dutch 
military were given the responsibility of creating a safe haven for Bosnian Muslims at 
Srebrenica which is on the border between Bosnia and Serbia.  The safe haven came 
under attack from the Bosnian Serb forces and the Dutch garrison surrendered to the 
Bosnian Serbs without a shot being fired. This resulted in 8000 Muslim men and boys 
being executed in one of the worst atrocities of the war. 
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Dutch infantry forgot that they were infantry soldiers and adopted an identity 
more akin to civil policing. When it came to fighting (their reason for existence) 
they had no cohesion or fighting spirit as that identity had been lost. The role 
that an organisation¶s identity plays in the achievement of its aims cannot be 
underestimated. Hatch (1993) argues that organisational beliefs are grounded 
in the organisation¶s cultural assumptions, but more importantly organisational 
identity only involves those cultural assumptions that are self defining for the 
organisation.  If the cultural assumptions are eroded, the organisation loses 
the bedrock on which it bases its organisational identity.  Returning to the 
Dutch military example, the constant UN and political interference in the 
mission on the ground coupled with highly restrictive rules of engagement with 
the Bosnian Serb forces meant that the Dutch unit lost its sense of self-
definition and with that any cohesion to perform the duties that were asked of 
it. 
 
This thesis therefore argues that infantry identity is sacrosanct and the 
institution within which infantry soldiers are trained has to be strictly 
maintained in order to achieve its aim.  It is therefore accepted that the total 
institution that is the Infantry Training CHQWUH LV D µQHFHVVDU\ HYLO¶ WR
accomplish the organisational aim.  What is of interest is whether or not the 
totalitarian nature of the institution as a whole is causing the problem of high 
attrition, or alternatively is it how the Army introduces the individual to that 
institution and integrates them into it that causes the problem.  Israeli studies 
have shown that it is the rapid transition to military life, not the military 
institution itself which causes identity conflict, confusion, mental health 
problems and recruit attrition (Levy et al., 1987, Bleich and Levy, 1986). 
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As British society has become more civilised and the population as a whole 
has not experienced war, it has become more risk adverse. The military 
therefore reflects the society which it serves less and less.  It could be argued 
that military forces from different nations have more in common than they do 
ZLWKWKHLURZQQDWLRQVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\  ,W LV WKHH[WUHPHQDWXUHRIWKH
military identity, its beliefs, values and attitudes which appears to account for 
failure and voluntary withdrawal from training amongst infantry recruits.  The 
values, beliefs and attitudes of the infantry identity are so diverse from those 
of the infantry recruits social and personal identity that the recruit is unable to 
cope with the psychological demands that the transition to the Army 
organisation puts upon them.  This is the process identified by Turner (1984), 
in which the recruit has to recategorise his social identity to incorporate a new 
military identity.  This is achieved by the recruit defining themselves within the 
military environment in relation to other recruits, instructors and the physical 
environment (Tajfel and Turner, 1985).  Social identity is very fragile during 
this process as the recruit re-establishes the hierarchy of his social categories 
based on his sense of belonging to the social group that is the infantry 
(Abrams and Hogg, 1990, Jenkins, 1996). If the recruit is unable to define 
himself as a member of this new and very different social group, then he 
becomes at risk of leaving. It is the difference in the identities that forms the 
catalyst for attrition in infantry training.  Societal identity has become so 
detached from military identity that the gap between the two identities is vast, 
the chasm between the two being too great for many to cross. 
   
To demonstrate this cultural difference Figure 21 identifies key situational 
demands that were identified by recruits as factors in their failure.  Physical, 
emotional and social demands were identified as the main cause of 
transitional demand and stress.  It is these demands and the expectation of 
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military organisational identity that creates the chasm between the two 
identities.  
 
There are three fundamental areas where the military expects the individual to 
adapt to and adopt the cultural values and beliefs of the organisation (Figure 
21).  Physicality is at the heart of military identity as physical fitness equals 
better fighting effectiveness.  The physical expectation of the military 
surpassed all of the expectations of those recruits who failed, even though the 
majority of recruits within the failure group of phase 1a participated in rugged 
outdoor activity and more than six hours of team sports per week prior to 
enlistment.  It was not the lack of physical ability that caused them to fail, but 
the inability to psychologically cope with the physical expectations of the 
organisation.  None of the previous British studies (Holland, 1985, Long, 1990, 
Hampson, 1997, Sirett, 1999) identified an association between poor fitness 
and failure, but more importantly, they do not make the association between 
physical expectations of the organisation and psychological failure. A recent 
US military study (Niebuhr et al., 2008) found that attempting to use physical 
fitness as an indicator of performance was very difficult, as the majority of 
discharge in that study were related to conduct, personality and mood 
disorders. 
 
It is an important finding of this study that recruits generally have the physical 
capability to complete training, what they lack is the emotional robustness and 
social support required to succeed.  The military expect high degrees of 
physical output at a point when the individual believes that they can no longer 
carry on.  It requires team work and cohesion to overcome these difficulties 
and achieve success.  In reality what is expected by the military and what the 
individual recruit can deliver differs and as a result the military has to 
191 
acknowledge that in excess of 30% of infantry recruits are not able to cope 
with the current method of transition from civilian life to life in infantry training. 
   
Figure 21: Recruit identity transition 
 
Those that failed appeared to lack the emotional maturity to make the 
transition, and once separated from their social support network and their 
established coping strategies, induction into training was too much for them to 
cope with.  As identified in the results, if the recruit was living at home with his 
family then the physical demands would most probably not have caused the 
level of psychological stress that it did.  In turn if the emotional or social 
factors were faced individually then again the recruit most probably would 
have coped.  It is the culmination of these factors that impact on the individual, 
creating not only a cultural chasm that has to be crossed but also the 
complete loss of prior social and emotional support.  This transitional period 
creates psychological turmoil, or cognitive dissonance within the recruit as he 
tries to make sense of the situation he finds himself in and develop new 
strategies to cope.  As identified by Ashforth and Mael (1989) the opposing 
identities conflict as the recruit attempts to integrate the hierarchy of the 
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military organisational identity within his own social identity, causing the 
SV\FKRORJLFDO LQFRQVLVWHQF\ UHFRJQLVHG LQ )HVWLQJHU¶V (1957) cognitive 
dissonance theory (the dissonance being perpetuated by multiple individual 
DQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHPDQGV,WLVWKHLPSDFWRIWKHGLVVRQDQFHDQGWKHUHFUXLW¶V
inability to cope with it that is the primary cause of failure. 
 
  
193 
5.3: Trans-cultural difficulties during the transitional phase 
 
5.3.1: Coping 
 
-HQNLQV¶ (1996) theory of social identity suggests that coping is a learnt 
strategy that human beings develop from exposure to their social 
surroundings. Individually, we learn behaviour and how to cope by observing 
the behaviour of others (Bandura, 1977). As humans progress through life, 
their ability to cope generally increases unless damaged by a psychologically 
traumatic event.  The findings within this study support the position of the 
established literature; that individuals in stressful situations do better if they 
have access to established social support mechanisms (Kobasa et al., 1982).  
Katz & Kahn (1978) conceptualised this notion of social support as: 
assistance from others, affirmation of beliefs, sharing practices with the 
µJURXS¶EHLQJOLNHGE\RWKHUVDQGNQRZLQJDORWRISHRSOHZKRDOONQRZHDFK
other.  Prior to enlistment, individual recruits would have well established 
support mechanisms. However, enlistment itself strips away almost all of Katz 
	.DKQ¶V (1978) key components that define social support. In essence the 
recruit is stripped of his entire social support network through physical 
separation.  What the findings suggest is that if the individual does not have a 
robust and established concept of self to cope with separation from their 
support network on enlistment into the Army, they progress rapidly from 
coping to not coping and fail in training.  If coping is a learnt strategy (Jenkins, 
1996) then it might be hypothesised that  actions can be taken to help the 
individual to cope during inductions into the organisation. 
 
The findings of this study show recruits failing to convert stressful stimuli into 
healthy coping strategies. Difficulty in coping instigated a sequence of self 
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doubt as regards belonging, which in turn undermined their own confidence in 
their performance ability and their self-esteem.  What was observed in effect 
was a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The recruit began to believe that he did not 
belong which in turn affected his performance; this evoked poor feedback from 
the instructors which reinforced the recruits own thoughts of self doubt.  Very 
quickly the recruit moved from having difficulty in coping to not being able to 
cope with the situation he found KLPVHOI LQ  $V LGHQWLILHG LQ .REDVD HW DO¶V
(1982) study, the failure to cope with the stressful stimuli and adapt to their 
surroundings led to high levels of stress and a deterioration in mental health.  
This was most prominently observed in the mood scores taken from each 
recruit interviewed after failure.  
 
,W FDQ EH DUJXHG WKDW ZKDW LV EHLQJ REVHUYHG LV DQ H[DPSOH RI *RIIPDQ¶V
process of self-mortification.  It has already been argued that the infantry 
training centre provides a near perfect example of the total institution.  It has 
also been argued from the outset of this thesis that the consensus of opinion 
DPRQJVW*RIIPDQ¶VFULWLFV LVWKDW LIVXFKDWRWDO LQVWLWXWLRQH[LVWHGWKHQLWKDV
the potential to be harmful to some of those that are inmates within it when 
WKH\H[SHULHQFHWKHµVKRFNSHULRG¶(Scott, 2010, Homer, 1981, Karmel, 1969).  
Self mortification is the loss of self-concept and self esteem when an 
individual enters a total institution and the institutional processes that 
FRQWULEXWH WR WKH µJULQGLQJ GRZQ RI VHOI¶ (Karmel, 1969, Homer, 1981).  
Goffman (1961) observed that admission procedures either intentionally or 
unintentionally begin a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations and 
profanations of self. He suggests that individuals entering a total institution 
undergo a change in self-concept, arguing that after admission the inmate is 
not the same as prior to admission, as the individual takes on a different self-
concept. This is the process of the recruit redefining their social identity within 
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the military organisation as they struggle with the difficulties and psychological 
conflict that being an organisational newcomer brings (Jenkins, 1996, Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989, Fisher, 1986). Karmel (1969) and Homer (1981) argues that 
*RIIPDQ¶VEHOLHI WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO UHDVVHPEOHVKLVFRQFHSWRIVHOI after the 
shock period is over simplified, and that other factors come into play.  He 
argues that individuals base their concept of self on feelings about significant 
others, and therefore the degree of self-mortification experienced by the 
individual is based upon how significant he considers those who are in charge 
of the institution.  In relation to this study it could be argued that those recruits 
who FDUHG OLWWOH IRU WKH LQVWUXFWRU¶VRSLQLRQRI WKHPDV WKH\GLGQRWFRQVLGHU
them significant) fared better than those for whom it mattered more.  Being 
DEOHWRµSOD\WKHJDPH¶DQGQRWWDNHVHULRXVO\WKHDFWLYLWLHVGHVLJQHGWRDEDVH
acted as an insulator to the process of self-mortification, with the attitudes and 
behaviour of the institution not affecting their self-esteem and social identity.  
What LV LPSRUWDQW LV7LWWOH¶V (1972-1973) observation that integration into the 
institution improves self esteem, which conversely would mean that those that 
were not able to integrate experience a loss of self esteem.  
 
7KH ILQGLQJVRI WKLV VWXG\ FOHDUO\ VXSSRUW.DUPHO¶V (1969) assertion that the 
process of self mortification can occur in various different kinds of total 
institutions. However, the way in which it affects the individual varies greatly.  
Within the failure group in this study, the process of self-mortification caused 
loss of self-esteem, low mood and a loss of the sense of belonging.   What is 
important for organisations such as the Army is its process of induction; there 
appears to be a fine line between integration and mortification.  Organisations 
have to be conscious that their induction processes are integrating 
organisational newcomers and not mortifying them, as the latter clearly is not 
in the interest of the organisation or the individual. 
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5.3.2: Expectation 
 
It was evident amongst those recruits that failed that the transition to military 
life was a greater challenge than they had expected. When met with the 
demands of basic training they were overwhelmed and believed themselves 
incapable of meeting the expectations placed upon them; subsequently their 
commitment towards training appeared to wane.  They failed to anticipate or 
prepare for the environment in which they were going to live and the physical 
realities of military life.  They seemed to have had no understanding of what 
military culture and service entailed and failed to make sufficient social or 
emotional preparation.  However, it is not the fault of the recruit that they have 
a poor perception of what life in the Army entails.  This thesis has asserted 
that the Army is a closed institution, so the only source of credible information 
for recruits entering training has to come from the recruitment process. It 
would be too easy to place the blame for false expectations on the recruit and 
for the organisation to avoid any reflection on their organisational practice. It is 
evident that the Army portrays a positive image, as it has a constant flow of 
ZLOOLQJYROXQWHHUVWRMRLQ+RZHYHUDVLGHQWLILHGE\7]QDQG&D÷ODU (2009) 
organisational trust is the bridge between organisational attractiveness and 
organisational identification and commitment, and if recruits are deceived with 
regards to their expectation of service life and infantry training, all trust will be 
lost when they are met with the reality of the organisation.  When recruits 
spoke about how they had not anticipated the regime in training, they were 
verbalising their annoyance at being misled about what infantry training 
consisted off.  This in turn caused a breakdown of trust between the recruit 
and the Army with the recruit no longer being attracted to the organisation or 
willing to stay. 
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The problem of recruits being misinformed about service life is not isolated to 
this study. Hampson (1997) and Sirett (1999) have previously identified that 
there was a mismatch between the expectations of recruits and the reality of 
training. Sirett (1999) UHIHUUHGWRWKLVIDLOXUHLQH[SHFWDWLRQDVµFXOWXUHVKRFN¶
and stated that the recruits had a poor expectation of the discipline and the 
loss of personal freedom.  Recruits in this study also cited the loss of freedom 
and the unexpected harshness of discipline as reasons for leaving, and 
reported that their expectations did not match the reality of training.   
Hampson (1997) also observed that there was a failure in expectation as to 
what the recruit experience would be like. Hampson (1997) identified that the 
reasons for failure were multiple and that a combination of factors affected 
different recruits; the recurrent theme being that there was no expectation by 
the recruit of how difficult training could be. Both Hampson (1997) and Sirett 
(1999) identified that the initial demands of the first weeks of training were the 
major cause of discharge and suggested strategies that would ease the 
transition from civilian life to Army service, as well as ways in which the 
expectations of the recruit could be improved. Their findings are consistent 
with the present study as regards the cumulative demands that are associated 
with failure. What this study adds is an understanding of those cumulative 
demands through the personal accounts of recruits, and how their decision to 
leave training or their inability to continue training psychologically manifests 
itself.  As identified in the findings of this study, it is the inability to cope with 
the psychological impact of the cumulative demands of training and military 
life that causes failure. 
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5.3.3: Cognitive Dissonance 
 
,WKDVEHHQDUJXHGWKDWDUHFUXLW¶s unrealistic or misinformed expectations of 
service life are a fundamental cause of the breakdown of trust between him 
and the Army.  A subsequent effect of this conflict between what the recruit 
believes Army life will be like, and what they are actually faced with in reality, 
is that a significant proportion of the recruits experience debilitating cognitive 
dissonance.  Festinger (1962) proposed that an individual prefers and seeks 
consistency, and will change attitudes and behaviours to reach a consistent 
state.  Dissonance refers to the personal tension or stress experienced when 
DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDFWLRQVFRQWUDGLFWRUDUH LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKKLVRUKHUYDOXHVRU
beliefs (Gruber 2003).  Kowol (2008) argues that individuals, such as the 
recruits in this study, will hold information regarding what they believe Army 
life to be like prior to enlistment.  These will be beliefs created from Army 
recruitment material, the media, television and films and will lead the recruit to 
establish idealistic notions of what Army life will be like.  Naturally they will 
seek information that will support these beliefs, but when they are exposed to 
the reality of military training they are confronted with non-supportive 
information that challenges their established beliefs causing cognitive 
dissonance (Kowol, 2008, O'keefe, 2002) +RZHYHU 2¶.HHIH (2002) does 
question the significance of mass media and misinformation.  He argues that 
individuals will seek information to support their beliefs even when the beliefs 
OHDG WR EHKDYLRXU WKDW LV QRW LQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHVW LQWHUHVW :KDW ZDV
observed in this study was that recruit failure is the result of psychological 
inconsistencies not logical inconsistencies.  It can be argued that leaving 
training is not a logical action for the recruit to take. They have expended a 
great amount of energy, commitment and time to get in to the Army and they 
are leaving a career that offers long term job security and guaranteed 
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logical thought, which makes the recruit seek information that supports his 
belief that he is better off leaving the Army. Therefore it is important to 
acknowledge that the dissonance is caused by psychological inconsistency, 
not logical inconsistency (Festinger, 1957), with the recruit rejecting the logical 
FRXUVHRIEHKDYLRXU LH µWUDLQLQJ LVRQO\ IRUDVKRUWSHULRGRI WLPHDQG WKHQ
WKLQJVJHWEHWWHU¶7KLVLVDFULWLFDOSRLQWIRUWKH$UP\WRDFNQRZOHGJHDVWKH\
must focus on what is causing the psychological discomfort as this is what 
makes the recruit behave in a way that might appear not to be considered 
rational or objective. 
 
Another significant factor is the very short period of time during which the 
Infantry Training Centre DWWHPSWV WR IDVKLRQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V EHOLHIV ,I DQ
LQGLYLGXDO¶VEHOLHIVDUHLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKDWRIWKHLQVWLWXWLRQWU\LQJWRLPSRVH
institutional beliefs over a matter of days potentially causes a polar response; 
the individual has to decide whether they belong or not and no time is given 
for attitudinal change.  Festinger (1957) believes that cognitive dissonance is 
a motivational state which drives the individual to attitudinal change in order to 
seek consonance. To achieve consonance the recruit will have to either 
change his beliefs to those that are in tandem with the Army or attempt to 
FKDQJHWKH$UP\¶VEHOLHIVWRPDWFKKLV:LWKOLWWOHWLPHWRDFKLHYHHLWKHU, what 
is potentially happening is that the recruit does not change his beliefs about 
WKH $UP\ EXW DFWXDOO\ HQWHUV LQWR D SHULRG RI µSRVW-GHFLVLRQDO¶ GLVVRQDQFH
(Littlejohn and Foss, 2005) where the recruit begins to deliberate over whether 
he has made the correct decision regarding joining.  Littlejohn and Foss 
(2005) UHIHU WR WKLVDV µSRVWSXUFKDVHGLVVRQDQFH¶ VLFDQGGHVFULEHKRZ WKH
individual will seek information to support their beliefs.  If the recruit believes 
that he has made a mistake by joining he will seek information that supports 
his own sense that he should leave.  It is at this point of dissonance that Smith 
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and Taylor (2004) argue that sellers (the Army) should support buyers (the 
recruit) with reassurance and additional support so that the individual believes 
that they have made the right choice in joining. 
 
This thesis argues, therefore, that poor recruitment information and the 
portrayal of service life in the media causes the recruit to create misguided 
nostalgic beliefs about service life. These idealised beliefs are not congruent 
with the reality of LQIDQWU\ WUDLQLQJ DQG EHFRPH GLVVRQDQW ZLWK WKH $UP\¶V
EHOLHIV7KHSUHVVXUHDQGVSHHGRIH[SHFWDWLRQVWRDFFHSWWKH$UP\¶s beliefs 
do not allow for attitudinal change which in turn drives the recruit to seek 
consonance through leaving.  
  
This problem is not isolated to the British military, as similar psychological 
conflict has been observed in young Israeli Army recruits (Bleich and Levy, 
1986).  Bleich and Levy (1986) observed a psychological crisis that occurs 
when young Israelis are conscripted into the Army.  They identified that 
conscripts were generally late adolescents who were at the height of 
µH[SORUDWLRQ¶DQGµFU\VWDOOLVDWLRQ¶RIWKHLU LGHQWLWLHV(QOLVWPHQWLQWHUUXSWHGWKLV
FU\VWDOOLVDWLRQ SURFHVV FDXVLQJ D FULVLV DV UHJDUGV WKHLU µVWDWXV DQG UROH¶
Bleich and Levy (1986) view the conflict from an individual developmental 
prospective but what they describe is not dissimilar to the dissonance 
observed in this VWXG\¶V population.   
 
The challenge for the Army is to assist those recruits that have the potential to 
be successful in transiting the period of dissonance and achieving consistency 
in their thoughts, beliefs, values and attitudes. The aim being to better prepare 
them to face the physical, emotional and social challenges associated with the 
transition into the Army.  The key to success lies in providing the recruit with a 
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suitable bridge to cross the divide between their social identity and the military 
organisational identity and allow for attitudinal change.  It will take time to 
cross the gulf between the two identities as the individual has to adapt and 
learn to cope with their new life and surroundings as well as the expectations 
of their new cultural setting.  
 
This returns to the question of whether current Army discharge policy is 
supporting the recruit or inadvertently placing them under pressure to leave.  
The ArP\¶V µ'LVFKDUJH DV RI 5LJKW¶ SROLF\ SRWHQWLDOO\ KLQGHUV WKH UHFUXLW¶V
transition to military life by providing an attractive option of escape and 
UHLQIRUFLQJ WKHEHOLHI WKDW LI WKH\GRQ¶W EHORQJ WKH\ FDQVHHNFRQVRQDQFHE\
returning to what they know and avoiding attitudinal change. When recruits 
that failed were asked about how they would feel should service now be akin 
to National Service of the 1950s; surprisingly the majority stated that they 
ZRXOGµJHWRQZLWKLW¶7KHRSWLRQWROHDYHLVWRRHDV\DWWKe fundamental point 
during the crossing of the chasm between the two identities.  
 
Ashforth and Mael (1989) and Jenkins (1996) identify this point both in 
organisational newcomers and when transiting social identities. The recruit is 
adapting their social identity to incorporate the new military organisational 
identity. They are struggling to resolve the category conflict as they 
psychologically process the norms and values of the military organisation and 
attempt to place them in a hierarchy of importance within their own social 
identity. During this transitional phase where the recruit is adjusting and 
adapting to his new surroundings the emphasis should be on encouraging 
commitment and staying through support, rather than inviting them to leave.  
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However, the resolution of this problem is not as simple as moving the 
Discharge as of Right period further into the recruit¶s training and making them 
stay. On the contrary, the Army has to capitalise on the recruit¶s initial 
attraction to the organisation and make staying attractive by making the 
transition to the military more achievable.  The recruits left because they had 
convinced themselves that they did not fit in or did not have the ability to 
succeed in training; tKH$UP\¶VFKDOOHQJHLVWRDGDSWWKHLUHQOLVWPHQWSURFHVV
VRWKDWWKHUHFUXLW¶VFRQILGHQFHLQKLVRZQDELOLW\LVLPSURYHG. Training should 
be designed to help overcome the challenges faced.  Until the recruits have 
adapted they should be gradually introduced to their new organisation one 
challenge at a time.    
 
The benefits of the organisation investing time in newcomers and developing 
trust is  identified by Puusa and Tolvanen (2006) who believe that capitalising 
on the initial attractiveness of the organisation and developing trust between 
the organisation and the individual is the key to assisting the individual in 
FURVVLQJ WKH µPHQWDO EULGJH¶ EHWZHHQ WKH WZR 7KH\ EHOLHYH WKDW VORZO\
LQWURGXFLQJ WKH UHFUXLW WR WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LGHntity will engender trust, 
maintain attractiveness and provide the recruit with the time to resolve the 
identity conflict and cognitive dissonance that enlistment causes.  The ultimate 
aim is that the recruit internalises some, if not all of the norms and values of 
the Army and places Army identity within the top of the hierarchy of their social 
identity. 
 
5.3.4: Factors affecting transition 
 
The qualitative findings showed that there were multiple situational demands 
WKDW LQIOXHQFHG WKH UHFUXLWV¶ DELOLWLHV to adapt and cope with the transition to 
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Army life.  The period of transition between cultures is when the recruit is at 
the highest risk of failure. This is not a new finding as both Hampson (1997) 
and Sirett (1999) formed the same conclusions based on a broader Army 
population.  However, to accept the above reason for failure is over simplified 
and places the blame for failure firmly with the recruit. This does not reflect the 
role that the organisation plays in recruit failure.  This study not only identifies 
the multiple situational demands that recruits are exposed to but also 
identifies the effect which it has on them, and the cognitive processes that are 
a result of them.  Most importantly, it identifies when the recruit is most 
vulnerable to failure and how they make the decision to leave.  
 
The importance of this new information cannot be under estimated if the 
organisation is motivated to recognise its own role in attrition and improve the 
recruit wastage figures. The Army now have the information to identify when a 
recruit is most vulnerable and target interventions at specific times in the 
enlistment process to reduce the impact of situations that cause attrition. To 
achieve a greater chance of reducing attrition rates, multiple solutions are 
required to reduce the impact that the situational demands have during 
transition.  For example recruits spoke of a loss of freedom after initial entry as 
they did not go home for seven weeks.  To reduce the impact of enlistment 
this restriction could be removed.  This would allow the recruit to go home at 
the weekends, providing an integrated approach to them learning to cope and 
adapt.  This would help to reduce the amount of dissonance experienced as 
the recruit would still remain firmly in contact with his established social 
support network whilst slowly building a new support network in the Army, 
making the transition at a pace that he is able to cope with and allowing 
attitudinal change.  Coupling this with moving the opportunity to leave further 
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into training could help to reduce the psychological impact of the initial 
transition and provide a realistic time for adaptation. 
 
The challenge for the military organisation during the transitional period is to 
help the recruits adapt their established behaviours to those behaviours that 
are expected within a military institution. The findings from Phase 1 of the 
present study suggest that prior to enlistment, avoidant behaviours and 
difficulty with coping are traits associated with those who went on to fail, 
indicating that within the failure group difficulties experienced at school are 
being replicated in the initial phase of Army infantry training. It seems that 
failure in training is more common among individuals who have difficulty with 
discipline, and use absenteeism and aggression as a coping strategy.  Their 
commitment to make the transition to the military is overwhelmed and they 
revert to their previously established avoidant behaviours, adopting a childlike 
VXUUHQGHUUDWKHUWKDQWKH$UP\¶VH[SHFWHG³PDWXUH´DSSURDFKRIVXIIHULQJWKH
hardship of training for the deferred gratification of success. Commanding 
Officers wrote about the lack of maturity and the lack of desire to pass, and 
reported how recruits used medical or welfare appointments as a tool to avoid 
the hardships of training.   
 
Findings from phase 1 of this study also suggested that individuals with poor 
VHOIGLVFLSOLQHKDGGLIILFXOW\FRQIRUPLQJWRWKH$UP\¶VH[SHFWDWLRQRIGLVFLSOLQH 
It can be argued that recruits who failed placed little importance on the value 
of self discipline and the need to behave to a set of rules. Whilst in school they 
SUREDEO\ KDG QR GHVLUH WR EH WKHUH DQG GLG QRW FRQIRUP WR WKH VFKRRO¶V
expectations of behaviour and achievement.  Their concept of self-discipline 
and their values and norms would have come from the experiences that 
created their social identity; the evidence suggests that they did not value 
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education, structure and discipline and therefore showed little or no interest in 
school. However, what this study found is that when they did find something 
that they valued and were attracted to (the Army), they did not know how to 
cope and adapt with the hardship that went with achieving what they wanted 
(success in recruit training).  As identified, prior to enlistment those within the 
failure group appear to have established avoidant behaviours rather than 
dealing with the hardships that commitment and achievement caused.  Mael 
DQG$VKIRUWK¶V(1995) study on US recruits was based on the premise that if 
the US Army selected those recruits that identified with the values and beliefs 
of the US Army then recruit attrition would be reduced.  This proposed that 
established behaviour would repeat itself in training and recruits would remain 
loyal to the military as they had shared beliefs. Although prediction of failure in 
ERWK WKLV VWXG\ DQG 0DHO DQG $VIRUWK¶V (1995) study is limited, this study 
supports Mael and AsfortK¶V (1995) findings as the recruits that failed 
displayed behaviour in training which was evident in their school history. This 
behaviour led to poor achievement at school and a similar outcome in the 
Army. They repeated their pattern of school behaviour which ultimately was a 
factor in their failure in infantry training.  
 
The argument that patterns of avoidant behaviours and failure to succeed 
repeat themselves in adult life following schooling suggests that recruits who 
have difficulty with commitment and achievement do not possess the social 
and psychological maturity to achieve success at the point when they most 
desire it.  This question of social and psychological maturity is vitally important 
as the military needs to recognise that their recruitment methods have not 
changed dramatically for three decades. However, the schooling system and 
its approach to competitiveness and discipline have.  The Army needs to 
reflect upon whether recruits have the level of emotional maturity and life 
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experience required to endure the rigors of infantry training. Not only does the 
Army need to consider its current recruitment process, but also it potentially 
needs to acknowledge that some recruits may not able to commence military 
training at the point of entry and would require a period of transitional training 
and socialisation.  
 
5.3.5: Fitting in 
 
What appears to be the most critical point during the transitional phase is the 
period when the recruit begins to doubt whether he belongs or fits in.  
Reflecting on the argument that the transitional phase causes cognitive 
dissonance, Kowol (2008) argues that if a dissonant cognition violates the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRQFHSW RI VHOI WKH UHDOLVDWLRQ WKDW WKH $UP\ LV QRW ZKDW they 
expected and they doubt whether they are good enough to succeed) the 
recruit will engage in ego-defensive, dissonance reducing behaviour. As 
individuals reduce their dissonance they aim to maintain a positive image of 
themselves, an image that depicts the individual as being good, smart or 
worthwhile (Kowol, 2008). Aronson (2004) argues that people are not rational 
beings but rather rationalising beings, motivated to believe that they are right 
and to justify their own actions and beliefs, convincing themselves that when 
they do something it is a reasonable and logical thing to do.  What was 
observed in this study were recruits engaging in dissonance reducing 
behaviour that is ego-defensive.  There is no recognition that they are at fault; 
RQWKHFRQWUDU\WKH\VWDWHWKDWLWLVWKH$UP\¶VZD\RIOLIHWKDWLVXQDFFHSWDEOH
DQG WKH\GRQ¶WEHORQJRU ILW LQWR LW 0RUH LQWHUHVWLQJO\ WKLVPLJKWH[SODLQ WKH
unexpected phenomenon of recruits who clearly had difficulty in training 
creating elaborate and noble reasons for why they had to leave (sick relative, 
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mother or girlfriend not coping without them etc) that did not appear to be 
VXEVWDQWLDWHGRUVXSSRUWHGE\WKHLU&RPPDQGLQJ2IILFHUV¶UHSRUWV 
 
The notion of this sense of fitting in was observed by Shabtay(1995a) when 
looking at Ethiopian immigrants achieving Israeli naturalisation. 
Shabtay(1995a) observed that national identity was an achieved status and 
that the Ethiopian recruits had to adapt to Israeli society and serve in the 
military not only to be seen to fit in, but also to feel that they fit in. The need for 
the recruit to feel that they belong cannot be underestimated. Ashforth and 
Mael (1989) argue that organisational newcomers are particularly vulnerable 
as they are unsure of their role and status within the new organisation and will 
build a self definition of the organisation based on their initial experience, 
using that to determine whether they belong or not.   
 
The present study identified that the recruit had to adapt and earn his status in 
the military organisation. When the recruit was accepted by the organisation, 
he felt accepted in himself and part of the larger group.  The point when the 
recruit questioned this sense of belonging was the point where he had most 
difficulty in fitting in.  As the recruit tried to cope with the multiple demands 
being placed upon him, in conjunction with adapting to his new environment, 
he soon reached the limit of his ability to cope. Eventually, when he could 
cope no longer, he made the decision that he did not belong and from that 
point forward the recruit sought only to distance himself from the Army as 
soon as possible.  Prior to that point the recruit was coping; he may have had 
difficulty in coping, but he was coping nonetheless.  What is important about 
this finding is that the qualitative evidence suggests that once a recruit 
decides that he no longer belongs and has made the decision to leave there is 
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little hope of return.  From a retention perspective this suggests that any 
intervention to increase recruit success has to be performed prior to this point.   
 
5.3.6: Mood and Performance 
 
The emotional impact of training on those recruits who failed was the part of 
the study which was most surprising.  What was observed in the failure group 
was a marked deterioration in their subjective mood, which in turn had an 
adverse effect on their performance.  This appeared to be the start of a cycle 
of decline as the recruit struggled with the impact of initial training and how it 
made him feel.  Once the mood began to deteriorate, the recruit soon lost any 
hope of completing training and doubted the purpose of the training that they 
were being exposed to.  They appeared to be unable to see that the discipline 
and hardship aimed to test them and to stimulate cohesive unity amongst the 
recruits. 
 
The need to impose its cultural or organisational identity is imperative to 
DFKLHYLQJWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWV7KHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQDELOLW\WRSURcess 
and internalise the beliefs and values of the organisation is probably not only 
due to them being at odds with their own beliefs, but also due to the methods 
with which they are imposed.  Levy et al (1987) identified a similar conflict 
EHWZHHQµ\RXWKLGHQWLW\¶DQGµPLOLWDU\LGHQWLW\¶DPRQJVW,VUDHOLFRQVFULSWV7KH\
REVHUYHGµ\RXWKLGHQWLW\¶ZLWKLWVRZQLQWHUHVWVFXOWXUDOQRUPVDQGYDOXHVDQG
FRQWUDVWHG WKDW ZLWK µPLOLWDU\ LGHQWLW\¶ ZKLFK LV D µUDWLRQDO IRUPDO JURZQ-up 
ideology, the purpose of which LV WR GHIHQG WKH FRXQWU\¶  9HU\ VLPLODU
observations concerning this conflict of identities have been observed in this 
study, as there is a chasm between the values and beliefs of the recruit and 
those of the infantry.  The current training process appears to thrust the 
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LQIDQWU\¶VLGHQWLW\XSRQWKHLQGLYLGXDOUHFUXLWZLWKVXFKUDSLGLW\WKDWLWWKUHDWHQV
their sense of personal identity, causing psychological conflict and dissonance 
and subsequently deterioration in mood.  However, it is not just the rapidity of 
transition that causes problems, although that is potentially one of the major 
contributing factors. It has already been argued that the nature of the infantry 
training institution is total and that symptoms of the self-mortifying process 
were observed amongst the failure group.  The impact on mood is caused by 
a complex mix of environment, staff behaviour and identity conflict which 
results in persistent low mood. This is not an uncommon phenomenon 
amongst military communities and similar symptoms were observed in the 
psychiatric casualties from the Second Gulf War (1993).  During that war 178 
casualties were evacuated for psychiatric reasons, of which 50.8% (n=59) 
were diagnosed with adjustment disorders and 30.2% had no diagnosable 
psychiatric disorder on return to the UK (Turner et al., 2005).  Turner et al 
(2005) argue that as the fighting was brief and of low intensity the mental 
health problems observed were characteristic of adjustment disorder. This 
almost always included low mood and was not dissimilar to that observed in 
the peace time military population.  Most relevant to this study is that 78% of 
those evacuated cited difficulties in coping with the physical environment and 
separation from family as the cause of their symptoms. Turner et al (2005) 
argue that the casualty rate observed was a result of situational stressors and 
that longer term mental health problems and relatively poor military identity 
were a cause and not a consequence of military personnel failing to cope.  
 
Phase 2 of the present study identified that for just under half of those recruits 
interviewed, their subjective mood failed to fully recover prior to discharge.  
8QGHUDTXDUWHURIDOO LQWHUYLHZHHV¶VXEMHFWLYHPRRG IDLOHG WR UHFRYHUDERYH
five (scale 0-10) prior to discharge. It is argued that the most likely cause of 
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the sustained low mood is that an adjustment disorder26 was observed in the 
failure group not dissimilar to that observed in the psychiatric casualties from 
the Second Gulf War.   What is of most importance is that evidence of mood 
deterioration was observed in the failure group interviewed, caused directly by 
the situation in which they found themselves.  Evidence of stress and mood 
deterioration in such a substantial number of failing recruits adds further 
pressure to review the method of induction into training and how the transition 
into the infantry is managed. 
 
  
                                            
26
 International Classification of Disease, F43.2 States of subjective distress and 
emotional disturbance, usually interfering with social functioning and performance, 
and arising in the period of adaptation to a significant life change or to the 
consequences of a stressful life event (including the presence or possibility of serious 
physical illness).  
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5.4: Predicting recruitment outcome using a risk score 
 
Although the study has developed a comprehensive understanding of the 
cause of failure in infantry recruits, the biographical questionnaire proved to 
offer only a slightly better than chance ability to predict failure.  The proportion 
of recruits that it would incorrectly place as either being successful or 
unsuccessful was too great to recommend its routine use.  The highest 
positive predictive value was 44.2% at a cut-point of greater than or equal to 
44.0 (n=32), indicating that if the model was used to screen recruits into 
additional training, and the threshold was set at a cut-point of greater than or 
equal to 44, 55.3% of those screened into additional training at extra cost 
would not have required that training.  
 
This raises an important question about the biographical questionnaire itself 
and its overall relevance with regards to predicting recruit attrition. Mael and 
Ashforth (1995) developed the biographical questionaire to identify the 
dimensions of organisational identity within the US military.  The focus of their 
study was on the relationship between a recruit¶s antecedent biographical 
factors and identification with the US Army. The impact of organisational 
identification in relation to recruit attrition was measured as a practical 
concern.  Their results identified four biographical factors which were 
associated with increased organisational identification (pre-enlistment 
participation in rugged outdoor activity, solid citizen, participation in group 
orientated team sports and intellectual and achievement orientated pursuits).  
Mael and Ashforth (1995) acknowledge that the relationship between 
organisational identification and attrition was not the focus of the study. 
However a positive relationship between good organisational identification 
and reduced attrition was observed. What their study did not comment on was 
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the effectiveness of biographical data alone in predicting attrition.  This study 
XVHG 0DHO DQG $VKIRUWK¶V (1995) biographical data tool as indicator of 
organisational fit and whether it was possible to discriminate between those 
that pass and those that fail.  The tool was relatively successful in identifying 
the behavioural traits that were associated with failure, but potentially fell 
down on its inability to identify those emotional traits that were most prominent 
in the failure group.  The study did identify that there were pre and post 
enlistment patterns of behaviour. However, it has been argued that the most 
prominent factor attributable to failure was an inability to cope with the nature 
of the training institution, poor expectation of service life, identity conflict, and 
the cumulative cognitive dissonance and self-mortification caused by all of 
these factors.  
 
This is not to say that the biographical data gathered is of no use. On the 
contrary, as already evident in this chapter some of the variables that were 
statistically associated with failure are consistent with the findings of phase 2 
of the present study, showing patterns of behaviour repeating themselves in 
the Army which were evident in the UHFUXLW¶V pre-military life.  These findings 
DUHQRWGLVVLPLODUWR0DHODQG$VKIRUWK¶V(1995) as they observed that certain 
patWHUQV RI EHKDYLRXU VXFK DV µVROLG FLWL]HQ EHKDYLRXU¶ ZHUH DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
training success and low attrition. 
 
7KHSUHVHQWVWXG\VXSSRUWV/RQJ¶V(1990) DQG+DPSVRQ¶V(1997) assumption 
that predicting attrition in military training is problematic as the cause of failure 
is multi-faceted. This is the only study into military training attrition to attempt 
to use biographical data to predict training attrition, and of the studies 
reviewed it is the only one to test its findings on a separate validation dataset.  
The findings of this study also reflect more recent studies of predicting military 
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training outcomes (Niebuhr et al., 2008, Armstrong et al., 2000, Larson et al., 
2002), and again share the conclusion that predicting training success or 
failure is notoriously difficult due to the significant level of false positives.  
What has been learnt from the present study, which supports Mael and 
Ashforth (1995) DQG+DPSVRQ¶V(1997) findings, is that there is an association 
between pre-enlistment behaviour and training outcome. However this 
association is not significant enough to be used for prediction.  
 
Some of the variables within the predictive model are more difficult than others 
to interpret.  The recruits were asked how they responded to stressful 
VLWXDWLRQVWKHRSWLRQVDYDLODEOHWRWKHPUDQJHGIURPµDJJUHVVLYHRXWEXUVW¶ WR
µPHWKRGLFDO SUREOHP VROYLQJ¶  7KRVH WKDW UHVSRQGHG WR VWUHVVIXO VLWXDWLRQV
non-aggressively decreased their odds of failure by over a half.  Similarly, 
those who grew up with female siblings had odds of failure which were half 
that of those who only had brothers.  Being an only child showed no 
association with failure, indicating that having a sister was a protective factor. 
This poses the question as to whether there is a link between the formation of 
limited aggressive coping mechanisms and the lack of peer female influence 
in the formative years.  Being able to communicate well and talk about 
problems was a protective factor and potentially reduced the cognitive 
dissonance experienced. Those recruits with good communication skills were 
more able to establish new friendships which in turn provided them with a 
social support network which enabled them to cope better with the expected 
attitudinal change that was required for success. Arguably, recruits that grow 
up with sisters have learnt to negotiate and compromise, as aggression 
towards sisters would have been unacceptable in the family home; aggression 
towards a male sibling may have been less of a problem.  
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Spending between two and five evenings at home per week also decreased 
the odds of failure by half in comparison to only spending one evening at 
home.  Spending more than five evenings a week at the family home was not 
associated with training failure. This would suggest that those recruits who 
had a balance between spending evenings in with their family and some 
evenings out increased their chances of training success.  Potentially, what is 
being observed in these recruits is a gradual achievement of independence 
away from the family unit. By going out a few nights a week they are 
developing their independence and ability to cope outside of the family unit, 
making their own decisions and friends.  By the time they enlist in the military 
they are used to having their own independence but still have strong links with 
the family unit and the support that the family provides. Wintre and Ben-Knaz 
(2000) H[DPLQHGWKHHIIHFWWKDWSDUHQWLQJVW\OHSOD\HGRQDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\
to cope with stressful life events.  They employed a model developed to 
investigate the transition in young adults from home to military service on 114 
male Israeli conscripts which consisted of the use of eight psychometric 
scales.27 The study examined three parental approaches (authoritative, 
authoritarian and permissive28) to investigate the impact which these different 
parenting styles had RQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\ WRFRSHRQ OHDYLQJKRPHDQG
commencing compulsory military service within the Israeli Defence Force. 
  
                                            
27
 Parental Authority Questionnaire (Buri 1991), Perception of Parental Reciprocity 
Scale (Wintre et al 1995), Social Provisions Scale-Present Version (Cutrona 1989), 
Individual Adequacy Subscale of the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory (Greenberger 
1974), Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al 
1961) and  Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen 1983) in Wintre, M. G. & Ben-Knaz, R. 
2000. It's Not Academic, You're in the Army Now: Adjustment to the Army as a 
Comparative Context for Adjustment to University. Journal of Adolescent Research, 
15, 145-172. 
28
 AXWKRULWDWLYHSDUHQWVDVPRQLWRUVRIWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRXUVDQGWKHVHWWHUVRI
age related expectations and good communicators.  Authoritarian parents are seen as 
controlling, highly demanding and discouraging of communication whereas permissive 
parents are seen as undemanding. Baumrind Baumrind, D. 1971. Current Patterns of 
Parental Authority. Development Psychology Monographs, 4, 1-103. 
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Wintre and Ben-Knaz (2000) argue that there is a consensus of opinion that 
authoritative parenting practices seem to be the most beneficial means of 
child rearing.  They identify that this is specifically so with regards to academic 
achievement, autonomy, self-esteem, social competence and personal and 
social responsibility.  In addition they argue that children raised in an 
authoritative style displayed less depressive symptomology than those raised 
in an authoritarian or permissive way. Their study tested the hypothesis that 
authoritative parenting best prepares the individual to cope with the rigours of 
military service.   An explanation as to why permissively reared adolescents 
did better in an authoritarian organisation was that the imposed structure of 
the army provided an unambiguous situation with clear expectations and 
outcomes, which may be perceived as less stressful and more esteem 
enhancing by the permissively reared (Wintre and Ben-Knaz, 2000).  In 
addition to this it can be argued that permissively reared children develop a far 
more comprehensive ability to cope with life in general out of necessity due to 
lack of parental guidance.  More importantly, authoritative and authoritarian 
SDUHQWDOVW\OHVSRVVLEO\VWXQWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VGHYHORSPHQWRIFRSLQJVNLOOVGXH
to either cosseting or the insistence that they adopt the skills and traits of the 
parents.  What is observed in this study is that recruits that sit between the 
permissive (always allowed out and never spend a night at home) and the 
authoritative  (spend more nights in than out) parenting styles do better with 
the transition to military service.  What Wintre and Ben-Knaz (2000) and this 
study identify is that those recruits that are afforded a degree of independence 
during school years appear to cope better with stressful life events.  Arguably 
this is linked to increased emotional maturity, a lack of which was identified by 
instructors as a factor associated with failure.  However the biographical data 
questionnaire did not measure parenting directly and its difficult to draw direct 
relationships between parenting style and recruit success.  Alternatively, 
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depressive symptoms described by Wintre and Ben-Knaz (2000) were 
observed in this stud\¶V failure population; it would be of interest in future 
research to see if there is also a link between parenting style and poor recruit 
adjustment and performance. 
 
Classroom behaviour was identified as being associated with failure indicating 
that those who sat quietly and paid attention were potentially twice as likely to 
fail compared with those who daydreamed.  However, as discussed in the 
results section, this variable had a p value of 0.052 and was on the threshold 
for inclusion. 
 
What was clear from the results was that attending three or more schools 
nearly doubled the odds of failure.  What makes this variable difficult to 
interpret is that it does not differentiate between those that moved schools for 
family reasons and those that attended multiple schools for disciplinary 
reasons. Without knowing why so many schools were attended little meaning 
can be drawn from this finding.  However, what it potentially indicates is an 
individual who finds it difficult to settle and fit in.  This assumption would 
corroborate with the phase 2 findings where difficulty in adjusting and fitting in 
was given as the fundamental reason for recruits leaving.  
 
What is evident from the statistical model is the collective picture that it 
produces of a recruit more likely to fail.  We are provided with an image of a 
recruit who is more inclined to adopt aggressive strategies when under stress 
and had a disrupted childhood or difficulty in settling into schools. In 
comparison with the phase 2 results there are striking instances of repeat 
behaviour; that is the recruit who fails in training is repeating behaviour 
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already established at school. The recruits that failed reported difficulties in 
coping with the training and also found it hard to settle and fit into army life. 
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5.5: Implications of findings: Next steps for further study 
The current level of attrition at the British Army Infantry Training Centre is 
unacceptable for both financial and humanitarian reasons.  This study 
identifies three areas in which the Army needs to examine its current 
recruitment and enlistment practices if it is truly motivated to reduce the 
amount of attrition that is currently observed in the infantry training population. 
 
5.5.1: Recruitment process 
 
This study has argued that recruits who failed had unrealistic expectations of 
life and training in the Infantry Training Centre.  They had established 
idealised beliefs of what infantry training would be like which were not 
matched by reality.  Subsequently, on arrival to training they experienced a 
high degree of cognitive dissonance which eventually resulted in discharge.  
Recruits need to be able to prepare for enlistment both physically and 
mentally, so it is vitally important that they are given the most accurate 
information as possible regarding what life in training is like. It is particularly 
important that this preparation includes information about the environment, 
instruction technique and the training program which recruits will experience.  
Army careers offices need to review their current information and ensure that 
it portrays a realistic representation of infantry training.  In addition, it would be 
beneficial if potential recruits were given a short presentation followed by a 
question and answer session by a recruit who has just successfully completed 
training.  This again would give potential recruits a pragmatic view of what 
training will consist of and allow them to ask questions.  The benefit of this 
would be that potential recruits would be in a better position during the 
recruitment process to make an informed decision as to whether or not they 
are truly suited to infantry life. 
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5.5.2: Prediction of training failure 
 
Although the British Army Recruit Battery is relatively useful at  identifying an 
intellectual and physical capacity for training, it does not appear to predict 
organisational fit well (Hampson, 1997).  The biographical data tool identified 
behavioural characteristics which were associated with training, but did not 
have the ability to identify those emotional factors which were associated with 
training failure.  For decades the British military has attempted to develop a 
psychometric test to assist in predicting success in recruit training.  This study 
has shown that biographical data has potential to assist in predicting recruit 
failure and occupational fit, but not as a standalone tool.  It was the emotional 
factors which were the most prominent cause of failure. Future research might 
beneficially look at how successful an amalgamation of current psychometric 
measures, biographical questionnaires and a scale that measures the 
emotional factors is at predicting training failure or success. The US military 
have adopted this approach and use a non-cognitive two scale test battery 
ZKLFK LQFOXGHV DQ µDVVHVVPHQW RI LQGLYLGXDO PRWLYDWLRQ¶ WRRO DQG D
µELRJUDSKLFDOLQYHQWRU\TXHVWLRQQDLUH¶(Borman et al., 2004a).  Of considerable 
note regarding this current US military research is the inclusion in the  
µELRJUDSKLFDO LQYHQWRU\ TXHVWLRQQDLUH¶ RI VHOI-report measures related to 
reactions to specific life events that are indicative of the targeted personal 
characteristics.  The US military have identified the need for emotional 
robustness and are attempting to measure that in relation to previous 
emotional responses to specific life events.  The study is longitudinal and 
currently ongoing; however, initial findings are encouraging with regards to the 
ability to identify those at an increased risk of failure.  If the UK military is to 
continue to be reliant on predictive tools it needs to reflect the progress made 
by the US military and develop a multiple scale recruitment battery. 
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5.5.3: Enlistment process 
 
The enlistment process is arguably the area where the most impact could be 
achieved to reduce attrition.  The present study suggests three areas for 
further research and intervention strategies: the enlistment phase, the training 
phase, and the exit phase. Within the qualitative findings it was identified that 
DPRQJUHFUXLWVZKRGRQ¶WFRPSOHWH training there appear to be gateways that 
recruits pass through on a journey to failure, where they make the transition 
from coping to not coping.  The findings in the present study suggest that 
once a recruit has entered the exit phase then there is little hope of recovery. 
Therefore, research and interventions at the exit phase would not be 
recommended as the financial cost of letting recruits progress that far into 
training with little chance of successful recovery would not make it financially 
viable. This leaves the enlistment phase and the training phase as potential 
areas for intervention. This identified training cost is a key factor when 
considering potential interventions during the enlistment phase.  The longer 
that the recruit who fails in training remains the greater the cost of that training 
failure.  The goal is to achieve a balance between attaining minimal 
manpower wastage and maximising training success, thereby reducing the 
financial cost of training wastage overall. 
 
Figure 22 SURYLGHVDGLDJUDPPDWLFSLFWXUHRIWKHUHFUXLW¶VHQOLVWPHQWMRXUQH\
The point of entry into service is described by the recruits who failed and is 
illustrated here as vertical challenge, a cliff which they must climb.  This 
vertical climb incorporates the demands of enlistment, and all of the demands 
which apply pressure to the recruits coping strategies.   
 
  
221 
Figure 22: Enlistment journey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dotted line in Figure 22 demonstrates a potential solution which could 
reduce the transitional impact that enlistment has on the recruit in the early 
stages of recruit training.  This study has identified that it is the sudden impact 
of the situational demands which causes their ability to cope to be 
overwhelmed. Therefore a slower integration may be one way in which the 
impact of the transition to the military can be minimised.  Figure 22 proposes 
that rather than presenting the recruit with a short, intense, overwhelming 
transition into training that risks high attrition, it would be better to introduce 
the recruit to the Army through a graduated transitional period. 
  
It is recommended, on the basis of this study, that the enlistment process 
consist of a series of familiarisation days that build up to a two week 
transitional training course.  This course would involve enjoyable activities 
such as adventurous training as well as team building and socialisation 
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exercises.  In addition to this, group sessions would focus on informing 
SRWHQWLDOUHFUXLWVDERXWWKHLQIDQWU\¶VHWKRVYDOXHVEHOLHIVJRDOVDQGFXOWXUH
clearly stating to them what will be expected of them in training.  A key 
recommendation is that this period of transitional training should be conducted 
in civilian attire, and that the recruit should be allowed to leave at any point 
should he decide that the infantry is not for him.  Such an approach potentially 
removes the sense of being trapped, as the recruit is essentially having an 
introduction to the infantry and using this process to gain an informed insight 
prior to making his decision to join.  In turn, the infantry would also have a 
period of time to asVHVV WKH UHFUXLW¶V VXLWDELOLW\ IRU WUDLQLQJ SULRU WR IXOO
enlistment.  This process of transitional training would aim to coach the recruit 
through the initial period of transition, introducing the individual to Army 
identity and culture in manageable chunks, allowing the recruit to become 
accustomed to the training institution.  This integrated introduction would 
SRWHQWLDOO\JLYHWKHUHFUXLWWLPHWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHPLOLWDU\¶VYDOXHVEHOLHIVDQG
goals and adapt his socio-personal identity and attitudinal beliefs so that they 
fit into the new environment.  It would be hoped that by introducing a gradual 
integration, stronger ties with family and friends (established social support 
networks) would be maintained. By removing the sense of being trapped, the 
recruit would experience less cognitive dissonance which reduces the chance 
of an adjustment disorder.  There will of course be attrition, but those who are 
unsuitable would leave earlier, even before they entered uniformed service. 
This would reduce significantly the financial cost of wastage.  Such a process, 
if integrated into the enlistment phase, would help the recruit to make a 
graduated psychological and physical transition into the infantry.     
 
An intervention during the enlistment phase would have to be proactive and 
aim to prepare the recruit for all aspects of training, hopefully ensuring that 
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unsuitable recruits do not progress to subsequent phases.  However, as 
prediction of failure is very difficult to achieve, this approach would require all 
recruits to pass through the transitional training introduction to the Army.  
Whether this would be economically viable would depend upon how much the 
attrition rate would need to be reduced to warrant the cost compared to the 
current attrition rate.  That would equate to providing training for over 60% of 
individuals that would have passed through training anyway.  An additional 
benefit would be that those who were clearly unsuitable for the infantry would 
potentially leave during the first two weeks of the transitional training period, 
reducing the cost of wastage as it would avoid the requirement of equipping 
and paying recruits for four weeks before letting them leave.  If such a 
randomised trial was to be undertaken it would need to show that the 
additional cost of training was less than the current cost of wastage and that 
wastage rates for those commencing the common infantry course were 
significantly reduced for it to be deemed a successful intervention.  
 
The second recommendation for further research in the enlistment phase 
would be a targeted intervention strategy, with recruits to be monitored for 
early signs of difficulty in training. This process of monitoring would be aided 
by the findings in the biographical data.  It is accepted that the risk score does 
not provide the accuracy to predict those who will have difficulty in completing 
training; however, the findings from this study potentially give training staff 
direction as regards behavioural traits that are associated with failure.  By 
incorporating those findings into the training interviews that instructors have 
with recruits, it could aid training staff to identify early signs of difficulty in 
coping with the transition to military life.  That early identification could then 
lead to a similar process that is used for recruits currently who experience 
physical injuries. Recruits who experience physical injuries, or are unable to 
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meet the physical requirements of training, go into a training platoon which 
provides remedial training, bringing them to the required standard before re-
introducing them back into main infantry training.  Those that experience 
psychological difficulties with the transition to the infantry could also be 
directed to a training platoon that provides additional specialised training to 
help the recruit to develop both the physical and psychological requirements 
for continuation of training.  The benefits of this approach would be that it 
adds minimal additional cost to training, as the infrastructure is in place for 
accommodating recruits whose training is on hold. However, there is the 
disadvantage that additional training will be wasted on those who will choose 
to leave anyway. 
 
One potential difficulty is that this approach would involve re-training the 
current instructors.  There is a clear barrier between instructor and recruit.  As 
identified in the findings, there is a fine line between difficulty in coping and 
not coping, and in reality to achieve retention you would need to identify when 
WKH UHFUXLW PRYHV IURP WKH µFRSLQJ SKDVH¶ WR WKH µGLIILFXOW\ LQ FRSLQJ¶ SKDVH
This is a very subtle transition, especially in the face of the stigma associated 
with the recruit admitting that they are having some difficulties early on.  A 
great deal of responsibility would be placed on the infantry instructors to 
PRQLWRU WKH UHFUXLW¶V SV\FKRORJLFDO VWDWH ZKHQ WKHLU SULPDU\ IRFXV LV WR
produce highly trained infantry soldiers.  It is the conflict of roles that 
potentially makes this intervention difficult.  Stigma would also be a significant 
barrier for this approach, as those removed from training for psychological 
reasons would potentially draw attention from fellow trainees and training staff. 
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5.5.4: Summary 
 
In summary, there are clearly defined areas where either further research or 
changes to current practice may provide a better understanding of, and 
ultimately reduce, the current attrition rates experienced by the Infantry 
Training Centre.  More openness and honesty by the Army during the 
recruitment process will allow potential recruits to make a more informed 
decision as to whether they are suited to the infantry role.  In addition, more 
knowledge of the training and what is expected of them will help recruits to 
better prepare both physically and psychologically for training.   
 
The Army should consider approaching the problem of recruit wastage from 
two perspectives. First, they must reduce the number of recruits lost during 
the training process and second, reduce the financial cost of wastage.  
Though related, these are distinct objectives.  The Army appears to accept 
that there will always be training wastage, however, this must be minimised by 
a more supportive and graduated transitional process, which will allow recruits 
who are unhappy to withdraw with immediate effect.  There has to be a 
distinction between the transitional period and the commencement of 
professional infantry training, as this would go some way to ensuring that only 
those who are motivated and accepting of military life enter the common 
infantry course.  This approach would potentially reduce the amount of attrition 
on the common infantry course and reduce the cost of wastage as recruits 
would leave during the transitional phase prior to commencement of training.  
On the basis of my own findings I am recommending that research to examine 
the effectiveness of introducing a transitional period of training is of primary 
importance. A randomised controlled trial should be used to test the use of 
transitional training in comparison to the current method of enlistment, 
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specifically to compare costs and the attrition rate on the common infantry 
course. 
The present study has shown that biographical data alone does not have a 
sufficient level of accuracy to predict those recruits who will fail in training.  In 
addition the current British Army Recruit Battery is also an inaccurate predictor 
of recruit failure.  If the Army remain focused on using a test battery for recruit 
selection then it needs to re-develop those tests so that they more accurately 
reflect the factors that cause recruit attrition.  This study has contributed to an 
understanding of why recruits fail.  It has identified that emotional factors are 
the main cause of training failure, which iV SUHGRPLQDWHO\ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V
difficulty in coping with stressful life events.  The biographical data tool used 
identified behavioural traits associated with failure, but did not have the ability 
to measure emotional traits.  Further research in this area should draw from 
the US military research and focus on a test battery that measures not only 
general trainability, but also emotional and behavioural traits that are 
associated with training success and failure.  This study focused on training 
failure and subsequent factors associated with that. Before work could begin 
on developing a new test battery, research into emotional and behavioural 
factors associated with success would need to be undertaken. 
 
The findings of this research are not isolated to the infantry alone as training 
wastage remains a problem across all three armed services.  Presently there 
is little collaboration between the Services in tackling this problem and each 
Service remains dependent on recruitment batterys, which are predominantly 
based on psychometric testing, and subjective interviewing for measuring 
occupational fit.  The British Armed forces are currently experiencing a golden 
period for recruitment and retention as there are currently few vacancies due 
to the downturn in the British economy.  As a result of the current state of the 
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economy, few Servicemen are leaving the Services and there are plenty of 
recruits willing to join.  However, the Ministry of Defence cannot afford to be 
complacent. Now is the time for all three Services to take a radical look at how 
they recruit and enlists their Service personnel.  With impending cuts to the 
budgets of all three services, they can no longer rely on outdated and 
ineffective recruitment and enlistment selection processes.  When the 
economy recovers the Armed Forces potentially will be left with three 
problems: (1) The number of recruits will dramatically fall as civilian job 
opportunities return; (2) retention of soldiers will become an issue as better job 
opportunities become available in civilian life; (3) front line units, such as the 
infantry, will be left chronically undermanned as was witnessed during the 
height of the economic boom in the late nineties. Hypothetically, reducing 
budgets and poor recruit selection coupled with outdated training methods 
DQGVHUYLFHLQGXFWLRQFRXOGFUHDWHDVLWXDWLRQZKHUHWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶V
military policy could be dictated by available trained infantrymen and not 
strategic aim.  To put this into context, if faced with another Bosnia or Kosovo 
crisis, the UK may not be able to respond as it would wish too as it would not 
have the amount of trained infantry personnel to safely do so. 
 
The Ministry of Defence needs to develop a recruitment and enlistment 
process that is able to identify suitable individuals for service careers and be 
able to place them in the most appropriate occupational role for them.  The 
enlistment process must be explicit and supportive in a way which enables the 
individual to understand and internalise the values and beliefs that are 
essential to fitting in to the Armed Services.  There should be a move away 
from draconian and punitive retention measures in training, as they only prove 
to waste resource and have a detrimental psychological effect on the recruits 
involved. 
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Some caution has to be taken when generalising from the findings of this 
study. The British military is a unique organisation which volunteers choose to 
join, experiencing some of the most arduous military training in the world.  
Findings from this study suggest that it is the uniqueness of the infantry 
training organisation and the totality of the institution that has led to high levels 
of recruit attrition. Caution is exercised because one of the key criticisms of 
*RIIPDQ¶V (1961) work was his attempt to over generalise his findings and 
make his model of the total institution fit other quasi-total institutions (Scott, 
2010, Weinstein, 1994, Perry, 1974, Levinson and Gallagher, 1964).  The 
effect that a total institution has on individuals is dynamic and will vary 
according to the nature of the institution that an individual finds themselves in.  
For instance, there may be some institutional similarities between a soldier in 
training and a prison inmate as they both enter a total institution. However, a 
soldier is a willing volunteer embarking on a life career, who has the freedom 
to decide whether he stays in the institution or not; a prisoner has no choice 
as he is incarcerated for breaking the law.  
 
This study has shown that primarily it is the transition between organisations 
or social identities that causes a degree of dissonance and unease in an 
individual. The findings of this study are potentialy useful for any residential 
organisation, be it a university, boarding schools, the police or a prison as it 
provides good evidence of the effect that transition has on the individual. Any 
organisation or institution that brings individuals into a residential setting 
should reflect on their induction and transitional practices, in order to ensure 
that they are causing the least amount of dissonance necessary and 
encouraging the individual to settle and embrace the organisations values and 
norms. 
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5.6: Strengths and limitations 
5.6.1: Research bias and validity 
 
From the outset of this study it was acknowledged that the research was being 
conducted from within the military, and that there would always be a risk of 
personal identification with the military influencing how observations were 
PDGHDQGLQWHUSUHWHG,WZRXOGEHYHU\HDV\IURPµZLWKLQ¶WRSODFHWKHEODPH
for recruit failure at the feet of the recruit and paint the military in a good light.  
However, by acknowledging from the outset that there would always be a risk 
of bias, the methodology was developed to counteract unintentional bias 
through its transparency.  Not only does the framework analysis provide 
transparency for the reviewer, it also provides a methodological approach that 
reduces the risk of a priori knowledge biasing the findings.  For every 
assumption, there must be textual evidence.  The framework methodology 
provided a systematic approach to the data that allowed for a priori 
knowledge, but minimised the influence of that knowledge in the analysis 
phase. A strength of conducting this research from within the military was that 
there was knowledge and understanding of how the military works.  This 
thesis has argued that the military is a closed institution and therefore it would 
have been very difficult for an outsider to gain both the access, and have the 
credibility that enabled and encouraged individuals within the study population 
to speak openly and candidly. Prior knowledge and experience of the 
recruitment process was invaluable during the study design phase.  
 
5.6.2: Regression modelling 
 
The rule of thumb for logistic models is ten cases per independent variable 
(Vittinghoff and Mcculloch, 2007) with an absolute minimum of five cases per 
independent variable (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1989).  Tabachnik and Fidel 
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(1989) recommend that to increase the power of the findings 20 cases per 
independent variable is ideally the correct ratio for regression analysis.   
However, access to recruits and time limitations forced a compromise.  The 
collection of biographical data for 1000 recruits took in excess of 12 months, 
with every intake during that period being included in the study.  To have 
doubled the sample size would have meant that the first phase of data 
collection would have taken in excess of 18 months, meaning that all of the 
outcomes would not have been known until two years from the 
commencement of data collection.  Funding implications and available time for 
the study meant that a compromise had to be made as regards sample size. 
As identified by Vittinghoff and McCulloch (2007), the rule of thumb of 10 or 
more cases peU LQGHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH LV QRW D µZHOO GHILQHG EULJKW OLQH¶ DQG
when a statistically significant association is found in a regression model with 
five to nine cases per independent variable only a minor degree of extra 
caution is warranted.  The decision was therefore taken to have a cohort of 
1000 so that there were ten cases per independent variable for the entire 
population and seven cases per independent variable for the development 
dataset.  This ensured that the proportion of cases to independent variables 
UHPDLQHG ZLWKLQ 9LWWLQJKRII DQG 0F&XOORFK¶V (2007) acceptable range of 5-9 
cases per independent variable for use in logistic regression.   
  
5.6.3: Semi-structured interview data collection 
  
A semi-structured (rather than an open) interview was used to explore the 
reasons given for leaving by recruits undergoing discharge. It is 
acknowledged that these interviews could have been taped rather than 
recorded with hand written notes.  However, as identified in the methodology, 
there was only a small window of opportunity available to have sole access to 
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the recruit for an interview and recording equipment might have made the 
recruits reluctant to speak openly about their experiences.  In addition, it is 
also acknowledged that many interviews would have to be conducted in order 
to ensure that the correct population coverage was achieved, and that the 
interview had to be brief, concise and target key areas of inquiry.  To manage 
the amount of data collected, coupled with the access and time constraints, 
the decision was taken to record interviews by hand.  A balancing factor for 
this was that all the interviews were carried out by me and I was able to 
decipher my detailed abbreviations and fill in gaps immediately after the 
interview.  In practice, conducting many of the interviews was a frantic affair, 
involving rapidly securing a private vacant space within the Headquarters at 
the Infantry Training Centre, and conducting the interview wherever possible.  
The benefit of this was that data was collected which reflected the entire 
population, rather than just one small regional group of recruits. 
 
5.6.4: Consent and Coercion 
 
From the outset of this study, it was acknowledged that a great level of care 
had to be taken to ensure that new recruits did not feel pressurised into taking 
part.  The hierarchical nature of the military could easily place pressure on a 
recruit to take part in the study for the fear of being punished.   Steps were 
taken to de-militarise the information and consent phase in order to remove 
potential feelings of coercion in the recruits.  During the presentation 
regarding study participation the research team wore civilian clothing, all the 
training staff were asked to leave and although the research team identified 
that they were military, they stressed that they were medical personnel. They 
also introduced themselves by their first name and surname and did not use 
any form of rank.  Although every physical effort was taken to avoid coercion, 
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it is accepted that some recruits might have felt an obligation to take part as 
they would not want to draw attention to themselves by opting out in the first 
days of training.  To counter this, each individual was reassured when given 
the biographical data collection questionnaire to complete that they did not 
have to take part and that they could withdraw from the study at any point.  
Some candidates expressed a reticence to take part, but in all cases this was 
found to be related to their embarrassment surrounding their literacy ability 
and not to do with disclosing the information.  The data collection team had 
anticipated this problem and readers were provided for those recruits if they 
were happy to continue. 
 
5.6.5: Use of mental health assessment tools 
 
The impact on the mood of those who failed was significant and 
underestimated at the outset of the study.  Previous experience had 
suggested that recruits were unhappy when they left training; to measure that 
unhappiness a subjective mood score was taken using the Shapiro method of 
measuring subjective mood (Shapiro and Forrest, 2004).  On reflection, this 
was probably not adequate to truly reflect the impact which the situation had 
XSRQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO UHFUXLW¶V PHQWDO KHDOWK  $Q\ IXWXUH VWXGLHV ZRXOG EH
advised to utilise more complete and comparable measures of depression 
HJ%HFN¶V'HSUHVVLRQ,QYHQWRU\(Beck et al., 1961, Hawton, 1989) and the 
Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et al., 1979) to truly assess the level of 
impact that training has on those who fail. 
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5.7: Conclusion 
 
This study has identified that there is a significant and diverse difference 
between military identity and the socio-personal identity of the infantry recruit.  
The challenge of transit into military culture causes significant dissonance and 
stress in recruits as they adapt to the values and beliefs of the military 
organisation. The military has been identified as a unique organisation within 
society as it meets almost all of the requirements of a total institution, which 
puts an additional pressure on recruits as they are dislocated from their 
established social support networks.   
 
The highest risk period for failure appears to be the transitional phase, early in 
training, as the recruit becomes overwhelmed by the cumulative effects of the 
situational demands of enlistment.  It is the psychological impact of these 
demands upRQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDELOLW\WRFRSHZKLFKFDXVHVWKHPWRIail. They 
make the conscious decision that the demands of training are too great and 
that they do not belong in the Army. To alleviate the dissonance that they are 
experiencing they leave in order to restore consistency in their thoughts. 
Failure in training clearly has an impact on the mood of those who failed, and 
in just under a quarter of failed recruits that mood had failed to significantly 
recover at the point of returning home.  What is not known is the long term 
psychological effect on those who failed.   
 
This study has demonstrated that a biographical questionnaire is unable to 
predict failure in training with enough accuracy for it to be viable as a 
screening method; but those factors relating to coping, family composition and 
behaviour during secondary education, are associated with a poor training 
outcome. This study has added to the already established literature 
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surrounding failure in military training by providing a comprehensive 
understanding of why recruits fail to make the transition to military life and 
choose to leave infantry training.  This study has advocated the idea that the 
British Army should explore the benefits of transitional training to reduce the 
amount of infantry training wastage. 
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PARTICIPANTS INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE STUDY INTO THE 
CAUSES OF ATTRITION AMONGST INFANTRY RECRUITS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
You have been asked to participate in the above study in which the investigator 
wishes to carry out research to better understand why infantry recruits choose to or are 
discharged during phase 1 & 2 of basic training.  The proposed research has been 
scrutinised scientifically as well as being approved by an ethics committee. 
 
PURPOSE 
 
In recent years there has been an increase in infantry soldiers leaving the army during 
phase 1 & 2 of basic training as well as an increased difficulty in recruiting soldiers.  
The purpose of this research is to examine how recruits lifestyle prior to joining the 
army affects their ability to fit into army life. 
 
AIM 
 
The aim of the research is to identify those groups of recruits that find it more difficult 
to initially fit into the army and suggest ways in which this could be overcome. 
 
DURATION 
 
Your participation in the research will take approximately half an hour and this will 
involve completing a questionnaire.  It is important that you answer the questionnaire 
as honestly as possible as this will help the researcher achieve the best picture possible 
of the lifestyles of new recruits.  To make you feel more comfortable in doing this the 
questionnaires will be strictly confidential.  There will be no names on the 
questionnaires, but you will be given a unique identification number known only to 
the researcher.  This is to enable to follow-up the reasons why, should you leave the 
army during basic training. 
THE INFORMATION ON THE QUESTIONNAIRES WILL ONLY BE 
VIEWED BY THE RESEARCHER AND THEN DESTROYED AT THE END 
OF THE STUDY. 
 
PROCEDURE 
 
Within the first week of enlistment you will complete the questionnaire as a company 
under the supervision of the researcher.  There will be no training staff present when 
the questionnaire is being completed.  On completion, the questionnaire will be taken 
to the researchers permanent place of duty where it will be entered onto a database for 
statistical analysis.  The system that it is entered on and the database will be password 
protected. 
 
RESULTS 
 
It is hoped that results will benefit future recruits and therefore the results may be 
published.  This will contain no reference to the identity of individuals and your 
personal details will remain strictly confidential. 
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Army Biographical Inventory 
 
Confidential Questionnaire 
 
 
 
You are being asked to complete this questionnaire as part of a study looking at reasons 
why some recruits find it more difficult to initially fit into the army.   We aim to suggest 
ways in which this can be overcome. 
 
It is important that you complete the questionnaire fully, and answer each question 
honestly. 
 
Do not put your name on the questionnaire. 
 
All the information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence ² it will be 
seen only by the researcher and will be destroyed at the end of the study. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU TICK ONE BOX ONLY PER QUESTION 
 
Thank you for taking part. 
 
Matthew Kiernan 
Captain 
QARANC 
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Note: contents of questionnaire have been removed from the 
library copy as they are the property of the United States Army 
Research Institute and loaned for the purpose of the study only. 
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APPENDIX 3: SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE 
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LEAVING INTERVIEWS 
 
 
Why are you leaving?  
(have they been bullied?) 
 
 
How would you feel / what behaviour would you engage in if you could not 
leave? (Give national service example / have they contemplated self-
harm/suicide?) 
 
 
How are you coping between making the decision / being told, to leave and 
now waiting to leave?  
 
 
How is your mood at this point in time? What was the worst time? (ask to rate 
their mood on a SUD Scale of 1-10) 
 
 
Did contact with your family whilst serving make things better or worse? 
 
 
Could you suggest any changes or support that would enable you to stay in 
the army? 
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APPENDIX 4: CHARTS 
  
251 
CHART 1: COPING 
Case 
Number 
1.1 
Deterioration 
in Mood 
1.1 SUD Mood 
Score in 
training + 
week + 
cognition 
when stated 
1.1 SUD Mood 
Score on 
interview + 
cognition when 
stated 
1.2 
Homesickness 
1.3 Unable to cope 
psychologically with 
physical demands  
1.4 Immaturity  3.4 Lacking the 
emotional maturity 
to cope with the 
transitional period 
1.5 Problems at 
home 
4.2 Create a 
demand the 
necessitates exit 
from service 
1.6 Contact with Family 
C1 
  3/10  felt 
overwhelmed 
with the 
pressure of 
training 
8/10 pressure 
relieved, going 
home 
  feels overwhelmed by the 
pressure of training, 
experiencing anxiety 
before certain lessons 
        phoned home every 4/7 
and had W/E leave 
C2 
  3/10 on 2nd & 
3rd Week 
8/10 
misses his 
family and 
friends 
  enjoys the fitness 
but does not feel 
he is ready for 
army life yet, feels 
he is letting 
himself down by 
leaving 
    missing his family 
and girlfriend and 
social life, parents 
support his 
decision to leave 
phoned family every 2-3 
days and has been home 
twice 
C3 
  1/10 @ week 4, 
went home on 
:(SDVVGLGQ¶W
want to come 
back, felt very 
homesick and 
tearful 
5/10 
      he is a young 
immature 17 year old 
who does not have 
the character to force 
through his initial 
desire to join the 
infantry 
problems at 
home, his 
girlfriend has 
asked him to 
leave, she is not 
supportive of 
him serving, 
mum wants him 
home, father 
feels he has let 
him down by 
leaving, he feels 
he has let 
himself down 
faced considerable 
pressure from 
girlfriend and 
family to leave 
contacted family x2 week 
and phoned girlfriend x5 a 
day.  Also had 24hr pass 
C4 
  2/10 
3/10 mood 
remains low, fed 
up 
feels very 
homesick, 
weepy just 
wants to go 
home 
found training very hard, 
always playing catch up 
      very homesick Daily phone calls + visit, 
no contact would have 
made things much worse 
C5 
  3/10 week 4/5 8/10 not 10 as 
he is still here 
waiting to go. 
            WE leave since wk 6 
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C6 
  2/10 following 
W/E pass, did 
not want to 
come back 
9/10 now as he 
is leaving 
Feels homesick does not like army life, 
does not like the 
hardness of the physical 
training 
  very immature and 
lacked the 
commitment 
necessary to get 
through the course 
  felt homesick 
throughout the 
course 
Phone daily and has had 
W/E passes 
C7 
  4/10 lowest 
point day 5 
9/10 
            phone daily 
C8 very difficult 
interview, 
very guarded, 
discharged 2 
yrs previous 
on medical 
grounds 
  
  
        needs to leave 
army to care for 
son, split with 
girlfriend who no 
longer wishes to 
care for son, he 
will have 
custody. 
    
C9 
  8/10 8/10 has not 
disliked the 
experience, just 
prefers to be at 
home 
    feels he is to 
young for army life 
at this time 
      phones home every night 
and has gone home most 
W/Es 
C10 hated being 
in training, 
and wanted 
to leave, felt 
low and now 
his CO has 
told him he 
must stay for 
another 2 
weeks until 
he can DAOR 
  
  
missed 
parents, 
girlfriend and 
family, feels 
homesick 
          daily contact bt phone 
C11 finds 
communal 
living hard at 
times 
3/10 lowest 
point was 
evenings 
7/10 now knows 
that he is leaving 
does not like 
being away 
from home for 
periods of time, 
homesick 
misses son 
does not like drill and 
weapons lessons finds 
them too difficult 
      has been 
homesick 
throughout the 
course and misses 
young son 
phoned 3 times per week, 
no visits 
C12 
  3/10 when he 
did not know 
how or when 
he could leave 
10/10 now he 
knows he is 
going 
misses civilian 
life, misses 
friends and 
family 
  was not ready for it has struggled with 
different aspects of 
the course and has 
shown a high level of 
immaturity 
    phones daily and has 
been home x6 W/Es 
C13 
  3/10 felt weepy 
low and sad 
3/10 still here 
  found the PT hard         daily by phone and family 
visited 
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C14 
  2/10 
4/10 
      would support his 
return to the army in 
the future when he 
matures 
    phoned daily + WEL 
C15 has cried 
himself to 
sleep most 
nights 
3/10 when 
continually 
shouted at for 
messing up 
5/6  
feels very 
homesick 
finds training hard, 
discipline hard, in trouble 
most days, infantry not 
for him, has made lots of 
mistakes and the Plt has 
been punished 
    mother disabled, 
difficult family 
dynamics, feels 
he needs to be 
at home 
  phone daily 
C16 considered 
DSH but 
believed it 
was wrong 
and he must 
leave the 
right way 
4/10 
4/10 as he is still 
here 
  parents want him to stay, 
believes that he has let 
them and himself down, 
believed he could 
succeed 
  his homesickness 
has been 
exacerbated by his 
lack of maturity 
    phone daily 
C17 does not like 
it here, has 
wanted to 
leave since 
day 1, hates 
poor block 
facilities, 
does not like 
food 
6/10 
10/10 when he 
leaves here 
  found PT hard, gets shin 
splints 
  he believes he made 
a mistake  in joining 
the army and 
believes that he has 
a lot more growing 
up to do before he 
re-enlists 
    speaks with home every 
2-3 days 
C18 
  10/10 
1/10 devastated 
to be leaving 
            
  
C19 
  
2/10 5/10 
            spoke x2 per week plus 
long W/E at home 
C20 
  
  
8/10 knows he is 
going home 
feels homesick finds ITC depressing, not 
the life he is looking for, 
feels he can not hack it, 
does not like weapons 
handling & PT as he feels 
he has not got it 
        has had contact with 
relatives, did not want to 
return from W/E pass 
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C21 
  
    
        girlfriend 
pregnant with 
twins 
girlfriend sick in 
hospital carrying 
twins, feels he 
should be there 
supporting her, can 
not cope any more 
in the army due to 
worrying about his 
girlfriend 
Speaks daily, has been 
home once 
C22 
  
8/10 8/10 
          misses his family 
and friends and 
homesickness has 
set in 
phones most nights, has 
been home most 
weekends 
C23 
  
4-5/10 when he 
decided that he 
wanted to 
leave 7/10 
feels homesick     immature   slightly homesick phones home x2 per 
week and has been home 
once 
C24 felt sad 
1/10 felt sad, 
very weepy 5/10 
homesick, 
misses his son 
and girlfriend 
          daily by phone, no visits 
home, no contact would 
have made things worse 
C25 
  1/10 
contemplated 
self harm and 
suicide   
          he considers 
himself to have 
considerable 
personal problems 
little or no contact with 
home 
C26 
  
8/10 now and 
all along   
          suffered outside 
pressures to leave 
during the course 
phones daily and has 
been home once 
C27 
  
  
7-8/10 now he 
knows he is 
leaving 
        prefers to be 
nearer home to 
support his 
family 
  phones home every 3 
days and has visited once 
C28 
  
3/10 
10/10 now that 
he knows he is 
leaving 
does not like 
army life, 
homesick 
        he is homesick and 
has enjoyed no 
part of the course 
to date 
phones every 2-3 days 
C29 
  
2/10 
10/10 now he 
knows he is 
going 
homesick, does 
not like the way 
Scots are 
treated 
          
phones every night 
C30 
  
2-3/10 
contemplated 
self harm to 
effect release 
due to feeling 
of entrapment 
8-9/10 now that 
he knows he is 
leaving 
  has been having medical 
tests since week one 
unable to train 
        phones regularly and has 
WEL 
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C31 
  
  
6-7/10 will be 
happier when he 
leaves 
misses 
girlfriend and 
son 
      girlfriend wants 
him to come 
home 
has suffered 
homesickness, 
PLVVHV¶SDUWQHU
and child. 
WEL + phones daily 
C32 
  4/10 feels 
down about 
being here, 
thinks he will 
feel better once 
he leaves   
homesick     he is immature and 
young, he is 
homesick and misses 
the relative freedoms 
of home life 
    texts home regularly + 
WEL 
C33 feels tearful 
all the time 
    homesick finds discipline side of 
things hard as well as 
communal living 
  very young and 
relatively immature 
  very homesick phones daily, and mother 
has visited 
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Chart 2: Fitting In 
Case 
Number 
2.1 Loss of freedom 2.2 Failure of Expectation 2.3 Failure to adapt to culture 
(Subjective) 
2.3 Failure to adapt to culture 
(Objective) 
2.4 Breech of Discipline 
(Subjective) 
2.4 Breech of 
Discipline 
(Objective) 
2.6 Inappropriate 
recruitment 
(Objective) 
C1 misses his freedom 
and preferred his old 
job 
  does not fit in with army culture, 
finds it mentally demanding but 
has tried to get on with it  
        
C2 
              
C3 
  gets on well with peers and 
instructors, army not what 
he was expecting, not really 
enthusiastic about the job 
          
C4 does not like the way 
of life, misses 
freedom, wants to be 
with family doing his 
own thing 
  feels he does not fit in failed to adapt to army life, presented 
himself to the medical centre daily from 
week one with a range of ailments, 
suspected nothing wrong just avoiding 
training 
      
C5 
    GRQ¶WOLNHLWGRQ¶WHQMR\WKHZRUN
GRQ¶WILWLQWRWKHOLIHVW\OHIHHOVKH
has let his family down by leaving, 
felt he rushed his decision to join 
he has stated to the OC that he cannot 
cope with the course 
      
C6 feels trapped, feels he 
has lost his freedom, 
army is always on his 
mind, the discipline is 
hard, far more 
discipline than the 
army cadet corps. 
  feels that he has not fitted in, not 
getting on with some of his peers, 
does not like the culture 
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C7 wants to be his own 
SHUVRQGRHVQ¶WOLNHWR
be told what to do all 
the time - GRHVQ¶WIHHO
disappointed in 
himself, glad of the 
experience.  Does not 
like communal living 
and lack of privacy 
  ELJPLVWDNHGRHVQ¶WILWLQWRWKH 24 
hr lifestyle/24hr job.  Feels some 
peers are immature 
strong willed, decided army not for him 
nothing we will say or do will make him 
change his mind 
      
C8 
    states that he has enjoyed himself, 
if he had to stay would not be 
bothered as he wants to be in the 
army, feels he has too many 
problems to stay. What he states 
does not reflect his performance 
report. 
        
C9 misses civilian life and 
seeing his girlfriend, 
misses his freedom 
    he is severely depressed and can not 
handle the regime within the training 
establishment 
    he is not physically or 
mentally strong enough 
for the army, should not 
be allowed to rejoin as 
he is not suited in any 
shape or form 
C10 
      failed to fit in or work as part of a team had a fight with one of his room 
mates, then had another fight 
breaking the other mans nose, 
thought he was in trouble and 
could not leave so then took an 
overdose 
fear of being 
disciplined led 
to OD 
has shown himself to 
be a liar, untrustworthy 
and unable to work as 
part of a team, if ever in 
a position of authority 
would be a bully. 
C11 
    he is a quite person         
C12 
    army life not for him, does not like 
it, feels he was not ready for it, 
harder than he thought 
ill prepared for the rigours of training, 
has struggled and failed to adapt to 
infantry training. 
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C13 
    does not like the way he is spoken 
too, feels he does not fit into army 
life, gets on with his peers but 
dislikes the culture 
failed to adapt to army life, found the 
initial loss of freedom hard to accept 
and did not adapt to the loss of privacy 
found in communal living 
      
C14 not for him, feels 
restricted, wants to 
live own lifestyle.  
Finds communal living 
to much sometimes 
          joined because his 
brother was in the army 
C15 
    feels he does not fit in highly unusual individual who has 
totally failed to fit in with his peers or 
adapt to military life, has not coped with 
having to do things for himself.   
    Has irritated instructors 
and peers to such an 
extent that he has been 
removed from training 
and is supervised in 
HQ.  Training that he 
did complete was poor 
with no determination 
to succeed no chance 
of him ever passing 
basic should not be 
allowed to re-enlist 
C16 
    does not want to be in the army, 
not for him finds aspects of army 
life difficult, rather not do it 
has struggled to come to terms with the 
loss of freedom and separation from the 
family 
      
C17 
              
C18 
        had some thoughts of DAOR, 
used cocaine recreationally prior 
to joining, took whilst on W/E 
leave after drinking, did not think 
that he would be caught, 
enjoyed training and is 
disappointed in himself.  Went to 
pub during exercise 
been found 
positive on 
drugs test and 
had recent 
lapses in 
discipline 
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C19 
  used to be full time TA, this 
is very different here, gets 
picked on for others 
mistakes, feels he is more 
experienced than a lot of the 
people here 
  had some problems with his fitness and 
found settling in to army life hard to 
cope with.  While personable found 
rigours of infantry training difficult and 
needs to understand the concept of 
teamwork 
      
C20 
    finds the younger recruits irritating, 
feels he does not fit into the 
life/culture 
performed poorly in some aspects of 
the course, struggled to assimilate and 
apply much of the information taught 
him, his physical fitness is weak.  
Decided that the army was not for him 
and dose not wish to give it any more of 
a chance 
      
C21 
              
C22 
  a lot different from what he 
expected, does not like field 
FUDIWH[HUFLVHV¶ 
does not feel the army is for him         
C23 does not like pt and 
communal living 
  wanted to give it a go as friends 
had joined but does not feel that he 
fits in 
        
C24 
      found separation from son and girlfriend 
difficult to handle, does want to be a 
soldier but the thought of separation for 
operational tour would be detrimental to 
his family 
      
C25 
    wanted to join as a youngster, has 
interest in weapons, joined for that.  
Feels he does not fit in with military 
culture, dislikes routine, finds it 
boring and tedious 
      self-harmed during 
training, he has a 
history of self harm and 
psych services 
intervention as a child, 
totally unsuited to a 
military career at the 
moment, unfit army 
service 
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C26 
    does not like army life or the 
discipline, not for him, first 
experience of true discipline, army 
life is crap, does not fit into the 
culture 
he has had problems adapting to army 
life, he has had problems fitting into the 
Plt and Coy and this has led to his 
DAOR 
      
C27 finds communal living 
and loss of freedom 
difficult 
  found it difficult to be around 
younger recruits who mess around 
a lot and cause trouble, found 
discipline hard most of the time 
had previously been in the army but 
DAORd before, not settled into the 
training regime and has been disruptive 
within the platoon.  
      
C28 found lack of freedom 
and privacy hard 
            
C29 
    feels he does not fit into army life 
and culture, finds it hard to adapt 
and feels he has lost his freedom 
        
C30 hates the confinement 
and the people he has 
to mix with, feels the 
institution has 
prevented him from 
forming real 
friendships due to 
competition,  
  not fitting in, sacrifices are to great, 
his personality clashes with the 
culture, a lot of the training is 
bullshit, found peers idiots who he 
would not choose to associate with 
      seen by child 
psychological services 
at school 
C31 does not enjoy being 
told what to do, does 
not like communal 
living 
  does not like communal living and 
feels he does not fit in with army 
culture, feels that he is too set in 
his ways 
        
C32 
  different to what he 
expected it to be, a lot of 
long hours and hard 
discipline 
          
C33 
    does not feel he fits into army life found discipline difficult to cope with       
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Chart 3: Transition 
Case 
Number 
3.1 Psychologically and 
Physically Unprepared 
for Transition to Service 
3.2 Option to leave made 
to easy (National Service 
Ethos) 
3.3  Lack of determination to push 
through initial cognitive dissonance 
3.4 Lacking the emotional 
maturity to cope with the 
transitional period 
C1   if I had to stay I would 
probably get on with it as I 
get on with people, does 
not think he would rejoin, 
but if he did he would join 
a different corps, nothing 
would make him stay 
he is a drifter with no direction in his life 
and actively working to keep it that way.  
Had no intention of staying just joined to 
see what it was like 
  
C2   would not mind, would just 
get on with it...would 
consider re-enlisting in the 
army in 2 yrs time 
    
C3 struggled to come to terms 
with reality of training 
would keep trying to get 
out and go AWOL if 
unsuccessful,  may join at 
a later date when older 
not applied himself well, poor level of 
concentration, fell behind in training, lack 
of commitment following pressure from 
home 
he is a young immature 17 year 
old who does not have the 
character to force through his 
initial desire to join the infantry 
C4   if he could not leave would 
be very sad and states that 
he would probably try and 
kill himself 
has the capability to pass but would need 
to show far more commitment 
  
C5   would feel down however 
would just get on with it, 
would not take any drastic 
action 
not committed to staying, committed to 
leaving, not enjoying the course 
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C6 had given himself the 
impression that the course 
was to hard for him to 
pass, his lack of 
confidence was to 
ingrained even though he 
had the ability to succeed 
if he had to stay would be 
upset and annoyed but if 
he had too would get on 
with it 
  very immature and lacked the 
commitment necessary to get 
through the course 
C7   would make the best of it very confident, very able soldier, however 
knows his own mind, decided that he no 
longer wanted to be a soldier 
  
C8 performance deteriorated 
significantly and he 
became incapable of 
concentrating on his job, 
claimed to be depressed, 
deemed TU by MO 
states he would not be 
bothered 
    
C9   would stick at it because 
he would have to, more 
money would make him 
VWD\««ZRXOGFRQVLGHUUH-
enlisting 
    
C10   LIKHKDGWRVWD\ZRXOGQ¶W
know what to do, would 
probably try and escape by 
taking another overdose. 
    
C11   would just try and get on 
ZLWKLW««ZRXOGFRQVLGHU
rejoining if he could not get 
a job in civie street 
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C12   would try and get on with 
it, but not 
VXUH«««ZRXOGonly 
stay if desperate for 
money or in debt 
  has struggled with different 
aspects of the course and has 
shown a high level of immaturity 
C13   would be very unhappy but 
would get on with 
LW««ZRXOGQRWUHMRLQ
dislikes the culture 
lack the commitment to see him through 
the initial period of enlistment 
  
C14   would get on with it   would support his return to the 
army in the future when he 
matures 
C15   would rejoin in the future to 
another CEG 
    
C16   if he had to stay would not 
like it but would try and get 
on with it, believes he 
would not cope 
WKRXJK«ZRXOGFRQVLGHU
in the future as a driver 
  his homesickness has been 
exacerbated by his lack of 
maturity 
C17 missed some training due 
to minor injury, made his 
intention to leave very 
clear in the first few days 
of training 
would feel gutted if made 
to serve, would consider 
AWOL 
  he believes he made a mistake  
in joining the army and believes 
that he has a lot more growing 
up to do before he re-enlists 
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C18   Caught on drugs test, does 
not want to leave,  would 
like to stay 
    
C19   would have to knuckle 
down and get on with 
it...would consider re-
enlisting through the TA as 
a linguist 
    
C20   if made to stay would 
probably go 
$:2/««ZRXOG
consider TA but not 
regular 
    
C21   would have to get on with 
LW««SODQVWRUH-enlist 
after birth of twins 
    
C22   would feel gutted but 
would try and get on with it 
    
C23   would feel bad but would 
get on with it because 
would have to 
  immature 
C24   if he had to do it he feels 
he would get on with it with 
QRSUREOHPV««ZRXOG
not rejoin with current 
domestic circumstances 
would need to show far more 
commitment to the army if he was to 
rejoin 
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C25   if he had to stay would be 
depressed and would 
probably contemplate 
VXLFLGH««ZRXOG
contemplate re-joining at a 
later date 
    
C26   would have to get on with 
it but would consider 
$:2/«««ZRXOG
consider re-enlistment 
when he is older and more 
disciplined 
    
C27   would have to stick with it     
C28   would get on with it     
C29 fitness below par and 
something of a know-all, 
not sufficient backbone to 
stick out the course 
would try to knuckle down 
and get on with it but 
ZRXOGIHHODQJU\««PD\
consider re-enlistment into 
a Scottish regiment 
    
C30 failed training medical with 
heart murmur, took system 
12 weeks to investigate 
him at which point he had 
lost all interest to not being 
allowed to train 
would just get on with it     
C31 struggled with the 
immaturity of the younger 
recruits 
would feel desperate and 
consider going AWOL 
    
C32   would get on with it if he 
had to 
  he is immature and young, he is 
homesick and misses the 
relative freedoms of home life 
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C33 physical demands have 
been to much for him to 
cope with 
does not know how he 
would cope 
  very young and relatively 
immature 
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Chart 4: Legitimisation of Failure 
Case 
Number 
4.1 Bad behaviour to ensure dismissal 4.2 Create a demand the 
necessitates exit from 
service 
3.2 Option to leave made to easy 
(National Service Ethos) 
C1 
    if I had to stay I would probably get on 
with it as I get on with people, does not 
think he would rejoin, but if he did he 
would join a different corps, nothing 
would make him stay 
C2 
  missing his family and 
girlfriend and social life, 
parents support his 
decision to leave 
would not mind, would just get on with 
it...would consider re-enlisting in the army 
in 2 yrs time 
C3 
  faced considerable 
pressure from girlfriend 
and family to leave 
would keep trying to get out and go 
AWOL if unsuccessful,  may join at a 
later date when older 
C4 
  very homesick if he could not leave would be very sad 
and states that he would probably try and 
kill himself 
C5 
    would feel down however would just get 
on with it, would not take any drastic 
action 
C6 
  felt homesick throughout 
the course 
if he had to stay would be upset and 
annoyed but if he had too would get on 
with it 
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C7 
    would make the best of it 
C8 on arrival claimed to have taken drugs, 
refused initial entry medical, placed on 
CSMs formal drugs warning but vowed to 
soldier on 
  states he would not be bothered 
C9 
    would stick at it because he would have 
to, more money would make him 
VWD\««ZRXOGFRQVLGHUUH-enlisting 
C10 appeared petulant, sulky and resented 
authority. Intimidated and harassed other 
platoon members resulting in violent 
confrontation.  A combination of fear of the 
consequences of his behaviour and his 
desire to leave resulted in self harm 
  LIKHKDGWRVWD\ZRXOGQ¶WNQRZZKDWWR
do, would probably try and escape by 
taking another overdose. 
C11 
  has been homesick 
throughout the course and 
misses young son 
would just try and get on with 
LW««ZRXOGFRQVLGHUUHMRLQLQJLIKH
could not get a job in civie street 
C12 
    would try and get on with it, but not 
VXUH«««ZRXOGRQO\VWD\LIGHVSHUDWH
for money or in debt 
C13 
    would be very unhappy but would get on 
ZLWKLW««ZRXOGQRWUHMRLQGLVOLNHVWKH
culture 
C14 
    would get on with it 
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C15 
    would rejoin in the future to another CEG 
C16 
    if he had to stay would not like it but 
would try and get on with it, believes he 
ZRXOGQRWFRSHWKRXJK«ZRXOGFRQVLGHU
in the future as a driver 
C17 
    would feel gutted if made to serve, would 
consider AWOL 
C18 
    Caught on drugs test, does not want to 
leave,  would like to stay 
C19 
    would have to knuckle down and get on 
with it...would consider re-enlisting 
through the TA as a linguist 
C20 
    if made to stay would probably go 
$:2/««ZRXOGFRQVLGHU7$EXWQRW
regular 
C21 
  girlfriend sick in hospital 
carrying twins, feels he 
should be there supporting 
her, can not cope any 
more in the army due to 
worrying about his 
girlfriend 
ZRXOGKDYHWRJHWRQZLWKLW««SODQVWR
re-enlist after birth of twins 
C22 
  misses his family and 
friends and homesickness 
has set in 
would feel gutted but would try and get 
on with it 
C23 
  slightly homesick would feel bad but would get on with it 
because would have to 
C24 
    if he had to do it he feels he would get on 
ZLWKLWZLWKQRSUREOHPV««ZRXOGQRW
rejoin with current domestic 
circumstances 
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C25 
  he considers himself to 
have considerable 
personal problems 
if he had to stay would be depressed and 
would probably contemplate 
VXLFLGH««ZRXOGFRQWHPSODWHUH-
joining at a later date 
C26 
  suffered outside pressures 
to leave during the course 
would have to get on with it but would 
FRQVLGHU$:2/«««ZRXOGFRQVLGHUUH-
enlistment when he is older and more 
disciplined 
C27 
 Adamant that he does not want to be in 
the army and has adopted a completely 
negative attitude towards the training 
regime should be discharged UFAS and 
should not be allowed to re-enlist 
  would have to stick with it 
C28 
  he is homesick and has 
enjoyed no part of the 
course to date 
would get on with it 
C29 
    would try to knuckle down and get on 
ZLWKLWEXWZRXOGIHHODQJU\««PD\
consider re-enlistment into a Scottish 
regiment 
C30 
    would just get on with it 
C31 
  has suffered 
homesickness, PLVVHV¶
partner and child. 
would feel desperate and consider going 
AWOL 
C32 
    would get on with it if he had to 
C33 
  very homesick does not know how he would cope 
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Chart 5: Objective evidence from Commanding Officers reports 
Case 
Number 
7.1 Struggled with physical 
& mental demand 
7.2 Lack of commitment, failed 
to identify with the Army 
7.3 Homesick & External 
Pressure to leave / Not 
supported to stay by 
family/relatives 
7.4 Failure to adapt / 
cope / fit in 
7.5 Immature 7.6 Failure to conform / 
accept discipline 
7.7 
Inappropria
te 
recruitment 
/ lack of 
ability 
7.8 
Lapse in 
disciplin
e / drugs 
C1   he is a drifter with no direction in 
his life and actively working to 
keep it that way.  Had no 
intention of staying just joined to 
see what it was like 
            
C2     missing his family and 
girlfriend and social life, 
parents support his decision to 
leave 
          
C3 struggled to come to terms 
with reality of training 
not applied himself well, poor 
level of concentration, fell behind 
in training, lack of commitment 
following pressure from home 
faced considerable pressure 
from girlfriend and family to 
leave 
  he is a young immature 
17 year old who does 
not have the character 
to force through his 
initial desire to join the 
infantry 
      
C4   has the capability to pass but 
would need to show far more 
commitment 
very homesick failed to adapt to army 
life, presented himself to 
the medical centre daily 
from week one with a 
range of ailments, 
suspected nothing wrong 
just avoiding training 
        
C5   not committed to staying,  to 
leaving, not enjoying the course 
  he has stated to the OC 
that he cannot cope with 
the course 
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C6 had given himself the 
impression that the course 
was to hard for him to pass, 
his lack of confidence was to 
ingrained even though he 
had the ability to succeed 
  felt homesick throughout the 
course 
  very immature and 
lacked the commitment 
necessary to get 
through the course 
      
C7   very confident, very able soldier, 
however knows his own mind, 
decided that he no longer 
wanted to be a soldier 
  strong willed, decided 
army not for him nothing 
we will say or do will 
make him change his 
mind 
        
C8 performance deteriorated 
significantly and he became 
incapable of concentrating on 
his job, claimed to be 
depressed, deemed TU by 
MO 
        on arrival claimed to have 
taken drugs, refused 
initial entry medical, 
placed on CSMs formal 
drugs warning but vowed 
to soldier on 
    
C9       he is severely depressed 
and can not handle the 
regime within the training 
establishment 
    he is not 
physically or 
mentally 
strong 
enough for 
the army, 
should not 
be allowed 
to rejoin as 
he is not 
suited in 
any shape 
or form 
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C10       failed to fit in or work as 
part of a team 
  appeared petulant, sulky 
and resented authority. 
Intimidated and harassed 
other platoon members 
resulting in violent 
confrontation.  A 
combination of fear of the 
consequences of his 
behaviour and his desire 
to leave resulted in self 
harm 
has shown 
himself to 
be a liar, 
untrustworth
y and 
unable to 
work as part 
of a team, if 
ever in a 
position of 
authority 
would be a 
bully. 
fear of 
being 
discipline
d led to 
OD 
C11     has been homesick 
throughout the course and 
misses young son 
          
C12       ill prepared for the rigours 
of training, has struggled 
and failed to adapt to 
infantry training. 
has struggled with 
different aspects of the 
course and has shown 
a high level of 
immaturity 
      
C13   lack the commitment to see him 
through the initial period of 
enlistment 
  failed to adapt to army 
life, found the initial loss 
of freedom hard to accept 
and did not adapt to the 
loss of privacy found in 
communal living 
        
C14         would support his 
return to the army in 
the future when he 
matures 
  joined 
because his 
brother was 
in the army 
  
C15       highly unusual individual 
who has totally failed to fit 
in with his peers or adapt 
to military life, has not 
coped with having to do 
things for himself.   
    Has irritated 
instructors 
and peers 
to such an 
extent that 
he has been 
removed 
from 
training and 
is 
supervised 
in HQ.  
Training 
that he did 
complete 
was poor 
with no 
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determinatio
n to 
succeed no 
chance of 
him ever 
passing 
basic 
should not 
be allowed 
to re-enlist 
C16       has struggled to come to 
terms with the loss of 
freedom and separation 
from the family 
his homesickness has 
been exacerbated by 
his lack of maturity 
      
C17 missed some training due to 
minor injury, made his 
intention to leave very clear 
in the first few days of 
training 
      he believes he made a 
mistake  in joining the 
army and believes that 
he has a lot more 
growing up to do before 
he re-enlists 
      
C18               been 
found 
positive 
on drugs 
test and 
had 
recent 
lapses in 
discipline 
C19       had some problems with 
his fitness and found 
settling in to army life 
hard to cope with.  While 
personable found rigours 
of infantry training difficult 
and needs to understand 
the concept of teamwork 
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C20       performed poorly in some 
aspects of the course, 
struggled to assimilate 
and apply much of the 
information taught him, 
his physical fitness is 
weak.  Decided that the 
army was not for him and 
dose not wish to give it 
any more of a chance 
        
C21     girlfriend sick in hospital 
carrying twins, feels he should 
be there supporting her, can 
not cope any more in the army 
due to worrying about his 
girlfriend 
          
C22     misses his family and friends 
and homesickness has set in 
          
C23     slightly homesick   immature       
C24   would need to show far more 
commitment to the army if he 
was to rejoin 
  found separation from 
son and girlfriend difficult 
to handle, does want to 
be a soldier but the 
thought of separation for 
operational tour would be 
detrimental to his family 
        
C25     he considers himself to have 
considerable personal 
problems 
      self-harmed 
during 
training, he 
has a 
history of 
self harm 
and psych 
services 
intervention 
as a child, 
totally 
unsuited to 
a military 
career at 
the 
moment, 
unfit army 
service 
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C26     suffered outside pressures to 
leave during the course 
he has had problems 
adapting to army life, he 
has had problems fitting 
into the Plt and Coy and 
this has led to his DAOR 
        
C27       had previously been in 
the army but DAORd 
before, not settled into the 
training regime and has 
been disruptive within the 
platoon.  
   Adamant that he does 
not want to be in the army 
and has adopted a 
completely negative 
attitude towards the 
training regime should be 
discharged UFAS and 
should not be allowed to 
re-enlist 
    
C28     he is homesick and has 
enjoyed no part of the course 
to date 
          
C29 fitness below par and 
something of a know-all, not 
sufficient backbone to stick 
out the course 
              
C30 failed training medical with 
heart murmur, took system 
12 weeks to investigate him 
at which point he had lost all 
interest to not being allowed 
to train 
          seen by 
child 
psychologic
al services 
at school 
  
C31 struggled with the immaturity 
of the younger recruits 
  has suffered homesickness, 
PLVVHV¶SDUWQHUDQGFKLOG 
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C32         he is immature and 
young, he is homesick 
and misses the relative 
freedoms of home life 
      
C33 physical demands have been 
to much for him to cope with 
  very homesick found discipline difficult to 
cope with 
very young and 
relatively immature 
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APPENDIX 5: STATA ANALYSIS (DO-FILES) 
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*Table 1: Demographic and social characteristics of sample (n=1000) 
 
summarize   
summarize age   
summarize heightm   
summarize WEIGHTKG  
summarize BMI  
tab q78ethnic fail 
tab q34 fail 
tab q42coll fail 
tab q68 fail 
  
Table 2: Training outcomes with reason for failure 
 
Data taken from training outcome data 
 
Table 3: Comparison of distribution of key factors in development 
(n=667) and test datasets (n=332) 
 
*use "Matt & Tony 1000.dta" 
sample 667, count 
gen dev=1 
sort ID 
save develop, replace 
clear 
use "Matt & Tony 1000.dta" 
sort ID 
merge ID using develop 
tabulate _merge 
rename _merge dataset 
recode dataset (3=1) (1=2) 
label define dataset 1 "develop" 2 "test" 
label values dataset dataset 
save "Matt & Tony 1000.dta" 
 
*run following on development and test dataset 
 
summarize   
summarize age   
summarize heightm   
summarize WEIGHTKG  
summarize BMI  
tab q78ethnic  
tab q34  
tab q42coll  
tab q68  
 
 
Table 4: Comparison of physical measurements by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
ttest  heightm, by(fail) 
ttest  WEIGHTKG, by(fail) 
hist BMI (BMI normally distributed) 
ttest  BMI, by(fail) 
 
Table 5: Comparison of family factors by outcome in development 
dataset 
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tabulate q4 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q33 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q34 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q35 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q3coll fail, chi2 row 
 
 
Table 6: Comparison of personal information by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate q55 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q77 fail, row 
ranksum q77, by(fail) 
tabulate q7coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q5coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q66age fail, row 
ranksum q66age, by(fail) 
tabulate q78ethnic fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q80coll fail, row 
ranksum q80coll, by(fail) 
 
Table 7: Comparison of education factors by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
tabulate q8 fail, row 
ranksum q8, by(fail) 
tabulate q12 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q69 fail, row 
ranksum q69, by(fail) 
tabulate q11coll fail, row 
ranksum q11coll, by(fail) 
tabulate q48coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q75skipped fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q75failed fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q42coll fail, row 
ranksum q42coll, by(fail) 
 
Table 8: Comparison of team activity factors by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
tabulate q10coll fail, row 
ranksum q10coll, by(fail) 
tabulate q21coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q62team fail, chi2 row 
 
Table 9: Comparison of outdoor activity factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate q54outdoor fail, row 
ranksum q54outdoor, by(fail) 
tabulate q54practical fail, row 
ranksum q54practical, by(fail) 
 
Table 10: Comparison of individual physical activity factors by outcome 
in development dataset 
 
tabulate q28 fail, row 
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ranksum q28, by(fail) 
 
tabulate q29 fail, row 
ranksum q29, by(fail) 
 
Table 11: Comparison of Individual non-physical activity factors by 
outcome in development dataset 
 
tabulate q26a fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q26b fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q26c fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q26d fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q36 fail, row 
ranksum q36, by(fail) 
tabulate q38 fail, row 
ranksum q38, by(fail) 
tabulate q39 fail, row 
ranksum q39, by(fail) 
tabulate q61 fail, row 
ranksum q61, by(fail) 
tabulate q46coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q54domestic fail, row 
ranksum q54domestic, by(fail) 
tabulate q54babysit fail, row 
ranksum q54babysit, by(fail) 
 
Table 12: Comparison of employment history factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate q13 fail, row 
ranksum q13, by(fail) 
tabulate q32 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q73 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q14coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q15coll fail, row 
ranksum q15coll, by(fail) 
tabulate q31coll fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q72coll fail, chi2 row 
 
Table 13: Comparison of behavioural history factors by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate q37 fail, row 
ranksum q37, by(fail) 
tabulate q41 fail, row 
ranksum q41, by(fail) 
tabulate q43 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q52 fail, row 
ranksum q52, by(fail) 
tabulate q57 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q58 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q67 fail, row 
ranksum q67, by(fail) 
tabulate q68 fail, row 
ranksum q68, by(fail) 
tabulate q70 fail, row 
ranksum q70, by(fail) 
tabulate q76 fail, row 
ranksum q76, by(fail) 
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tabulate q44coll fail, row 
ranksum q44coll, by(fail) 
 
Table 14: Comparison of coping behaviours by outcome in development 
dataset 
 
tabulate q18 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q24 fail, row 
ranksum q24, by(fail) 
tabulate q25 fail, row 
ranksum q25, by(fail) 
tabulate q59 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q60 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q74 fail, row 
ranksum q74, by(fail) 
tabulate qreligion fail, chi2 row 
 
Table 15: Comparison of group affiliation behaviours by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate q22 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q30 fail, row 
ranksum q30, by(fail) 
tabulate q40 fail, chi2 row 
tabulate q56 fail, row 
ranksum q56, by(fail) 
gen q63score=20-((q63a+q63b+q63c+q63d+q63e)-5) 
alpha q63a q63b q63c q63d q63e  
hist  q63score (q63score normally distributed so ttest used) 
ttest q63score, by (fail) 
tabulate q64 fail, row 
ranksum q64 if q64<6, by(fail) 
tabulate q65 fail, row 
ranksum q65, by(fail) 
tabulate q71 fail, row 
ranksum q71, by(fail) 
 
Table 16: Comparison of Drug and alcohol use history by outcome in 
development dataset 
 
tabulate qd1 fail, row 
ranksum qd1, by(fail) 
tabulate qd2 fail, row 
ranksum qd2, by(fail) 
tabulate qd3 fail, row 
ranksum qd3, by(fail) 
tabulate qd4 fail, row 
ranksum qd4, by(fail) 
tabulate qd5 fail, row 
ranksum qd5, by(fail) 
tabulate qd6 fail, row 
ranksum qd6, by(fail) 
tabulate qd7 fail, row 
ranksum qd7, by(fail) 
tabulate qd8 fail, row 
ranksum qd8, by(fail) 
tabulate qd9 fail, row 
ranksum qd9, by(fail) 
tabulate qd10 fail, row 
ranksum qd10, by(fail) 
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tabulate qd11 fail, row 
ranksum qd11, by(fail) 
tabulate qd12 fail, row 
ranksum qd12, by(fail) 
tabulate qd13 fail, row 
ranksum qd13, by(fail) 
tabulate qd14 fail, row 
ranksum qd14, by(fail) 
tabulate qd15 fail, row 
ranksum qd15, by(fail) 
tabulate drugs fail, row 
ranksum drugs, by(fail) 
tabulate nocan fail, row 
ranksum nocan, by(fail) 
tabulate qa1audit fail, row 
ranksum qa1audit, by(fail) 
 
 
Table 17: Variables shortlisted for inclusion in in the multivariable 
logistic regression model (development dataset) 
 
  Table created from above findings  
  
Table 18: Predictive model factors associated with training outcome 
after adjustment for each other (development dataset) 
 
Round 1 
 
*FULL MODEL - ALL 21 COVARIATES INCLUDED; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4; 
est store A; 
*SUBSEQUENT MODELS WITH EACH COVARIATE IN TURN REMOVED; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71  i.qd4 if q65!=.; 
est store C; 
lrtest A C; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74  i.q65 i.qd4 if q71!=.; 
est store D; 
lrtest A D; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25  i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
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i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24  
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q76!=.; 
est store I; 
lrtest A I; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
 
Round 2 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4; 
est store A; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
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xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q15!=.; 
est store P; 
lrtest A P; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q77!=.; 
est store U; 
lrtest A U; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.q65 i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 3 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
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i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if q71!=.; 
est store D; 
lrtest A D; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25  i.q71 i.qd4 if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24  
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q76!=.; 
est store I; 
lrtest A I; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
 
Round 4 
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xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q15!=.; 
est store P; 
lrtest A P; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q77!=.; 
est store U; 
lrtest A U; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q76 i.q17coll i.q24 
i.q25 i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 5 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
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lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q71!=.; 
est store D; 
lrtest A D; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25  
i.q71 i.qd4 if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24  
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
 
Round 6 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
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i.q71 i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q15 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q15!=.; 
est store P; 
lrtest A P; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q77 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q77!=.; 
est store U; 
lrtest A U; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q77 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 7 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q71!=.; 
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est store D; 
lrtest A D; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25  
i.q71 i.qd4 if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24  
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.q71 i.qd4 if q15!=.; 
est store P; 
lrtest A P; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
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lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.q71 i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 8 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.qd4 if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24  
i.q74 i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
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i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q15!=.; 
est store P; 
lrtest A P; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q15 i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 
i.q74 i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
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xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.qd4 
if q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24  i.q74 
i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q24!=.; 
est store G; 
lrtest A G; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
294 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q24 i.q25 i.q74 
i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 10 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 if 
qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q74!=.; 
est store E; 
lrtest A E; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
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q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 if 
q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.q74 i.qd4 
if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 11 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q25!=.; 
est store F; 
lrtest A F; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q25 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
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est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.q25 i.qd4 if 
WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 12 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
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est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q69!=.; 
est store Q; 
lrtest A Q; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll i.q69 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
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xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
q42coll!=.; 
est store R; 
lrtest A R; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 i.q42coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 14 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
299 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q73!=.; 
est store N; 
lrtest A N; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q73 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if 
WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 15 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
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i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q68!=.; 
est store J; 
lrtest A J; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q68 i.q17coll i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 16 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q31!=.; 
est store O; 
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lrtest A O; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q31 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 17 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q80coll 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail WEIGHTKG i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if WEIGHTKG!=.; 
est store W; 
lrtest A W; 
 
Round 18 
 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
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i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q80coll 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q80coll!=.; 
est store T; 
lrtest A T; 
xi:logistic fail i.q80coll i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
lrtest A V; 
 
Round 19 
 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll if qd4!=.; 
est store B; 
lrtest A B; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.qd4 if q17coll!=.; 
est store H; 
lrtest A H; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q67!=.; 
est store K; 
lrtest A K; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q37 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q57!=.; 
est store L; 
lrtest A L; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 
i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q37!=.; 
est store M; 
lrtest A M; 
xi:logistic fail i.q4  
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q11!=.; 
est store S; 
lrtest A S; 
xi:logistic fail i.q11 
i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 if q4!=.; 
est store V; 
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lrtest A V; 
 
xi:logistic fail i.q4 i.q11 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4 
 
 
Table 19: Accuracy of prediction in test dataset 
 
xi:logistic fail2 i.q4 i.q11 i.q37 i.q57 i.q67 i.q17coll i.qd4, 
coef; 
gen zed=-.255516+(-6179765*_Iq4_2)+(-
0.6209054*_Iq4_3)+(0.2966278*_Iq4_4)+(0.3715339*_Iq11coll_2) 
+(0.6853131*_Iq11coll_3)+(-0.6441025*_Iq37_2)+(-
0.5367342*_Iq37_3)+(-0.4412237*_Iq37_4)+(0.6532425*_Iq57_2) 
+(-
0.0921207*_Iq57_3)+(0.1058099*_Iq57_4)+(0.1771966*_Iq57_5)+(0.2
65794*_Iq67_2)+(-0.0913999*_Iq67_3) 
+(-0.5886231*_Iq67_4)+(0.4331621*_Iq67_5)+(-
0.5051842*_Iq17coll_2)+(-
0.0417124*_Iqd4_2)+(0.6248513*_Iqd4_3); 
gen risk=(1/(1+(exp(-zed)))); 
 
*calculating a new variable preddec that places subjects in 
predicted value deciles; 
egen predcut = cut(risk), group(10); 
 
*reports mean predicted value in each decile; 
mean risk, over (predcut); 
 
*reports proportion of group with outcome (i.e. observed); 
tab predcut fail2; 
 
 
Table 20: Receiver operating curve on test dataset 
 
roctab fail2 risk, graph summary detail; 
 
 
Table 21: Sensitivity and specificity (test dataset)  
 
 
gen cut00=risk 
recode cut00(min/.1461491=0)(.1492777/max=1) 
gen cut01=risk 
recode cut01(min/.2135306=0)(.2185863/max=1) 
gen cut02=risk 
recode cut02(min/.2507335=0)(.2529496/max=1) 
gen cut03=risk 
recode cut03(min/.2913713=0)(.2939135/max=1) 
gen cut04=risk 
recode cut04(min/.3308644=0)(.334787/max=1) 
gen cut05=risk 
recode cut05(min/.3792795=0)(.3825074/max=1) 
gen cut06=risk 
recode cut06(min/.402624=0)(.4080716/max=1) 
gen cut07=risk 
recode cut07(min/.4401153=0)(.4443169/max=1) 
gen cut08=risk 
recode cut08(min/.4920982=0)(.5028661/max=1) 
gen cut09=risk 
recode cut09(min/.61968=0)(.6256762/max=1) 
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diagt  fail2 cut00  
diagt  fail2 cut01  
diagt  fail2 cut02  
diagt  fail2 cut03 
diagt  fail2 cut04 
diagt  fail2 cut05 
diagt  fail2 cut06  
diagt  fail2 cut07  
diagt  fail2 cut08  
diagt  fail2 cut09 
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